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Abstract
Encryption is very much a vast subject covering myriad techniques to conceal
and safeguard data and communications. Of the techniques that are available,
methodologies that incorporate the number theoretic transforms (NTTs) have gained
recognition, specically the new Mersenne number transform (NMNT). Recently, two
new transforms have been introduced that extend the NMNT to a new generalised
suite of transforms referred to as the generalised NMNT (GNMNT). These two
new transforms are termed the odd NMNT (ONMNT) and the odd-squared NMNT
(O2NMNT).
Being based on the Mersenne numbers, the GNMNTs are extremely versatile with
respect to vector lengths. The GNMNTs are also capable of being implemented
using fast algorithms, employing multiple and combinational radices over one or
more dimensions. Algorithms for both the decimation-in-time (DIT) and -frequency
(DIF) methodologies using radix-2, radix-4 and split-radix are presented, including
their respective complexity and performance analyses.
Whilst the original NMNT has seen a signicant amount of research applied to it
with respect to encryption, the ONMNT and O2NMNT can utilise similar techniques
that are proven to show stronger characteristics when measured using established
methodologies dening diusion. Analyses in diusion using a small but reasonably
sized vector-space with the GNMNTs will be exhaustively assessed and a comparison
with the Rijndael cipher, the current advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm,
will be presented that will conrm strong diusion characteristics.
Implementation techniques using general-purpose computing on graphics processing
units (GPGPU) have been applied, which are further assessed and discussed. Focus
is drawn upon the future of cryptography and in particular cryptology, as a
consequence of the emergence and rapid progress of GPGPU and consumer based
parallel processing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The perpetual evolution of technology continues to erode current encryption
algorithms owing to performance increases and evolving architectures. Universally,
more and more devices are being invented that rely upon the ability to communicate
wirelessly [1{4] to name but a few. Whilst there are methodologies in place to
help protect these devices from unauthorised access, this does not imply that
such methodologies and their underlying algorithms are infallible to breaches of
security. In fact, the strongest algorithm will always be a victim of its weakest
component, which for proven algorithms is invariably the user's choice of password.
Unfortunately, there is no amount of research that is comparable to spending time
instructing the user of the importance of deriving and applying passwords that are
both robust and varied.
Historically, encryption was generally reserved for communications where
messages were to be either sent or broadcast across an unsecured channel. In
this instance, a channel can mean any medium, including transportation and
radio-wave. With the large amounts of data that companies began to accrue,
commercial encryption found its way into storage mediums that are accessible to
one or more individuals. Subsequently, this led to consumer-based encryption,
allowing the home user to encrypt les for their protection should a device be
lost or stolen. With the advance of the mobile phone revolution - where both
communications and storage are encrypted - the number of such online devices will
soon outnumber the world's population, it can be said now that the requirement
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for encryption is ubiquitous.
There are two aspects to protecting one's communication and data: security
and cryptography. Whilst security follows a protocol that determines what goes
where, when and how, cryptographic algorithms that encrypt and decrypt provide
the methods of applying such security. An example of how the security aspect is
applied could be as simple as which algorithm to use when sending a key to decrypt
the data, or in writing policies that direct users how to derive new keys and how
frequently they should be derived (usually always) and, importantly, ensuring that
all keys are kept condential. The encryption algorithm on the other hand, is
usually publically known and often heavily analysed, both ensuring and asserting
the robustness of such algorithms. The strongest algorithms have a completely
transparent architecture that neither hides secrets nor provides `back doors' that
will oer a way to bypass the security and allow decryption without a valid key.
The current de facto algorithm for providing encryption and decryption is the
advanced encryption algorithm (AES), which has been in used since its ratication
in 2001 [5]. Since this time, despite numerous attacks and analyses directed at
this algorithm, it continues to show resilience. The obvious question is why should
alternatives be sought if the original AES has not yet been compromised? As
previously highlighted, the eects of new technology continue to diminish current
techniques, albeit at an exceedingly slow rate. Nevertheless, if a method is
discovered to break the algorithms that are currently in use, a requirement to
switch to backup algorithms would be precluded if no viable alternatives can be
readily accessed. In addition, with the ever increasing size of data that is retained
by both industry and the consumer, dependence in stronger methods that can
better serve to protect this data may be required in future.
There are many types of encryption algorithms, which are selected depending
on the task at hand. These types fall into two main categories: symmetric (private
key) and asymmetric (public key). Symmetric based encryption algorithms are
usually based upon stream or block ciphers, where speed is a major requirement
without sacricing security. Such algorithms will use the same key to decrypt
as that used to encrypt. However, asymmetric based encryption algorithms are
usually derived through a mathematical problem where numbers (or keys) are
paired using a mathematical technique. While such techniques are extremely
resilient to attacks and analysis, they are notoriously slow in contrast to their
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symmetric counterparts. They do however oer unique functions such as signing
and key exchange operations.
1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Thesis
The aims and objectives of this work are to rst analyse work that has previously
been undertaken in this subject. This analysis will dictate the direction of
the research and help to inform the development of new transforms that can
also provide and extend the properties of the original new Mersenne number
transform (NMNT) [6, 7], with the benets of making it more resilient to
cryptanalysis. These new transforms are known as the odd-NMNT (ONMNT) and
the odd-squared-NMNT (O2NMNT), which extends the original NMNT into the
generalised new Mersenne number transform (GNMNT) [8], the taxonomy of which
is shown in Figure 1.1.
These transforms have a long and versatile power of two, which is unfound
in other transforms like the Fermat number transform (FNT) [9] and the original
Mersenne number transform (MNT) [10]. The latter transforms have short
transform lengths that are rigid and inexible in size and thus have very limited
scope.
Like the NMNT, the GNMNTs can be derived using fast algorithms. Although
there has been previous development with deriving fast algorithms for the new
transforms of the GNMNT - particularly in the one dimensional aspect - supporting
literature is extremely limited and consequently incomplete [8, 11]. Current work
aims to address these shortcomings by deriving fast algorithms that include the
radix-2, radix-4 and split-radix using both decimation-in-time (DIT) and -frequency
(DIF) methodologies. Complexity analysis will be provided and, together with
performance metrics, these algorithms will be further analysed.
In addition to the fast algorithms for applications using single-dimensional
implementations, row-column implementations have been derived to provide
two-dimensional implementations through inclusion of the separable algorithm.
These algorithms are validated using two dimensional convolution techniques
followed by demonstrations using two-dimensional encryption examples.
A major technique used in cryptanalysis is assessing the diusion properties
known as the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) [12{14]. These properties will
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Figure 1.1: Taxonomy of the GNMNT
be performed in the rst instance by doing an exhaustive test, simulating every
possible vector input of a pre-determined size and applying the series of tests on
each vector. Previously, this would have taken approximately 8.5 years using C
and a single processor thread. However, with the advent of parallel processing
techniques that are available using consumer grade graphics cards [15, 16], such
tests become a very much more realistic goal in terms of a modest two days.
1.3 Contributions
There are four main areas that have been addressed within this thesis, which are:
 The new transforms collectively known as the GNMNT, including fast
algorithms applied to the one-dimensional case
 Derivation of the ONMNT for two-dimensional applications
 Assessment of the diusion as an exhaustive simulation and against a series
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of vectors using the relevant aspects of the advanced encryption algorithm
(AES) for comparison
 Implementations of the GNMNT using graphics processing units (GPUs) for
parallel processing techniques.
1.4 Publications Arising From This Research
1. Boussakta, S.; Hamood, M.T.; Rutter, N., \Generalized New Mersenne
Number Transforms," Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, vol.60, no.5,
pp.2640-2647, May 2012.
2. Rutter, N.; Boussakta, S.; Bystrov, A., \Assessment of the One-Dimensional
Generalized New Mersenne Number Transform for Security Systems,"
Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC Spring), 2013 IEEE 77th, pp.1-5, 2-5
June 2013.
1.5 Thesis Outline
This thesis consists of seven chapters, each of which is described in this section.
Chapter 2 will introduce the background of cryptography. During the course of
this chapter, dierent types of methodologies will be covered along with their
appropriate applications. This chapter will briey touch upon the NMNT, which
has previously been researched for use in encryption techniques.
After this brief introduction, Chapter 3 will formally introduce the NMNT and
the new GNMNT transforms that were developed in [8]. During this chapter, notes
of particular interest will be presented that will be relevant in proceeding chapters.
Chapter 4 will expand upon previous work that was undertaken during the
development of the fast algorithms by introducing new techniques that build from
radix-2 including radix-4 and split-radix DIT and DIF derivations. This chapter
will also assess the complexities and performances of each of these new derivations
and compare the ndings with previous methodologies.
A natural progression is to expand the fast algorithms to row-column derivations,
where work that was presented in Chapter 4 will be applied and converted to
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two-dimensions in using newly adapted separable algorithms for the GNMNT in
Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 introduces cryptanalysis techniques and introduce the SAC. Using
the SAC, the new transforms will be assessed for their suitability for inclusion
within encryption algorithms. Initially, an assessment over a small but practical
and exhaustive range of vectors will be undertaken. Upon comparing the results, a
stripped down version of the AES will then be tested alongside the GNMNT using
identical vectors. This implementation of the AES does not contain any password
or round key functions so as to attain a true raw diusion measurement.
Finally, conclusions and suggestions for further work will be presented in
Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will introduce a small cross-section of applications that rely upon
encryption, during which some examples will be provided including some best
practices. A breakdown of the composition of encryption system will presented,
including key, cipher and mode types. The discussion includes the process of
determining the AES and a brief breakdown of each cipher. This chapter will also
introduce new and emerging technologies that could undermine current and future
systems prior to presenting a summary.
2.2 Encryption Applications
Security is ubiquitous in todays emerging technology. Encryption algorithms can be
found in many devices that are taken for granted on a day to day basis, frequently
and most likely without the user's knowledge that it has ever been implemented in
the rst place. As an example, use of mobile phones now extends to approximately
7 billion reported users and 3.5 billion reported unique subscribers [17], representing
approximately 50% of the global population [18]. A vast majority of these users
will not even consider the concept of encryption, never mind whether or not their
phone calls are protected or not. Additionally, we can also nd encryption in
wireless sensors and electronic wearable devices such as the smart watches and
heart-rate monitors for example [2, 19]; such devices are a fast-growing trend and
mobile smart phones are regularly used to process the signals. However, there
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are also reports that these sensor signals are currently not being encrypted, which
could potentially be exposing both private data and processing devices that may
otherwise be unprotected and vulnerable to attacks [20].
In addition to the requirements of security within a communicational
environment, there is also a requirement for the encryption of stored data,
whether it is for personal or commercial usage. Within a commercial environment,
the protection of documents containing strategies and nancial accounts that are
pertinent to the livelihood of the business is not only desirable, but may well be
a requirement by law, depending on the actual type of data and particularly if it
relates to client information [21{23]. This need will become more prevalent with
the evolution of cloud computing, where consumer computing requirements will be
virtualised and processed across the Internet, including cloud storage [24{28].
However, it is still important that local storage is adequately protected, whether
it is encrypted databases, implementing hard drives with built-in encryption or
even backup solutions. The importance of such is exemplied with the data storage
trends that are now referred to as big data [29], where electronic data is being
generated and stored at an exponential rate [30]. This trend has opened new
markets and research where new types of technologies are being researched and
developed to accommodate our ever expanding storage requirements. According
to [31], this is growing at a rate of approximately 2.5 EB / day and where [30]
believes that the digital universe will reach a size of 40 ZB by the year 2020. As we
are connecting more devices to the internet [32] and using increasingly faster link
speeds, the amount of data that we are moving is also increasing [33]. These trends
can and will no doubt impact on the way we manage data, which should obviously
be protected using encryption.
The most important aspects of encryption are to use using the appropriate
scheme and degree of security for the job and to always use dierent keys. For
example, long-term security requires strong encryption whereas short-term security
should use a less secure system. The reason for this is through building cribs or
clues from intercepted messages where known cipher texts had their corresponding
plaintexts known. This opens up the cipher to a known plaintext attack (KPA). An
example of this was when the same extremely strong encryption that was used for
priority communications was also used for encrypting weather and status reports
during World War II where messages were often duplicated using dierent daily
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keys [34]. Likewise, having an important understanding on the application of keys
is paramount, namely that keys should be both strong and unique, consist of many
unique and special characters wherever possible and be unique to each site, message
or application. Thus, should a key be compromised, damage would be limited to
the site, message or application that is attributed to that key. This practice is
further exemplied in [35], which goes on to emphasise that this is generally the
weakest part of an encryption scheme and that users should be trained accordingly
about the importance of key management.
2.3 Encryption Types
Encryption systems are generally categorised as falling into two distinct elds;
symmetric (private key) and asymmetric (public key). The symmetric system uses
the same key to decrypt that was used to encrypt and is always kept private, hence
the reason it is also called private key encryption. Conversely, systems that are
derived using asymmetric keys use two keys; a private key and a public key, which
give name to these types of systems as the public key encryption schemes. Systems
that were rst derived used symmetric keys and so will be covered rst.
2.3.1 Symmetric Keys
Systems using symmetric keys date all the way back to ancient times, where it has
been shown that Julius Caesar used encryption for communications. This is known
today as the Caesar Cipher [36]. It is a letter substation system where letters
of the message were substituted by letters a number of places either forwards or
backwards: modulo 26. This oset was the key and literature records that Julius
Caesar's preference was to use a key that was three letters to the right. All that
was then required to decrypt the message would be to reverse the operation by
substituting the letters in the opposite direction, which in Caesars case would be
three letters to the left. An example of this cipher is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Letter Indexing for Caesar Cipher with Key = 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
In A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Out D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C
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A major problem with this scheme, other than the existence of such a weak key,
was that cryptanalysis would be easy by determining letter substitutions through
letter frequencies. This was overcome with the Vigenere Cipher, where a repeating
passphrase was used instead, the cipher was later broken by Babbage [37]. Whilst it
was a much stronger system in comparison to the Caesar Cipher, it will nevertheless
still be regarded as a toy system by todays standards. Examples of this cipher
system in operation can be seen in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Further dissemination of
this encryption type will be provided further in block ciphers in Section 2.4.2.
2.3.2 Asymmetric Keys
The asymmetric encryption scheme uses two keys; a public key to encrypt, hence
the moniker public key encryption, and the corresponding private key to decrypt.
It was invented in 1978 by [38] where an algorithm called RSA was developed and
published, based on the initial of each of the inventors surnames. A similar system
was invented in 1975 but because it was developed under classied circumstances,
there was no mention of it until it was declassied in 1997 [39]. Although it is
not as fast as symmetric encryption, owing to the complexity of the calculations,
for applications where a reasonably small encryption message, such as a key for
a symmetric system that is required to be communicated, it is an ideal solution
for communicating over an exposed public channel. Similar schemes have been
developed that signicantly increase security, such as the elliptic curve encryption
system as shown in Table 2.4 from [40]. However, one of the biggest issues with
this system that can also be obtained from [40] is that it is an inaccessible system
to implement given that it is protected by over 130 patents.
Table 2.2: Encryption Using Vigenere Cipher
t h i s i s t o p s e c r e t
P A S S W O R D P A S S W O R +
i h a k e g k r e s w u n s k
Table 2.3: Decryption Using Vigenere Cipher
i h a k e g k r e s w u n s k
P A S S W O R D P A S S W O R  
t h i s i s t o p s e c r e t
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2.3.2.1 Factorisation Problem
The factorisation problem is based around a large modulus whose generation is
based upon two prime numbers. During the operation of constructing the modulus,
two keys are created that are linked to the modulus within a nite eld. This is
best described by using the RSA algorithm, which demonstrates the fundamentals
behind this type of encryption system. It is based on the factorisation problem
where two primes are selected, p and q; the product of these primes is calculated
such that
n = pq: (2.1)
The modulus for all future computations within the encryption algorithm will be
n. The totient is then calculated so that
' = (p  1)(q   1): (2.2)
A public key e is selected such that e < n and the greatest common divisor of e
and ' is equal to 1 such that
gcd(e; ') = 1: (2.3)
The private key d is calculated as the inverse of the public key, e 1 modulo the
totient ' as
d = e 1 mod ': (2.4)
Encryption is performed using
c = me mod n (2.5)
and similarly, decryption is performed by
m = cd mod n: (2.6)
Table 2.4: NIST Recommended Key Sizes
Key Size (bits)
Symmetric RSA and Die-Hellman Elliptic Curve
80 1024 160
112 2048 224
128 3072 256
192 7680 384
256 15360 521
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This algorithm is relatively simple to implement, with the main requirement being
the ability to perform calculations on very large numbers based upon the size of the
modulus being used. It is a fairly fast algorithm when used with small key sizes,
although the security of RSA is weak in contrast to symmetric based encryption
algorithms due to the size of the key required to oer comparable strength in
security. For example, a symmetric key size of 256 bits would be comparable to an
RSA key size of 15360 bits as previously shown from [40] in Table 2.4.
2.3.2.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is another asymmetric method [41].
However, instead of building problems based upon factorisation it is instead based
around logarithms. To demonstrate, the DLP is based upon solving the problem
x   mod p (2.7)
for x such that
x = log  mod p (2.8)
having previously disclosed ,  and p. The problem of solving x is deemed to
be very dicult. When this problem is applied over a cyclic nite group Z=pZ
over modulo p, which has been created using a generator, then there exists a
multiplicative inverse that is dicult to derive as each element is the result of
raising the generator to a power up to p   2 modulo p. For example, if  = 2,
x = 7 and p = 17 then 27 = 128, which results in 27  17. The multiplicative eld
(Z=pZ) is dened as
(Z=pZ) = f1; 2; : : : ; p  1g : (2.9)
This eld is computed from 0 to p 2 providing p  1 elements using generator 
as
(Z=pZ) =

0; 1; : : : ; p 2
	
: (2.10)
The eld is calculated up to p  2 because
p 1  1 mod p: (2.11)
12
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Should, for example, p = 17 with (Z=pZ) = f1; 2; : : : ; p  1g and generator  = 7
is used then
(Z=pZ) =

70; 71; 72; 73; 74; 75; 76; 77; 78; 79; 710; 711; 712; 713; 714; 715
	
: (2.12)
When this eld is calculated over mod p, it becomes
(Z=pZ) = f1; 7; 15; 3; 4; 11; 9; 12; 16; 10; 2; 14; 13; 6; 8; 5g : (2.13)
When x = 11 is applied to (2.7) then 711  14 mod 17. The problem then lies
within solving x with knowledge of alpha,  and p such that
x = log mod p: (2.14)
However, as p increases it becomes extremely dicult to derive x from  and .
2.3.2.3 Die-Hellman Key Exchange
One of the most common applications for asymmetric cryptography is the
Die-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol that was rst published by [42]. Again
like RSA [43], a similar system was developed previously but as it was developed
under classied circumstances, it was unable to be published at that time [39].
The DH scheme is usually used to exchange symmetric keys, which are generally
preferred over asymmetric keys as they are typically faster than asymmetric
systems. Based on the DLP, it provides a method for two parties to communicate
with each other without exposing decryption keys. Both parties will decide upon
a multiplicative eld over a prime, (Z=pZ) and a generator, . Each party will
derive an ephemeral or temporary key in the range 1 < k < p   1 and apply it to
the generator as
KA = 
ka mod p for 0 < ka < p  1 (2.15)
and
KB = 
kb mod p for 0 < kb < p  1: (2.16)
Each party sends each other KA and KB and by applying their private keys they
can both derive the same shared session key
(KA)
ka = Sk = (KB)
kb : (2.17)
13
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This works because 
kb
ka
=

ka
kb
: (2.18)
This method of key exchange is very secure and underpins how private
communications are established across the Internet, albeit in RSA form where
it has been adapted to the factorisation problem.
2.3.2.4 ElGamal Encryption
In 1985, Taher ElGamal developed an encryption scheme that was based on the
DLP [44]. Being based on the DLP, it also shares similarities with the DH key
exchange system [42], particularly the sharing of the `secret'. Both Alice and Bob
agree upon a large prime p and generator  over the multiplicative group (Z=pZ).
Alice then selects a random integer ka such that 1 < ka < p  1 and sends to Bob
the derivation of
KA = 
ka mod p (2.19)
Bob receives the value derived in (2.19) and himself derives a random key kb from
1 < kb < p   1. Representing the message m in the range 0; 1; : : : ; p   1 he then
derives
 = kb mod p (2.20)
and
 = mKkbA mod p (2.21)
sending c = (; ) to Alice. Upon receiving c, Alice uses her private key a to derive
p 1 ka mod p (2.22)
which because
p 1 ka =  ka (2.23)
this operation is equivalent to deriving  kakb . Alice can now decode the message
by
m =  a mod p: (2.24)
2.3.2.5 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was developed in 1985 independently by [45]
and [46]. Schemes using elliptic curves are based around the elliptic curve discrete
14
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logarithm problem (ECLDP). Similar to the LDP, the ECC uses a logarithm
problem. However, it accomplishes this by using points that exist along an elliptic
curve dened as
E : y2  x3 + ax+ b mod p (2.25)
where a; b 2 Z=pZ are user parameters used to dene the curve over a eld dened
by prime Z=pZ, p > 3. This eld contains coordinate pairs (x; y) 2 Z=pZ and an
imaginary point O, which is used to denote the point at innity. The validity of
the curve is dependent on satisfying
4a3 + 27b2 6 0 mod p: (2.26)
All the calculations for determining the coordinates of the points are carried out
from G, which is provided to dene Gx and Gy . This is the generator point and is
used to dene all of the other points. The problem is then dened as
Q = dG mod p (2.27)
where d is selected randomly and is in the range 2  d < p   2. Equation
(2.27) then produces Q, the public key. Determining d with only knowledge of
Q is therefore intractable if the eld is large enough. It should be noted that
technically points are not multiplied directly but instead repetitively added, for
which there are two distinct operations: adding and doubling. However, these
are not straightforward operations, as may be implied, as the line must rst be
characterised by its gradient. This can accomplished by rst deriving s as
s =
y2   y1
x2   x1 mod p (2.28)
if the point is to be added with another point or
s =
3x21 + a
2y1
mod p (2.29)
if the point is to be doubled, i.e. P + P or 2P . These operations can be better
visualised in Figure 2.2. Addition is shown by adding points P and Q and drawing
a line that intersects these points and continues until it hits the next part of the
curve. At the point where the line meets the next part of the curve, a vertical line
is drawn through the y = 0 axis until it reaches the curve again, denoting the actual
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Figure 2.1: Addition and Doubling Operations in the Elliptic Curve
position of the addition. Point doubling is shown by drawing a line at a tangent to
the point V and continuing until it reaches the curve once more, characterised by
point E in Figure 2.2. Like the point addition, a vertical line is drawn through the
y = 0 axis until it reaches the curve once more, indicating the point 2V .
An important aspect of the division operations in (2.28) and (2.30) is that
because the operations are performed within a eld, the division should be
performed by multiplying with the multiplicative inverse instead. This can easily
be undertaken using the extended Euclidean algorithm or
x 1 = xp 2 mod p: (2.30)
The line characterised by s connects the two points that are to be added and
where the line intersects the curve, is the point mirrored across the x-axis. While
point doubling only uses a single point, the line is derived by forming a tangent
to the curve at the point, again noting where the line intersects the curve. These
operations are better visualised in Figure 2.1. The new point can then be then be
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Figure 2.2: The Field of Elliptic Curve Points for p = 19; a = 2; b = 2
derived by
x3 = s
2   x1  x2 mod p (2.31)
and
y3 = s (x1   x3) mod p: (2.32)
Subtraction can be achieved by using the reective point and then adding the two
points together such that if
P = (x1; y1) mod p (2.33)
then
 P = (x1; y1) mod p (2.34)
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such that
Q  P = (x2; y2)  (x1; y1) mod p
= (x2; y2) + (x1; y1) mod p:
(2.35)
The method for providing multiplication is provided by point addition and doubling,
where the number of steps is equivalent to the number of bits in the prime. This is
accomplished using the left to right method and is exemplied in Table 2.5. This
multiplication technique is applied as shown in (2.27) where Alice and Bob both
select a random private key 1 < k < g and performs
KA = kaG mod p (2.36)
and
KB = kbG mod p (2.37)
Sending each other their public keys, Alice and Bob apply their private keys similar
to (2.17) such that
kaKB mod p = Sk = kbKA mod p: (2.38)
Where Sk becomes the shared session key. Using curve P-192 that was dened by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [47] shown in Table
Table 2.5: Elliptic Curve Multiplication (13 P ) using Double and Add
Step Operation Result Representative
1 - P 12P
2a Double P + P 2P 102P
2b Add 2P + P 3P 112P
3 Double 3P + 3P 6P 1102P
4a Double 6P + 6P 12P 11002P
4b Add 12P + P 13P 11012P
Table 2.6: NIST Prime Elliptic Curve P-192
p192 = 6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961279
a = 6277101735386680763835789423207666416083908700390324961276
b = 2455155546008943817740293915197451784769108058161191238065
Gx = 602046282375688656758213480587526111916698976636884684818
Gy = 174050332293622031404857552280219410364023488927386650641
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2.6, we can perform the following example where
KA = kaG mod p
= 354684134338427178248341788335664844735957824203528261950
 (602046282375688656758213480587526111916698976636884684818;
174050332293622031404857552280219410364023488927386650641)
= (2933140742448625203731641248407683827818026042006007265108;
1342160346315844524113810504268757567486830356720401950124)
(2.39)
KB = kbG mod p
= 1799075742360715006265099004488067778762135129614130234431
 (602046282375688656758213480587526111916698976636884684818;
174050332293622031404857552280219410364023488927386650641)
= (4147123246579862628199761933154009809426422151451232702766;
4754143181055516863572102753585715493405392185760408272858)
(2.40)
Sk = kaKB mod p
= 354684134338427178248341788335664844735957824203528261950
 (4147123246579862628199761933154009809426422151451232702766;
4754143181055516863572102753585715493405392185760408272858)
= (472803943651158730618988180737355535665961855491617197373;
4253469622903940143028516631910075165803201780065008295480)
= kbKA mod p
= 1799075742360715006265099004488067778762135129614130234431
 (2933140742448625203731641248407683827818026042006007265108;
1342160346315844524113810504268757567486830356720401950124)
= (472803943651158730618988180737355535665961855491617197373;
4253469622903940143028516631910075165803201780065008295480)
(2.41)
As (2.41) shows that a common point on the curve has been established, the next
step would be to take the x-coordinate and process it through a typical hashing
algorithm, currently SHA-1. The resultant hash will then be used as the symmetric
key.
Of particular interest are reports that have been circulating recently suggesting
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that the curves oered by the NIST [47] have tainted curves and that they
contain known weaknesses or backdoors [48{50]. This has not only brought about
the removal of the perpetrated curve and technique, but also led to companies
posting advisories and removing support for these curves from their products and
applications, with the focus moving to curves that have been developed by the
cryptographic community [51{54].
2.4 Cipher Types
There are two distinct methods that underpin how a cipher text is produced. These
methods are stream or block ciphers. Each method has an appropriate method of
use and will be discussed accordingly.
2.4.1 Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers are derived by combining the plaintext and the key to derive a
cipher text, one bit at a time. This requires combining a key stream by adding it
to the plaintext modulo-2 or using the exclusive-or (XOR) operation. The main
focus therefore is how the key stream is derived. The most secure way of deriving
the key is via the one-time pad (OTP) where the key is pre-computed and used
only once. However, deriving one-time pads must be undertaken in advance and
will obviously require storage.
Another method, which is more commonly used, is the linear feedback shift
register (LFSR) and applications may use one or more of these. The LFSR works
by shuing a series of bits through a register, the length of which will contribute
to determining the periodicity of the register. Taps are taken at certain points of
the register and these values are added together modulo-2. The resultant value is
then placed at the beginning of the register when all the bits shue to the next
position. The key would therefore be determined by the initial state of the LFSR
prior to the commencement of the operation. All LFSRs are cyclic or periodic and
depending on their design determines their length and whether they can utilise the
full space, which would be 2n   1 values, where n is the number of bits it contains.
The only value that a running LFSR cannot produce is the value zero, as there
would be no way otherwise to change this value.
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Figure 2.3: A5/1 Cipher Scheme
2.4.1.1 A5/1
The A5/1 cipher that was initially used with GSM mobile phones was designed
using three dierent LFSRs of varying bit sizes [55]. It combines the output of
three LFSRs that are built of varying sizes and conguration that are derived from
the following polynomials
LFSR1 = x
19 + x5 + x2 + x+ 1 (2.42)
LFSR2 = x
22 + x+ 1 (2.43)
LFSR3 = x
23 + x15 + x2 + x+ 1: (2.44)
The LFSRs are constructed by using the rst term, the degree of the polynomial,
to determine the length of the LFSR and taking the taps at positions determined
by the remaining terms, applying it to the LFSR by reading left to right. Therefore
(2.42) would produce an LFSR with bit taps at positions 18, 17, 16 and 13. The
output from each LFSR is, as well as being used as a feedback, combined with the
outputs of the other LFSRs using addition modulo-2. The resultant bit is then used
Table 2.7: LFSR Clocking Behaviour for A5/1
Clocking Bit Movement
LFSR1 LFSR2 LFSR3 LFSR1 LFSR2 LFSR3
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
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as a key bit to apply to the plaintext stream. The conguration of this scheme is
shown in Figure 2.3 where the shaded bits are identied as the clocking bits. Each
LFSR is clocked according to the value of its clocking bit against the values of the
clocking bits in the other LFSRs. Movement occurs for an LFSR if its clocking bit
matches the clocking bit of one or more of the other LFSRs. How this would aect
the movement is shown in Table 2.7.
2.4.2 Block Ciphers
Block ciphers are currently the most common type of cipher in use today. While a
stream cipher encrypts the plaintext on a bit-by-bit basis, changing one of the bits
can only have an impact on that one bit. However, a block cipher is encrypted as
a group of bits and because of this, a change to any of the bits within the block
should have an impact on the remaining bits. An example of an encryption scheme
that uses this type of scheme is the data encryption standard (DES) [56].
Techniques relating to block encryption have previously been described as falling
into two distinct categories; confusion and diusion [12]. The confusion aspect is
generally regarded as replacing the bytes in the plaintext such that there is little
to no relationship with the key. This is either undertaken by a pre-calculated
lookup table where values have maximal separable distance, or functions that have
a non-linear element that will appear to sever the relationship. Diusion is the
process of using each input byte to aect and impact the other bytes in the input
and corresponding cipher text. The result of this would mean the smallest change
in the cipher text, or slightest alteration in the key would have a devastating
impact upon the rest of the cipher text and resultant plaintext.
2.4.2.1 Substitution Boxes
The substitution box or S-box is the core of the confusion operation, proving
a method to reversibly transpose incoming data. This can be in the form
of a mathematical function, for example where data is swapped-out with its
multiplicative inverse so that the original data can be retrieved by reversing the
process. Typically, these types of operations are carried out using a Galois eld
(GF ). In addition, they may also include processes that are non-linear so as to
resist linear analysis.
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2.4.2.2 Permutation Boxes
The job of the permutation box or P-box is to mix the bytes of the cipher text
around so that individual bits within each byte are spread and swapped with
the bits of the other bytes. This results in changes in a single bit having a
catastrophic impact on the whole of the cipher text. When used in conjunction
with S-boxes over a number of stages they are together usually referred to as a
substitution-permutation network (SPN) and are usually found in Feistel networks.
2.4.2.3 Feistel Networks
Feistel networks are structures that split the incoming cipher text into two or more
parts that are typically applied to one or more functions at each stage depending on
their classication, as generalised by [57]. The function facilitates the development
of new transforms based on these structures, and can incorporate many techniques
including S-boxes, Boolean functions and even transforms. The Feistel network was
implemented in the DES, which was ratied for use in 1977 and uses what is now
known as a classical Feistel network [56]. Other Feistel constructions include the
unbalanced, type-I, type-II and type-III Feistel networks [57] and are illustrated in
Figure 2.4.
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2.4.2.4 Transforms
Another example that can be used as both a method of confusion and diusion are
transforms. These include the Walsh-Hadamard transform (WHT) as used in [58],
the pseudo-Hadamard transform (PHT) as used in [59,60] and the number theoretic
transform (NTT) as used in [61], particularly the NMNT. Typically, the NTT is
a transform that is dened over a nite eld modulo a prime. The NMNT uses a
Mersenne prime, which while can be implemented using simple shifts and additions,
serves to be a very eective operator without the need for time-consuming divide
algorithms.
Recently, there is evidence of encryption systems that are derived using S-boxes
and P-boxes, which are substitution and permutation boxes respectively. These
methodologies are based around Shannon's ideals of message encryption to be based
on confusion and diusion [12]. The S-box, being the confusion aspect, replaces
a byte within the message with another byte that is determined by the function
of the box and the key. In order to resist cryptanalysis, it is important that this
stage is non-linear, otherwise a linear cryptanalysis (LC) attack could potentially
be applied. The importance of the P-box would be to then mix around the bits of
the cipher text so that individual bits within each byte become dependent on the
bits of other bytes that were also being encrypted. This helps to resist dierential
cryptanalysis (DC).
2.4.2.5 Data Encryption Standard
The DES was developed by IBM [62] and has since been extensively studied since
its publication for use in 1977 [63]. It is based on the classical Feistel construction
where the incoming code is split into two equal sized blocks and a single function
element is used to process each alternate block every round as shown in Figure 2.5.
Consisting of 16 rounds for each block, it is a very secure algorithm, even though it
uses a key that is too short by today's standards.
This algorithm was in use for over 20 years and precedes the advanced
encryption standard (AES). Curiously, whilst it uses a 64-bit block and takes a
64-bit key, it utilises only 56 bits of the key. The bits that aren't used as part of
the key are deemed parity bits, although it can be seen from the design that they
literally are not used.
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Figure 2.5: The DES Algorithm
The algorithm begins with a permutation function and ends with the inverse
permutation function as shown in Figure 2.6, helping to spread the bits across the
block during the encryption process and thus strengthening its diusion properties.
Following this, the algorithm then falls through 16 rounds of Feistel networks where
32 block bits are processed at any one time. The function depicted in Figure 2.7
consists of block expansion, where the 32 block bits being processed are expanded
to 48 bits. The key is processed as two 28-bit halves, where 56 bits are selected
from the initial key and permutated; the unused parts have no connections and are
shown as shaded. A new key is derived each round and this is achieved by rotating
each half and selecting a total of 48 bits from both halves via another permutation;
again showing the unused parts with no connections as shaded. This round key is
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Figure 2.6: Initial and Inverse Permutate Functions
added to the expanded block text modulo-2. The intermediately processed 56-bit
key is reused for repeating the rotation and permutation for each successive round
serving as the round key. After the key has been applied to the block, the result
is fed into eight six-input S-boxes that each have four outputs. This reduces the
cipher back to 32 bits. The S-box works by using the outer-most bits of the
input to select a row of a lookup table within. After selecting one of the four
rows using the outer bits, the inner four bits are then used to select the column
that contains the output. This is shown more clearly in Figure 2.8. The DES
encryption scheme has been one of the most studied encryption systems to date
and has emphasised new areas of cryptanalysis with respect to DC and LC [64{66].
However, these techniques were described in [67] where DC was previously known as
a \T attack". Additionally, all of the attention that DES has received has resulted
in ways to measure advances in technology and techniques in methodologies and
implementations where there have been repeated attempts to defeat DES in the
shortest amount of time possible using brute force attacks [68{71].
Prior to the introduction of AES, moves were made to strengthen DES,
accomplished by applying the algorithm three times in succession using three
dierent keys. This methodology was known as the triple data encryption
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Figure 2.7: The F-Box in DES Feistel Network with Round Key
algorithm (TDEA) and triple-DES (TDES) or (3DES) and eectively increased the
key size to 168 bits. This works by using three separate keys and by applying
c = DES fEk3 ; DES [Dk2 ; DES (Ek1 ;m)]g (2.45)
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Figure 2.8: An S-Box from DES
for encryption and
m = DES fDk1 ; DES [Ek2 ; DES (Dk3 ; c)]g (2.46)
for decryption where Ekn and Dkn represent the dierent encryption and decryption
keys respectively. This makes DES a signicantly stronger algorithm and remains
one of the more robust algorithms developed.
2.4.2.6 Advanced Encryption Standard
While DES was coming to its end of life, the department of Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) announced the development of the AES [72]. The
standard stated that the algorithm to be used was to be a block cipher that had a
128-bit block and variable keys sizes that include 128-, 192- and 256-bit derivations.
Rather than developing a standard behind closed doors that could possibly contain
any number of potential weaknesses, an open and inclusive approach was adopted
in the development of the standard by inviting the current leaders in the eld to
submit their ideas. As a result, twenty-one algorithms were submitted and fteen
were short-listed for the rst round [73]. By 2000 this number was reduced to ve
nalists [60,74{78]. One month after the nal conference in 2000, NIST announced
that Rijndael had been selected according to the cumulative decisions by the
attendees as shown in Table 2.8 [79] and it was adopted as the new encryption
standard [80].
As AES has now superseded DES as the accepted encryption standard for
United States commerce by NIST, it is seeing signicant attention. Probably one
of the biggest criticisms is that it doesnt contain enough rounds and that there
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should be at least 16, 20 or 28 rounds depending on whether the key is 128-, 192-
or 256-bits in size [81]. Nevertheless, it now remains the standard against which all
emerging encryption systems must measure themselves.
Rijndael uses the SPN and runs over 10, 12 or 14 rounds depending whether
the key size if 128-, 192- or 256-bits accordingly. It is arranged as a 4x4 block of
bytes and uses an S-box developed over GF (28) with an ane transform. Diusion
is further applied using the mix-rows and mix-columns, which entails the rotation
of each row by a successive number of times followed by an invertible matrix
multiplication of each column. Signicantly, Rijndael has been developed as a
series of byte operations rather than using full 32-bit words like other nalists.
This makes the algorithm very attractive for devices with limited processing. It
also allows for the majority of the calculations to be pre-processed in advance and
referred to in lookup tables.
The AES algorithm will be discussed more in depth in Chapter 6 where a
stripped-down version will be used without the password functionality in order to
measure it against other diusion techniques.
2.5 Mode Types
The encryption modes are techniques that are used within the encryption process
to make the resultant cipher more robust. Without these modes, cipher texts
would be easier to attack owing to techniques such as KPAs or known cipher-only
attacks (COA). This section will present the ve condentiality modes that have
been ratied as applicable for use with AES [82]. Additional modes have been
ratied for use with AES depending on the purpose including: authentication [83],
authenticated encryption [84], high-throughput authenticated encryption [85] and
storage [86]. As well as presenting the methodologies associated with each of the
Table 2.8: Votes for AES Selection
Algorithm Yes No Score
Rijndael 86 10 76
Serpent 59 7 52
Twosh 31 21 10
RC6 23 37 -14
MARS 13 84 -71
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condentiality modes, these modes are also depicted in Figure 2.9.
2.5.1 Electronic Code Book
The electronic code book (ECB) mode is the simplest of all the modes. It processes
the plain text one block at a time before encrypting it and therefore each cipher
block is completely independent from the others. This mode is not particularly
secure as patterns can occur should identical plaintext blocks be encrypted, which
will result in the production of identical cipher blocks. This is particularly prevalent
with content that is uncompressed where repetition is more common. The use of
ECB is strongly discouraged as it opens the underlying encryption system to KPAs.
The procedure for using ECB is
Cj = EK (Pj) for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n (2.47)
for encryption and
Pj = DK (Cj) for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n (2.48)
for decryption.
2.5.2 Cipher Block Chaining
Cipher block chaining (CBC) mode is similar to ECB mode except that before the
plaintext block is encrypted, it is added modulo-2 to the previous cipher text block.
However, In the case of the rst block where no previous cipher block yet exists,
an Initialisation Vector (IV) is used to ensure the integrity of the rst block. Both
ECB and CBC modes require that the underlying encryption system is capable of
decryption as well as encryption. The formula for using this mode is based on the
rst block being index as j = 1 and apply for encryption
C0 = IV
Cj = EK (Pj  Cj 1) for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n
(2.49)
and for decryption
C0 = IV
Pj = DK (Cj) Cj 1 for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
(2.50)
30
2.5 Mode Types
CiphertextENCKPlaintext
CiphertextENCK
Plaintext
Ciphertext DECK Plaintext
IV
CiphertextENCK
CiphertextENCK
Ciphertext DECK
Ciphertext DECK
Ciphertext DECK
Unsecure
Channel
CiphertextENCKIV
Unsecure
Channel
Plaintext
Plaintext
Plaintext
Plaintext
IV
Plaintext
Plaintext
CiphertextENCK
Plaintext
CiphertextENCK
Plaintext
Ciphertext ENCK IV
Plaintext
Ciphertext ENCK
Plaintext
Ciphertext ENCK
Plaintext
CiphertextENCKIV
Unsecure
Channel
Plaintext
CiphertextENCK
CiphertextENCK
Ciphertext ENCK IV
Plaintext
Ciphertext ENCK
Ciphertext ENCK
Plaintext
Plaintext
Plaintext
Plaintext
CiphertextENCKCTR1
Unsecure
Channel
Plaintext
CiphertextENCK
Plaintext
CiphertextENCK
Plaintext
Ciphertext ENCK CTR1
Plaintext
Ciphertext ENCK
Plaintext
Ciphertext ENCK
Plaintext
CTR2
CTRn
CTR2
CTRn
Electronic Code Book
Cipher Block Chaining
Output Feedback
Cipher Feedback
Counter
Unsecure
Channel
Figure 2.9: The Five Condentiality Encryption Modes Ratied for AES
A major disadvantage with this mode is that while the ECB mode will lose a
block should as little as a single bit be changed, with CBC mode the current and
following blocks will be destroyed. This would make it more sensitive in noisy
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channels. However, if the bit has been changed through cryptanalysis then this is
obviously going to be an advantage.
2.5.3 The Initialisation Vector and Streams
The CBC mode introduced a new variable, in the IV; its role is to apply
cryptographic `salt' that is a random number to be used only once. As such, this
may also be known as a `nonce' indicating that it is a number to be used only
once. When used correctly, it works as a safeguard to ensure integrity of the cipher
should the user choose the same password. The remaining three condentiality
modes will also use an IV, including the CTR mode where it will use each block,
incrementing each time. Protecting the IV is not necessary and it may well be
transmitted with the cipher. However, if it is desired that the IV is concealed,
using a public key system can help maintain condentiality. The following three
condentiality modes are designed such that the plaintext is applied to the system
after the block has been encrypted. As such, these modes can be used as steam
modes where only a desired number of bits will be taken from the encrypted
block and added modulo-2 to the plaintext to create the cipher. This means that
these modes require that the encryption system uses the encrypting algorithm only
because the decryption process is simply the repeat of the encryption process, but
with the desired number of bits from the encrypted block modulo-2 to the cipher,
thus producing the original plaintext. Therefore the decryption function in systems
using these modes is ultimately redundant.
2.5.4 Cipher Feedback
Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode is a very similar process to CBC mode but rather
than adding the plaintext and previous ciphertext (or the IV if it is the rst
block) modulo-2 prior to encryption, it is instead performed after encryption of the
previous cipher text (or IV if rst block). Encryption is performed
C0 = IV
Cj = EK (Cj 1) Pj for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
(2.51)
32
2.5 Mode Types
and decryption as
C0 = IV
Pj = EK (Cj 1) Cj for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
(2.52)
2.5.5 Output Feedback
The output feedback (OFB) mode is similar to CFB mode but with a minor
distinction that the output of the encrypted block is used in conjunction with the
key in subsequent encryption blocks rather than the resultant cipher. Again, it is
the result of these encrypted blocks that are added modulo-2 with plaintext block.
Alternatively, a selected number of bits may be used instead, which could therefore
turn this block encryption system into a stream encryption system. To process this
mode the following operations are used to set up the system
O0 = IV
Oj = EK (Oj 1) for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
(2.53)
then
Cj = Pj Oj (2.54)
for encryption and
Pj = Cj Oj (2.55)
for decryption.
2.5.6 Counter
The counter (CTR) mode is a method utilising an IV as the input to an encryption
system and subsequently incrementing it at each round. Like the CFB and OFB
modes, the encrypted block is added modulo-2 to the plaintext to create the cipher.
There are therefore no feedback operations in this mode, which means that many
ciphers can be processed in parallel. Encryption is performed
I = IV
Cj = EK (I + j   1)) Pj for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n
(2.56)
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and decryption as
I = IV
Pj = EK (I + j   1)) Cj for j = 1; 2; : : : ; n:
(2.57)
2.6 Hashes
Depending on the nature of the application, there are additional types of encryption
that may not necessarily perform a reversible operation in a manner that is expected.
These encryption types are referred to as hashes. Hashes are one-way methods,
typically containing between 128 and 512 bits and are used whenever a user sends or
receives content that requires conrmation of message integrity or authentication.
Typical examples of this are the message digests MD4 and MD5 [87,88], the secure
hash algorithms, SHA1 and SHA2 [89] and the newly ratied SHA3 [90], which
is currently in draft format. The hash operation is synonymous to encrypting a
message block by block and cumulatively combining the encrypted outputs, thus
resulting in what should be an irreversible process. The security of the hash value
and its underlying algorithm is the assurance that the hash value from one message
cannot be duplicated by manipulating a dierent message. When a method is
discovered to reproduce values this is called a collision and rapidly degrades the
value of the algorithm.
Hashes, when used with public key cryptography, can serve as an important
method of authentication as well as proving integrity. This is accomplished with
the sender rst deriving the hash of a message using the same previous methods.
However, upon deriving the hash, it is encrypted using the senders private key.
By decrypting the hash using the senders public key and verifying the hash, both
message integrity and authentication of source can be proven. For example, a user
may request a connection with a secure service and in doing so he sends his public
key to the service. The service responds by encrypting a session key with the
users public key, using previously agreed techniques relating to public key exchange
and requesting that the user provides authenticating details using the session key.
The user may then decrypt the session key using his matching private key and
encrypting his password with the provided session key. The encrypted password is
then passed through a hash function so that he can then send his user identication
and hash to the service. The service will be able to reliably verify the hash by
34
2.7 General Purpose Graphics Processing Unit Processing
recreating the same process using the users stored password. This adds enhanced
security by avoiding the actual password from traversing an unsecured channel.
The use of hashes in this manner is typically referred to as a message authentication
code (MAC) and embodies the integrity and authentication operation.
2.7 General Purpose Graphics Processing Unit
Processing
In 2006, NVIDIA announced the software development kit (SDK) to their
proprietary compute unied device architecture (CUDA) [91], inspiring researchers
and developers to push the boundaries of their developments to new architectures
using graphics cards [92{94]. Meanwhile, AMD were working on their solution, close
to metal, which was released in November the same year [95]. Two years later the
Khronos Compute Working Group was formed [96] leading to the release of their
Open Computer Language (OpenCL) [97], which although originally developed
by Apple, was supported by both AMD and NVIDIA. These two architectures
epitomise what we know today as general processing graphics processing unit
(GPGPU) processing.
Cell processors in the Sony Playstation 3, which contain accessible compute
engines for the graphics, were also discovered to be fully available to system
developers [98]. In 2008, a researcher in the eld of astrophysics formed a cluster, in
which eight of these units were interconnected, costing less than two simulations on
an available supercomputer [99]. Unfortunately, while Sony once participated and
encouraged the use of their platforms for this purpose, they have since shut down
this resource to developers [100], currently leaving CUDA and OpenCL as the two
main contenders. However, the topic of GPGPU is currently an extremely vibrant
area, with frequent publications describing new achievements; such as the ability to
brute force every Windows NTLM hash derived from every possible eight-character
password, based upon 52 letters (upper- and lower-case), 10 digits and 31 special
characters [101]. This is a very realistic supposition as should the hacker gain
access to the Windows password le, then they would be able to process some 938
guesses in under 6 hours to determine the containing passwords.
GPGPU processing involves using a number of graphics cards, between one
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and four, within a desktop computer as a single host that can execute a users
program. Kernels are developed using the appropriate development system and
uploaded to the graphics card(s) along with datasets and parameters, including
the number of threads that are to be executed. These kernels can be executed
either synchronously, where the host program waits for the kernel to complete; or
asynchronously, where an interrupt can be generated within the host program upon
completion. Using graphics cards in this manner can be extremely benecial as they
are naturally highly parallel by design for their primary function to process graphical
requirements; they are compact and have very low power requirements as opposed
to their thoroughbred supercomputer counterparts [102]. Moreover, because these
graphics cards are designed to be implemented in reasonably low-power hosts,
they are massively energy ecient in terms of giga oating point operations per
second (GFLOPS) per Watt, in comparison to other supercomputing topologies.
Applications that exploit the potential of GPGPU are known as heterogeneous
computing, owing to the signicant processing workloads that can be ooaded to
one or more GPUs from the CPU.
Between the rapid development of GPGPU technology and associatively low
cost, the requirement for strong encryption has become a necessity, especially with
the vast amount of ongoing research and development to create GPGPU-based
algorithms to defeat security. Therefore, it is the balance in the critique between
the security strength of encryption algorithms and the evaluation of that strength
in terms of technological development.
2.8 Conclusion
This chapter has emphasised the scope and demand for secure methods of
communication and storage. Through advances in technology and techniques,
encryption processes are being broken and made redundant. Whilst there is
a demand for emerging techniques to be processed quickly and eciently, care
and consideration must be taken into account with respect to the life span of
the development of new techniques. Parallel processing has been brought to the
consumer through aordable graphics cards where the advent of GPGPU processing
has made a signicant impact in the eld of cryptanalysis. Techniques using this
subject will be presented in Chapter 6 where simulations and analysis will be
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undertaken using GPGPU processing.
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Chapter 3
The Generalised New Mersenne
Transform
3.1 Introduction
There are many dierent transforms that are applicable for use in signal-processing,
such as the Fourier-, cosine-, sine- and wavelet-transforms to name a few.
These techniques have applications that include image- and audio-processing and
communications. While fundamental, these transforms are error-prone as they
are built upon irrational functions that are subject to rounding and truncation
errors, which therefore have limited use for applications in cryptography. A
separate branch of transforms called NTTs are built over a residue eld modulo a
prime, such as the Fermat number (FNT), MNT and the NMNT. These particular
transforms incorporate Fermat and Mersenne prime numbers respectively, which
allow for extremely fast calculations using shifts and additions. As these transforms
are produced using modulo operations, the results they provide are exact as they
contain no irrational functions and therefore result in no rounding or truncation
errors.
One of the more recently created NTTs is the GNMNT, which was developed
by expanding the kernel parameters of the original NMNT, during which two
new transforms were invented; ONMNT and the O2NMNT. The GNMNT, like
the NMNT is built over a eld modulo a Mersenne prime and shares similar
properties such as cyclic convolutions. Contrary to previous techniques such as
the FNT and MNT, it has both long and versatile transform lengths that are
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dened over a power of two, making it suitable for application development using
fast algorithms. Like the original NMNT, it too has applications in image-, audio-
and signal-processing where techniques involve one- (1D) and two-dimensional (2D)
correlation and convolutions for matching and ltering, as well as applications in
cryptography. This chapter will start by introducing the NMNT algorithm followed
by the ONMNT and O2NMNT algorithms. The derivation of the transform
parameters will be briey discussed followed by the selection of the GNMNT
parameters and the taxonomy of the GNMNT will be included. The GNMNT
kernel components will be discussed and how key components can inuence the
results will be discussed. Finally, examples of using the GNMNT to undertake
tasks for encryption will be demonstrated before providing conclusions.
3.2 The NMNT
The NMNT is the original transform derived in this suite and as such, there
are already signicant developments in its use within signal- [6, 103{105] and
image-processing [7, 106{108], cryptography [61, 109{111] for example, as well as
being the topic of focus for implementations [112{115]. Its derivation is
X(k) =
*
N 1X
n=0
x(n) (nk)
+
Mp
for k = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1 (3.1)
where h:iMp denotes modulo Mp, Mp = 2p   1 is a Mersenne prime for p =
2; 3; 5; 7; 13; 17; 19; 31; :::; etc and N is a power of two where N  2p. The transform
kernel  is given by
(n) = h1(n) + 2(n)iMp (3.2)
where
1(n) = hRe(1 + j2)niMp , 2(n) = hIm(1 + j2)niMp (3.3)
for
1 = h2qiMp , 2 = h 3qiMp and q = 2p 2 (3.4)
and Re(:) and Im(:) denote the real and imaginary parts of the enclosed terms
respectively. For transform lengths equal to N
d
, 1 and 2 can be calculated as
1(n) =
D
Re
h
(1 + j2)
d
inE
Mp
(3.5)
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Table 3.1: The NMNT Kernel for N = 16 and Mp = 127
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 82 111 82 1 3 0 124 126 45 16 45 126 124 0 3
1 111 1 0 126 16 126 0 1 111 1 0 126 16 126 0
1 82 0 45 126 3 111 3 126 45 0 82 1 124 16 124
1 1 126 126 1 1 126 126 1 1 126 126 1 1 126 126
1 3 16 3 1 45 0 82 126 124 111 124 126 82 0 45
1 0 126 111 126 0 1 16 1 0 126 111 126 0 1 16
1 124 0 3 126 82 16 82 126 3 0 124 1 45 111 45
1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126
1 45 111 45 1 124 0 3 126 82 16 82 126 3 0 124
1 16 1 0 126 111 126 0 1 16 1 0 126 111 126 0
1 45 0 82 126 124 111 124 126 82 0 45 1 3 16 3
1 126 126 1 1 126 126 1 1 126 126 1 1 126 126 1
1 124 16 124 1 82 0 45 126 3 111 3 126 45 0 82
1 0 126 16 126 0 1 111 1 0 126 16 126 0 1 111
1 3 0 124 126 45 16 45 126 124 0 3 1 82 111 82
and
2(n) =
D
Im
h
(1 + j2)
d
inE
Mp
(3.6)
where d = 2
p+1
N
is an integer power of two and the term (1 + j2) is of the order
2p+1. The inverse NMNT is dened as
x(n) =
*
N 1
N 1X
k=0
X(k) (nk)
+
Mp
for n = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1. (3.7)
It can be seen that (3.1) is the same as its inverse (3.7) except for the scale
factor N 1. This indicates that both the forward and inverse transforms can
be implemented by the same algorithm with minimal intervention to dierentiate
between the two. This can easily be veried by


GNGNN
 1
Mp
= I (3.8)
where GN is an NMNT transform matrix of length N , N
 1 is the corresponding
scaling factor and I is the identity matrix. Moreover, it can be further observed
that the NMNT is its own transpose because GN = G
T
N and therefore it is also
orthogonal. An example of an NMNT transform matrix is shown in Table 3.1
where N = 16 and p = 7 thus producing Mp = 127. The NMNT, as well as being
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Table 3.2: The ONMNT Kernel for N = 16 and Mp = 127
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
72 19 19 72 5 99 28 122 55 108 108 55 122 28 99 5
82 82 3 124 45 45 124 3 82 82 3 124 45 45 124 3
19 5 122 108 28 72 72 28 108 122 5 19 99 55 55 99
111 0 16 0 111 0 16 0 111 0 16 0 111 0 16 0
19 122 122 19 28 55 72 99 108 5 5 108 99 72 55 28
82 45 3 3 45 82 124 124 82 45 3 3 45 82 124 124
72 108 19 55 5 28 28 5 55 19 108 72 122 99 99 122
1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126 1 126
5 28 28 5 55 19 108 72 122 99 99 122 72 108 19 55
3 3 45 82 124 124 82 45 3 3 45 82 124 124 82 45
99 72 55 28 19 122 122 19 28 55 72 99 108 5 5 108
0 111 0 16 0 111 0 16 0 111 0 16 0 111 0 16
28 72 72 28 108 122 5 19 99 55 55 99 19 5 122 108
124 3 82 82 3 124 45 45 124 3 82 82 3 124 45 45
122 28 99 5 72 19 19 72 5 99 28 122 55 108 108 55
orthogonal is also symmetric, producing a kernel that looks like
M =
266666666666666664
 (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) : : :  (0)
 (0)  (1)  (2)  (3) : : :  (N   1)
 (0)  (2)  (4)  (6) : : :  [2 (N   1)]
 (0)  (3)  (6)  (9) : : :  [3 (N   1)]
 (0)  (4)  (8)  (12) : : :  [4 (N   1)]
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
 (0)  (N   1)  [2 (N   1)]  [3 (N   1)] : : :  [(N   1) (N   1)]
377777777777777775
: (3.9)
3.3 The ONMNT
The ONMNT is the rst new transform of the GNMNT. Unlike the NMNT, it has
individual forward and inverse transforms, where the inverse can easily be obtained
by transposing the ONMNT matrix. This is analogous to the discrete cosine
transform (DCT), where the type-III is the inverse of the type-II. The maximum
transform length is slightly shorter than the NMNT and is dened as 2p 1. The
kernel is derived by replacing k from the NMNT with 2k+1
2
, which therefore denes
the forward transform as
XO(k) =
*
N 1X
n=0
x(n)

2k + 1
2
n
+
Mp
for k = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1: (3.10)
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The kernel that is produced looks like
M =
266666666666666664
 (0)  (0)  (0)  (0) : : : 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(3.11)
Subsequently, the inverse ONMNT (IONMNT) is derived by replacing n from the
NMNT with 2n+1
2
while retaining the original k term so that the inverse transform
is a transpose of the forward transform. This inverse transform of the ONMNT can
formally be dened as
x(n) =
*
N 1
N 1X
n=0
XO(k)

2n+ 1
2
k
+
Mp
for n = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1: (3.12)
Table 3.3: The IONMNT Matrix for N = 16 and Mp = 127
1 72 82 19 111 19 82 72 1 5 3 99 0 28 124 122
1 19 82 5 0 122 45 108 126 28 3 72 111 72 3 28
1 19 3 122 16 122 3 19 1 28 45 55 0 72 82 99
1 72 124 108 0 19 3 55 126 5 82 28 16 28 82 5
1 5 45 28 111 28 45 5 1 55 124 19 0 108 3 72
1 99 45 72 0 55 82 28 126 19 124 122 111 122 124 19
1 28 124 72 16 72 124 28 1 108 82 122 0 5 45 19
1 122 3 28 0 99 124 5 126 72 45 19 16 19 45 72
1 55 82 108 111 108 82 55 1 122 3 28 0 99 124 5
1 108 82 122 0 5 45 19 126 99 3 55 111 55 3 99
1 108 3 5 16 5 3 108 1 99 45 72 0 55 82 28
1 55 124 19 0 108 3 72 126 122 82 99 16 99 82 122
1 122 45 99 111 99 45 122 1 72 124 108 0 19 3 55
1 28 45 55 0 72 82 99 126 108 124 5 111 5 124 108
1 99 124 55 16 55 124 99 1 19 82 5 0 122 45 108
1 5 3 99 0 28 124 122 126 55 45 108 16 108 45 55
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As expected, this transform produces a matrix that is the transpose of the forward
transform kernel. This produces a kernel that looks like
M 1 =
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GOG
T
ON
 1
Mp
= I (3.14)
where GO is an ONMNT transform matrix of length N , G
T
O is the transpose of the
ONMNT transform matrix, N 1 is the corresponding scaling factor and I is the
identity matrix. Examples of the ONMNT and IONMNT transform matrices are
shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 respectively using N = 16 and p = 7.
3.4 Odd-Squared-NMNT (O2NMNT)
The O2NMNT is the third and nal new transform of the GNMNT. The O2NMNT is
unique to the GNMNT in that its construction contains no trivial elements that are
present in the NMNT, ONMNT and the IONMNT. The details and the implications
of these characteristics will be discussed further in Section 3.8.1. The derivation of
the O2NMNT is
XO2(k) =
*
N 1X
n=0
x(n)

(2n+ 1)(2k + 1)
4
+
Mp
for k = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1 (3.15)
and the inverse is dened as
x(n) =
*
N 1
N 1X
k=0
XO2(k)

(2n+ 1)(2k + 1)
4
+
Mp
for n = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1: (3.16)
Like the NMNT, the O2NMNT shares a similar advantage in that the inverse
transform is the same as the forward transform, meaning that as well as being
orthogonal, their kernels are also symmetrical. In addition to k being replaced by
2k+1
2
, so n is also replaced by 2n+1
2
, which when combined produces (2k+1)(2n+1)
4
. An
example of the O2NMNT kernel is provided in Table 3.4 where N = 16 and p = 7.
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Table 3.4: The O2NMNTKernel for N = 16 and Mp = 127
15 56 106 105 105 106 56 15 83 26 14 36 91 113 101 44
56 105 15 14 113 112 22 71 101 36 83 106 106 83 36 101
106 15 91 71 71 91 15 106 14 44 22 101 26 105 83 113
105 14 71 44 83 56 113 22 91 106 26 112 112 26 106 91
105 113 71 83 83 71 113 105 91 21 26 15 112 101 106 36
106 112 91 56 71 36 15 21 14 83 22 26 26 22 83 14
56 22 15 113 113 15 22 56 101 91 83 21 106 44 36 26
15 71 106 22 105 21 56 112 83 101 14 91 91 14 101 83
83 101 14 91 91 14 101 83 112 56 21 105 22 106 71 15
26 36 44 106 21 83 91 101 56 22 15 113 113 15 22 56
14 83 22 26 26 22 83 14 21 15 36 71 56 91 112 106
36 106 101 112 15 26 21 91 105 113 71 83 83 71 113 105
91 106 26 112 112 26 106 91 22 113 56 83 44 71 14 105
113 83 105 26 101 22 44 14 106 15 91 71 71 91 15 106
101 36 83 106 106 83 36 101 71 22 112 113 14 15 105 56
44 101 113 91 36 14 26 83 15 56 106 105 105 106 56 15
Table 3.5: Values of 1 and 2 According to p for NMNT
p 1 2
3 4 2
5 8 20
7 16 88
13 128 181
17 512 87260
19 1024 385302
31 65536 1268011823
As the O2NMNTis symmetrical, like the NMNT, the forward and inverse kernels
are derived as
M =
266666666666666664
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3.5 Derivation of Transform Parameters
Table 3.9: GNMNT Transform Selection
G n0 k0
NMNT 0 0
ONMNT 0 1
IONMNT 1 0
O2NMNT 1 1
3.5 Derivation of Transform Parameters
This section outlays the taxonomy of the GNMNT and demonstrates how
the transform parameters are derived for the NMNT, ONMNT and O2NMNT,
including consideration of their respective maximal transform lengths. For all
transforms of the GNMNT, the initial values of 1 and 2 are calculated by
selecting the appropriate value of q according to p for (3.4). The values that are
subsequently obtained with respect to p are shown in Table 3.5.
With appropriate starting values selected for of 1 and 2, they both require
adjustment according to the transform length to produce the initial values of 1
and 2. This is calculated as shown in (3.5) and (3.6) accordingly. The rst notable
dierence between the GNMNTs is through the derivation of N according to the
length N
d
for d is a power of two, which is 2p+1 for NMNT, 2p for ONMNT and
2p 1 for O2NMNT. A comprehensive list of nal values of 1 and 2 according to
the eld derived by p and the transform length N for the NMNT, ONMNT and
O2NMNTis shown in Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 respectively. The taxonomy of the
GNMNT that was rst shown in Figure 1.1 illustrates how all of the GNMNT
transforms are interlinked with each other. These transforms are generalised as
X(k) =
*
N 1X
n=0
x (n)

(2n+ n0) (2k + k0)
4
+
Mp
for k = 0; 1; :::; N   1 (3.18)
and
x(n) =
*
N 1
N 1X
k=0
X (k)

(2n+ n0) (2k + k0)
4
+
Mp
for n = 0; 1; :::; N   1 (3.19)
where the variables n0 and k0 are selected to denote which transform is to be used
from the GNMNT according to the conguration shown in Table 3.9, which is
described in more detail in [11]. All transforms are orthogonal and when n0 = k0
when either the NMNT or O2NMNT are selected then the transforms are also
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symmetrical.
3.6 Cyclic Convolution of the GNMNT
Convolution is widely used in signal processing and image processing. There are
three types of convolution that have been dened, which are linear convolution,
cyclic convolution and the skew-cyclic convolution [116, 117]. When the input
sequence is x (n) and the impulse response is h (n), which has the same length N ,
the length of the linear convolution output y
LC
(n) is 2N   1 [116,117]. The output
of the linear convolution is shown as
yLC (n) = x (n)~ h (n)
=
N 1X
k=0
x (k)h (n  k)
=
N 1X
k=0
x (n  k)h (k)
(3.20)
where ~ denotes convolution and the length of the cyclic convolution output y
CC
(n)
is N shown as
yCC (n) = x (n)~ h (n)
=
N 1X
k=0
x (k)h (n  k mod N)
=
N 1X
k=0
x (n  k mod N)h (k)
=
nX
k=0
x(k)h (n  k) +
N 1X
k=n+1
x(k)h (n  k +N) :
(3.21)
Finally, the skew-cyclic convolution output y
SCC
(n) is shown as
ySCC (n) = x (n)~ h (n)
=
nX
k=0
x (k)h (n  k) 
N 1X
k=n+1
x (k)h (n  k +N) :
(3.22)
3.6.1 Cyclic convolution of NMNT
As shown in (3.20) and (3.21), the output lengths are dierent. However, the
cyclic convolution can be derived from the linear convolution by padding with zeros
so that it can reach the required length of 2N   1. The cyclic convolution can
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therefore be calculated by
GN [yCC (n)] = GN [x (n)~ h (n)]
=
*
N 1X
m=0
N 1X
n=0
x(n m)h (m) (nk)
+
Mp
=
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
N 1X
s=0
x(s) (sk +mk)
+
Mp
(3.23)
where s = m  n, and GN denotes the NMNT transform. According to the NMNT
denition, (sk +mk) term in (3.23) can be simplied as
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

1 (mk) (sk) + 2 (mk) ( sk)
+
Mp
=
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)1 (mk)
N 1X
s=0
x(s) (sk) (3.24)
+
N 1X
m=0
h (m)2 (mk)
N 1X
s=0
x(s) ( sk)
+
Mp
:
Due to the relationships between 1(n) and (n), 2(n) and (n) where
1(n) =

1
2
[(n) + ( n)]

Mp
(3.25)
and
2(n) =

1
2
[(n)  ( n)]

Mp
(3.26)
then applying (3.25) and (3.26) to (3.24) produces
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)1 (mk)
N 1X
s=0
x(s) (sk) +
N 1X
m=0
h (m)2 (mk)
N 1X
s=0
x(s) ( sk)
+
Mp
=
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
h (mk) +  ( mk)
2
i
X (k) (3.27)
+
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
h (mk)   ( mk)
2
i
X (N   k)
+
Mp
where X(k) and X(N   k) are dened by NMNT property, as well as H(k) and
H(N   k), which are
*
N 1X
s=0
x(s) (sk)
+
Mp
= X (k) ; (3.28)
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N 1X
s=0
x(s) ( sk)
+
Mp
= X ( k)
= X (N   k)
(3.29)
and *
N 1X
m=0
h (m) (mk)
+
Mp
= H (k) ; (3.30)
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m) ( mk)
+
Mp
= H ( k)
= H (N   k) :
(3.31)
Therefore, applying (3.30) and (3.31) into (3.27) produces

H (k) +H ( k)
2
X (k) +
H (k) H ( k)
2
X (N   k)

Mp
=
n
[H (k) +H (N   k)]X (k) + [H (k) H (N   k)]X (N   k)
o
2p 1

Mp
(3.32)
= Y (k) :
where
1
2
=
D
2p 1
E
Mp
: (3.33)
Splitting H (k) into even and odd parts as
Hev(k) =

H (k) +H ( k)
2

Mp
=
D
[H (k) +H ( k)] 2p 1
E
Mp
(3.34)
and
Hod(k) =

H (k) H ( k)
2

Mp
=


[H (k) H ( k)] 2p 1
Mp
(3.35)
Then applying (3.34) and (3.35) to (3.32) produces the desired equation in order to
derive the cyclic convolution using the NMNT as
GN [yCC (n)] = GN [x (n)~ h (n)]
= Hev (k)X (k) +Hod (k)X (N   k)
= Y (k) :
(3.36)
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NMNT
NMNT
x(n)
h(n)
X(k)
H(k)
NMNT
-1Y(k)
y(n)⊙
Figure 3.1: Convolution Process Structure for the NMNT
This is shown in Figure 3.1, where the  operator is dened as
Y (k) = X(k)H(k)
= Hev (k)X (k) +Hod (k)X (N   k) :
(3.37)
An example using the NMNT to obtain the cyclic convolution yCC , generating x
and h randomly to represent the input and impulse response signals respectively,
with p = 13 and length N = 8 is rst shown as
x(n) = [1; 1; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 1] (3.38)
and
h(n) = [1; 1; 0; 1; 1; 0; 1; 0]: (3.39)
The resulting NMNT representations are
X(k) = [5; 923; 0; 6019; 3; 2547; 8063; 7492; 8190; 7268; 0; 2176; 1; 5644; 128; 703]; (3.40)
H(k) = [5; 8063; 8064; 5096; 1; 128; 8062; 1848; 1; 8063; 129; 3099; 1; 128; 127; 6347]: (3.41)
Applying the cyclic convolution algorithm produces
Y (k) = [25; 4354; 126; 7994; 3; 4795; 0; 2271; 8190; 3315; 8061; 459; 1; 3898; 0; 5670]; (3.42)
and applying the inverse NMNT results the rst 2N   1 elements as
ycc = [1; 2; 1; 2; 4; 2; 2; 4; 2; 1; 2; 1; 0; 1; 0]: (3.43)
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Conrming the results with the built in function of MATLAB produces
conv(x, h) = [1; 2; 1; 2; 4; 2; 2; 4; 2; 1; 2; 1; 0; 1; 0]: (3.44)
3.6.2 Cyclic convolution of ONMNT
Following similar steps to derive the NMNT cyclic convolution computation, the
ONMNT cyclic convolution can be calculated as
GO [yCC (n)] = GO [x (n)~ h (n)]
=
*
N 1X
m=0
N 1X
n=0
x(n m)h (m)

2k + 1
2
n
+
Mp
=
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

2k + 1
2
s+
2k + 1
2
m
+
Mp
(3.45)
where s = m  n, and GO denotes the ONMNT transform. From the  identities in
provided in [7], the 
 
2k+1
2
s+ 2k+1
2
m

term in (3.45) can be simplied as
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
N 1X
s=0
x(s)
"
1 (mk)

2k + 1
2
s

+ 2 (mk)

 2k + 1
2
s
#+
Mp
=
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)1

2k + 1
2
m
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

2k + 1
2
s

(3.46)
+
N 1X
m=0
h (m)2

2k + 1
2
m
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

 2k + 1
2
s
+
Mp
:
Applying (3.25) and (3.26) now into (3.46), produces
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)1

2k + 1
2
m
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

2k + 1
2
s

+
N 1X
m=0
h (m)2

2k + 1
2
m
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

 2k + 1
2
s
+
Mp
=
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
"

 
2k+1
2 m

+ 
  2k+12 m
2
#
XO (k) (3.47)
+
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
"

 
2k+1
2 m
     2k+12 m
2
#
XO (N   k   1)
+
Mp
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where XO(k) and XO(N   k) are dened by ONMNT variables, as are HO(k) and
HO(N   k), which are *
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

2k + 1
2
s
+
Mp
= XO (k) ; (3.48)
*
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

 2k + 1
2
s
+
Mp
= XO ( k   1)
= XO (N   k   1)
(3.49)
and *
N 1X
m=0
h (m)

2k + 1
2
m
+
Mp
= HO (k) ; (3.50)
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)

 2k + 1
2
m
+
Mp
= HO ( k   1)
= HO (N   k   1) :
(3.51)
Thus, substituting (3.50) and (3.51) into (3.47) generates
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
"

 
2k+1
2 m

+ 
  2k+12 m
2
#
XO (k)
+
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
"

 
2k+1
2 m
     2k+12 m
2
#
XO (N   k   1)
+
Mp
=

HO (k) +HO (N  K   1)
2
XO (k)
+
HO (k) HO (N   k   1)
2
XO (N   k   1)

Mp
(3.52)
=
n
[HO (k) +HO (N   k   1)]XO (k)
+ [HO (k) HO (N   k   1)]XO (N   k   1)
o
2p 1

Mp
= YO (k) :
Splitting HO (k) into even and odd parts produces
HevO (k) =

HO (k) +HO ( k)
2

Mp
=

[HO (k) +HO ( k)] 2p 1

Mp
(3.53)
55
3. THE GENERALISED NEW MERSENNE TRANSFORM
ONMNT
ONMNT
x(n)
h(n)
XO(k)
HO(k)
IONMNT
YO(k) y(n)⊙
Figure 3.2: Convolution Process Structure for the ONMNT
and
HodO (k) =

HO (k) HO ( k)
2

Mp
=

[HO (k) HO ( k)] 2p 1

Mp
:
(3.54)
Then applying (3.53) and (3.54) into (3.52) produces the desired equation to
process the cyclic convolution using the ONMNT as
GO [yCC (n)] = GO [x (n)~ h (n)]
= HevO (k)X (k) +H
od
O (k)X (N   k)
= YO (k) :
(3.55)
The  operator in Figure 3.2 is dened as
YO (k) = XO(k)HO(k)
= HevO (k)XO (k) +H
od
O (k)XO (N   k) :
(3.56)
In Figure 3.2, the  operator has the same function as it does in Figure 3.1. An
example of a cyclic convolution using the ONMNT given where all of the variables
that were used for the NMNT have the same purpose such that
x(n) = [1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0]; (3.57)
h(n) = [0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1]: (3.58)
The resulting ONMNT representations are
XO(k) = [2309; 5366; 5554; 2448; 5584; 3903; 2196; 3490;
790; 7921; 4485; 7591; 7703; 7387; 4151; 2857];
(3.59)
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and
HO(k) = [4977; 770; 6362; 1669; 1920; 1344; 235; 4305;
117; 4068; 8174; 433; 1177; 1497; 1611; 2296]:
(3.60)
Applying the circular convolution algorithm produces
YO(k) = [5515; 2526; 5538; 5146; 4799; 6275; 8100; 146;
319; 7307; 357; 7850; 5737; 7453; 2375; 4276];
(3.61)
and applying the inverse ONMNT results in the rst 2N   1 elements as
ycc = [0; 0; 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 4; 3; 2; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0]: (3.62)
Conrming the results with the built in function of MATLAB produces
conv(x, h) = [0; 0; 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 4; 3; 2; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0]: (3.63)
3.6.3 Cyclic convolution of O2NMNT
The O2NMNT can also be applied to compute the cyclic convolution. As previously
dened in (3.15), the O2NMNT kernel matrix is derived from 
 
2k+1
2
  
2n+1
2

and is therefore implemented as
YO2 (k) =
*
N 1X
m=0
N 1X
n=0
x(n m)h (m)

2k + 1
2

2n+ 1
2
+
Mp
=
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

2k + 1
2

2n+ 1
2
+
Mp
(3.64)
where
s = m  n: (3.65)
The O2NMNT denes HO2 (k) and HO2 (N   k   1) by*
N 1X
m=0
h(m)

2k + 1
2

2m+ 1
2
+
Mp
= HO2 (k) (3.66)
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and *
N 1X
m=0
h(m)

 2k + 1
2

2m+ 1
2
+
Mp
= HO ( k   1)
=  HO2 (N   k   1) :
(3.67)
Applying m; s to the  term in (3.64), produces


2k + 1
2

2n+ 1
2

= 

2k + 1
2

2m+ 1
2

+
2k + 1
2
s

(3.68)
and substituting (3.68) into (3.64) produces
YO2 (k) =
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

2k + 1
2

2m+ 1
2
+
2k + 1
2
s
+
Mp
=
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)
N 1X
s=0
x(s)
(
1

2k + 1
2

2m+ 1
2



2k + 1
2
s

+ 2

2k + 1
2

2m+ 1
2



 2k + 1
2
s
)+
Mp
=
*
N 1X
m=0
h (m)1

2k + 1
2

2m+ 1
2
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

2k + 1
2
s

+
N 1X
m=0
h (m)2

2k + 1
2

2m+ 1
2
N 1X
s=0
x(s)

 2k + 1
2
s
+
Mp
:
(3.69)
To simplify (3.69) according to (3.66), (3.67) and (3.48), then (3.49) yields
YO2 (k) =

HO2 (k) HO2 (N  K   1)
2
XO (k)
+
HO2 (k) +HO2 (N   k   1)
2
XO (N   k   1)

Mp
=

[HO2 (k) HO2 (N   k   1)]XO (k)
+ [HO2 (k) +HO2 (N   k   1)]XO (N   k   1)
	
2p 1

Mp
:
(3.70)
The function operator  as shown in Figure 3.3 is dened as
YO2 (k) = XO (k)HO2 (k)
=
D
HodO2(k)XO (k)
+HevO2(k)XO (N   k)
E
Mp
(3.71)
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ONMNT
O
2
NMNT
x(n)
h(n)
XO(k)
HO2(k)
O
2
NMNT
-1YO2(k) y(n)⊙
Figure 3.3: Convolution Process Structure for the O2NMNT
where
HevO2(k) =


[HO2 (k) +HO2 ( k)] 2p 1

Mp
(3.72)
and
HodO2(k) =


[HO2 (k) HO2 ( k)] 2p 1

Mp
: (3.73)
An example of using the O2NMNT to perform a cyclic convolution is shown as
x(n) = [1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 0]; (3.74)
h(n) = [0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 1; 1]: (3.75)
The resulting O2NMNT representations are
XO(k) = [3454; 6272; 3545; 18; 6333; 3215; 6685; 7957;
1642; 7015; 2802; 1830; 4957; 8075; 3354; 6581];
(3.76)
and
HO2(k) = [1973; 5938; 6361; 2277; 1222; 606; 3763; 4807;
7005; 5958; 225; 7841; 2599; 4844; 464; 5500]:
(3.77)
Applying the circular convolution algorithm produces
YO2(k) = [7595; 4072; 3529; 543; 963; 3337; 7814; 2753;
4813; 6359; 3429; 4057; 6479; 7859; 2744; 8088];
(3.78)
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and applying the inverse O2NMNT results in the rst 2N   1 elements as
ycc = [0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 2; 2; 0; 1; 1; 1; 2; 1; 0]: (3.79)
Conrming the results with the built in function of MATLAB produces
conv(x, h) = [0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 2; 2; 0; 1; 1; 1; 2; 1; 0]: (3.80)
Again, the variables x and h are input signal and impulse response accordingly,
which are generated randomly and y
CC
is the resultant cyclic convolution using the
O2NMNT. The result was veried using the built-in functions of MATLAB.
3.7 Encryption Example using the GNMNT
This section demonstrates the use of the GNMNT transforms as part of an
encryption application. As a demonstration, this is a basic implementation to
show some application techniques and the performance of each transform. There
are no additional rounds and operations that one would usually nd in general
encryption schemes. This process can also be considered as a straightforward ECB
implementation, which is the simplest form of encryption and, as previously noted
in Section 2.5.1, is not a recommended technique for general use implementations.
The algorithm will take the plaintext equivalent and transform it to the associate
domain by
TG = G (t) (3.81)
where t is the plaintext, and TG is the transformed plaintext using one of the
GNMNT transforms denoted by G. The key is randomly chosen as
K = f0x3e41, 0x1a4d, 0x273f, 0xf670, 0x39f4, 0xea3e, 0xddc1, 0x99a0g (3.82)
and to test the eect of using an incorrect key, an alternate random key will be
used shown as
K^ = f0x9ef7, 0x2913, 0x7503, 0xf2cc, 0x0ea8, 0xd934, 0xaab1, 0x2903g: (3.83)
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The cipher is then created by
CG = hTG 
KiMp (3.84)
and
c = G (CG)
 1 (3.85)
where G () 1 denotes the matching inverse GNMNT transform to what was used
in (3.81) and 
 denotes point-by-point multiplication. The inverse keys are then
derived by
K 1 =


KMp 2

Mp
(3.86)
K^ 1 =
D
K^Mp 2
E
Mp
: (3.87)
The unadulterated key from (3.86) is the used to decrypt c to recover r, which
represents the original plaintext t by rst deriving RG as
RG =


CG 
K 1

Mp
(3.88)
and then
r = G (RG)
 1 (3.89)
noting that
r = t: (3.90)
In addition, should we also wish to see the resultant plaintext with the use of a
dierent key then we compute
R^G =
D
CG 
 K^ 1
E
Mp
(3.91)
and then
r^ = G

R^G
 1
: (3.92)
We can then display t, c, r^ and r, which are the results for each stage. This type
of encryption will be ECB mode, which is the simplest form of encryption where
each block will be independent from all others. This will in due course also serve
to show the inherent weakness of the ECB mode, the use of which is strongly
discouraged. Additionally, each cipher will be produced using a single round and
a single operation, not the several rounds and further operations that are usually
expected from a typical symmetric encryption system.
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3.7.1 Encryption using the NMNT
Earlier research has been undertaken using the NMNT, where the transform has
been proposed for use as a component within an encryption system [61,110,111,118].
The methodology used in this example is achieved by rst considering the
parameters of the transform; N = 8 and p = 17 to derive Mp = 131071. The rst
16 pixels to be encrypted are then obtained by
t = f0xce, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xcf, 0xd1, 0xd1, 0xcf, 0xd1,
0xd0, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd3, 0xd1, 0xd0, 0xd2g
(3.93)
and concatenating subsequent pairs of bytes so that
t = f0xced0, 0xd1cf, 0xd1d1, 0xcfd1, 0xd0cf, 0xd0d1, 0xd3d1, 0xd0d2g: (3.94)
Applying the NMNT to the vector t we obtain
TG = f0x08887, 0x00202, 0x1f7, 0x00000, 0x001fe, 0x1fd, 0x1fbf9, 0x1f801g (3.95)
and subsequently after applying the key from (3.82) in (3.84) we get
CG = f0x16Ce0, 0x0ceb4, 0x00763, 0x00000, 0x17451, 0x18315, 0x1c7bb, 0x030dag:
(3.96)
The resultant cipher c is then produced by applying (3.96) to the inverse NMNT in
(3.85) to obtain
c = f0x1665e, 0x02da3, 0x0de24, 0x09f5d, 0x145b5, 0x1c096, 0x0e660, 0x06eb0g: (3.97)
Reverting c to the GNMNT domain CG allows recovery of the plaintext r, which can
be obtained by using the inverse key (3.86) with CG in (3.89). Similarly, recovering
the alternate plaintext r^ using the alternate key from (3.83) can be obtained by
applying the inverse of the altered key (3.87) to CG in (3.91) to respectively produce
Figures 3.5(a)-3.5(d) for the cameraman image.
R^G = f0x02c52, 0x0dcca, 0x06606, 0x00000, 0x149ec, 0x13a3a, 0x12ac2, 0x191e3g
(3.98)
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(a) Original (b) Cipher
(c) Incorrect Key (d) Correct Key
Figure 3.4: Encrypted Cameraman using NMNT, N = 8 and Mp = 131071
and
r^ = f0x015fe, 0x0edd6, 0x12c0a, 0x19fc0, 0x1abc3, 0x1fbf1, 0x1cd52, 0x0e7a9g: (3.99)
Using the public domain image of the cameraman, the results are shown for the
original image as the plaintext pT , ciphered image cT , the recovered image using
incorrect key r^T and the recovered image using the correct key rT in Figures
3.4(a)-3.4(d) respectively.
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(a) Original (b) Cipher
(c) Incorrect Key (d) Correct Key
Figure 3.5: Encrypted Cameraman using ONMNT, N = 8 and Mp = 131071
3.7.2 Encryption using the ONMNT
The application of the ONMNT as part of an encryption scenario is a very new
concept. While much has been published with the NMNT on this subject, the
only research to date using the ONMNT can be found in [119]. The results of the
encryption eectiveness can be shown in Figures 3.5(a)-3.5(d).
3.7.3 Encryption using the O2NMNT
Like the ONMNT, the application of the O2NMNT within the eld of encryption is
very recent. However, there is a stronger interest in O2NMNT as characteristics of
this transform appear to show that it is extremely resilient according to [119]. The
64
3.7 Encryption Example using the GNMNT
(a) Original (b) Cipher
(c) Incorrect Key (d) Correct Key
Figure 3.6: Encrypted Cameraman using O2NMNT, N = 8 and Mp = 131071
results of the process using the O2NMNT are provided in Figures 3.6(a)-3.6(d).
3.7.4 Encryption using the GNMNT
From the initial assessment of the processes covered, it can be seen that all
transforms appear to perform equally. This is shown by depicting an unrecoverable
image upon decrypting using the incorrect key for each transform, which have been
collated in Figures 3.7(a)-3.7(d). However, in order to get a little insight into how
the transforms actually perform, the kernel components must be investigated a
little more deeply.
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(a) Original (b) NMNT
(c) ONMNT (d) O2NMNT
Figure 3.7: Decrypted Cameraman Error using GNMNT, N = 8 and Mp = 131071
3.8 The GNMNT Kernel Components
The kernel components can be seen as the heart of the transform. These
components are quite easily observed in the GNMNT matrices and as such, can
give an indication as to how these attributes will reinforce or diminish the security
properties of the transform. One of the signicant metrics of an encryption
system is how its diusion characteristics perform. The characteristics that govern
this aspect will be covered in greater detail later in Chapter 6. However, it
would be relevant to describe the observed characteristics of each transform kernel
observation while the kernels have recently been presented.
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Figure 3.8: Consistency of Trivial Elements in the NMNT Kernel
3.8.1 The NMNT Kernel Components
The NMNT kernel is both orthogonal and symmetric. As such, it is its own inverse
when used with the corresponding scaling factor. One of the characteristics that
was observed with the NMNT was a potential weakness in its diusion properties,
which when used with encryption, are shown to be very linear. While [110]
and [111] provide an intensive study in this area, the work focused more upon the
changing of the elements rather than the eect upon the bits. As such, a signicant
amount of information can be gained through the manipulation of a single bit; this
will be discussed further in Chapter 6. However, one of the biggest attributes to
this observable problem may well be the construction of the matrix itself in that
it contains a signicant amount of trivial elements, i.e. one, zero and the eld
equivilant of minus one in quantities that can be determined by
#f(GN ;m (1))g = N [log2(N) + 0:5] (3.100)
#f(GN ;m (0))g = N [log2(N)  2] (3.101)
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Figure 3.9: Consistency of Trivial Elements in the ONMNT Kernel
and
#f(GN ;m ( 1))g = N [log2(N)  0:5] ; (3.102)
where GN denotes the NMNT kernel matrix and the eld equivalent of a minus
one is Mp   1. Figure 3.8 better illustrates how these elements are dispersed
throughout the kernel.
Elements containing either a one or a minus one can potentially be a means to
attack the system using cribs, particularly where both the rst row and column
contain ones, indicating that the rst element in the transformed vector is the sum
of the initial vector, modulo the Mersenne prime. However, the greatest threat
appears to be the number of zeros contained within the NMNT kernel. This can be
shown by using the same implementation and process as Section 3.7 but decrypting
using a very slightly modied key to that shown in (3.83), where the nal bit in
the nal element of the key has changed to reect
K^ = f0x3e41, 0x1a4d, 0x273f, 0xf670, 0x39f4, 0xea3e, 0xddc1, 0x99a1g: (3.103)
68
3.8 The GNMNT Kernel Components
The result of decrypting the image with the NMNT by using a key that diers by
a single bit is shown in Figure 3.10(b), where it can quite easily be observed that
part of the image has been recovered. However, it can be further observed that
this eect diminishes as the transform length and subsequent key length increases
as show in Figures 3.10(c)-3.10(f), where increasingly longer keys were derived
randomly. The reason why part of the image has been recovered using a key
diering by a single bit will be explained later in this chapter.
3.8.2 The ONMNT Kernel Components
Using the same methods that were used with the NMNT, we can derive the
consistency of trivial elements for the ONMNT. As the IONMNT is a transpose of
the ONMNT, the same formulae will work between both transforms for determining
the number of ones, zeros and minus ones in quantities that can be determined by
#f(GO;m (1))g = 3N
2
(3.104)
#f(GO;m (0))g = N (3.105)
and
#f(GN ;m ( 1))g = N
2
: (3.106)
From Figure 3.11 it can be observed that the ONMNT also suers from the same
inherent problems as the NMNT where part of the image has been recovered using
a decryption key that diers from the encryption key by a single bit. It can again be
further observed that this eect diminishes as the transform length and subsequent
key length increases as show in Figures 3.11(b)-3.11(f), where increasingly longer
keys were derived randomly. Proof of this will be provided later in this chapter.
3.8.3 The O2NMNTKernel Components
There is a unique aspect with the O2NMNT in that it does not contain any
of the trivial elements whatsoever. As will be analysed later, this suggests that
the O2NMNT would perform very well for security applications as there are no
components in the kernel to copy or invert elements from the input vector to
potentially perform attacks using cribs. More importantly, there are no elements
that nullify the eects of the key during the decryption process, as shown in Figure
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(a) Original Image (b) NMNT Bit Error N = 8
(c) NMNT Bit Error N = 16 (d) NMNT Bit Error N = 32
(e) NMNT Bit Error N = 64 (f) NMNT Bit Error N = 128
Figure 3.10: Decrypted 256  256 Cameraman Bit Error using NMNT with
N = 8; 16; 32; 64; 128, Mp = 131071
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(a) Original Image (b) ONMNT Bit Error N = 8
(c) ONMNT Bit Error N = 16 (d) ONMNT Bit Error N = 32
(e) ONMNT Bit Error N = 64 (f) ONMNT Bit Error N = 128
Figure 3.11: Decrypted 256  256 Cameraman Bit Error using ONMNT with
N = 8; 16; 32; 64; 128, Mp = 131071
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(a) Original Image (b) O2NMNT Bit Error N = 8
(c) O2NMNT Bit Error N = 16 (d) O2NMNT Bit Error N = 32
(e) O2NMNT Bit Error N = 64 (f) O2NMNT Bit Error N = 128
Figure 3.12: Decrypted 256  256 Cameraman Bit Error using O2NMNT with
N = 8; 16; 32; 64; 128, Mp = 131071
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3.12. The resultant image using the O2NMNT shows signicant promise over the
NMNT and ONMNT counterparts, where a similar level of performance appears to
have been reached when using a completely dierent key in Section 3.7.3.
3.8.4 Proving the Detriments of Zero-Elements within the
GNMNT
The eects of the phenomenon where stripes can be observed are easily described
where earlier claims were made indicating that the zero-elements within the kernel
matrices were the cause.
Proof. If we rst show the input vector x as
x = [x0; x1; : : : ; xN 1] (3.107)
and the NMNT kernel as
M =
266664
 (nk)  [n (k + 1)]  [n (k + j)] : : :  [n (N   k   1)]
 [(n+ 1) k]  [(n+ 1) (k + 1)]  [(n+ 1) (k + j)] : : :  [(n+ 1) (N   k   1)]
 [(n+ i) k]  [(n+ i) (k + 1)]  [(n+ i) (k + j)] : : :  [(n+ i) (N   k   1)]
.
..
.
..
.
..
. . .
.
..
 [(N   n  1) k]  [(N   n  1) (k + 1)]  [(N   n  1) (k + j)] : : :  [(N   n  1) (N   k   1)]
377775
(3.108)
where
0  i; j  N   1 (3.109)
then by applying
X = hxMiMp (3.110)
where the transformed vector X is similarly constructed as
X = [X0; X1; : : : ; XN 1] (3.111)
the derivation of each element of X as a result from applying the NMNT to x can
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be shown as
X0 = x0 (nk) + x1 [(n+ 1) k]
+ xi [(n+ i) k] + : : :+ xN n 1 [(N   n  1) k]
X1 = x0 [n (k + 1)] + x1 [(n+ 1) (k + 1)]
+ xi [(n+ i) (k + 1)] + : : :+ xN n 1 [(N   n  1) (k + 1)]
Xj = x0 [n (k + j)] + x1 [(n+ 1) (k + j)]
+ xi [(n+ i) (k + j)] + : : :+ xN n 1 [(N   n  1) (k + j)]
...
XN k 1 = x0 [n (N   k   1)] + x1 [(n+ 1) (N   k   1)]
+ xi [(n+ i) (N   k   1)] + : : :+ xN n 1 [(N   n  1) (N   k   1)] :
(3.112)
If we dene x^ as a copy of vector x where a single element has been changed shown
as x^r then we obtain a new transformed vector by
X^ = hx^MiMp (3.113)
and can show that
X^j = Xj when x^i 6= xi ()  [(n+ i) (k + j)] = 0; (3.114)
where the unaected resultant vector element(s) correspond to the matrix column(s)
that have a zero at the same row position as the modied key element.
Similarly, we can show that this also works with the ONMNT by applying the
matrix transpose, which for the NMNT yields the same matrix kernel.
Proof. Representing the transformed vector X as Y and derive the inverse
y =

1
N
h
YM
0i
Mp
(3.115)
noting that
y = x (3.116)
then dening Y^ as a copy of Y where a single element has been changed shown as
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Y^i and transforming the modied vector out of the NMNT domain by
y^ =

1
N
h
Y^ M
0i
Mp
(3.117)
we can show that
y^j = yj when Y^i 6= Yi ()  [(n+ i) (k + j)] = 0; (3.118)
where again the unaected resultant vector element(s) correspond to the matrix
column(s) that have a zero at the same row position as the modied key element.
This corresponds to the diminishing number of zero-elements in the NMNT
kernel as described in (3.101) illustrated in Figure 3.8 and depicted in Figure
3.10 building upon the alternate key (3.103). This can be further veried when
considering the NMNT kernel that was constructed using the 1 and 2 values
from Table 3.6
M =
266666666666666666664
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 512 1 0131070 130559 131070 0
1 1 131070 131070 1 1 131070 131070
1 0 131070 512 131070 0 1 130559
1 131070 1 131070 1 131070 1 131070
1 130559 1 0 131070 512 131070 0
1 131070 131070 1 1 131070 131070 1
1 0 131070 130559 131070 0 1 512
377777777777777777775
(3.119)
and noting that changing the last element of the key will have no bearing on the
resultant operation owing that
Mi;j = 0 for i = N   1; j 2

N
8
;
5N
8

and 8  N  2p: (3.120)
Remembering that there are two pixels in each element would further explain the
recovery of the presented parts of the images.
This phenomenon can also be demonstrated with the ONMNT using the same
methods and conditions but replacing (3.119) with the appropriate version of the
kernel for the IONMNT that was constructed using the 1 and 2 values from
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Table 3.7
M =
266666666666666666664
1 82137 512 82137 1 29287 0 101784
1 82137 0 48934 131070 29287 512 29287
1 29287 130559 29287 1 48934 0 82137
1 101784 0 29287 131070 82137 130559 82137
1 48934 512 48934 1 101784 0 29287
1 48934 0 82137 131070 101784 512 101784
1 101784 130559 101784 1 82137 0 48934
1 29287 0 101784 131070 48934 130559 48934
377777777777777777775
(3.121)
and this time noting that
Mi;j = 0 for i = N   1; j = N
4
and 4  N  2p (3.122)
would correspond the shortcomings of Figure 3.11. This again would correspond
to the diminishing number of zero-elements in the ONMNT kernel as described in
(3.105) illustrated in Figure 3.9. Therefore the only way that these anomalies can
be avoided is by applying multiple rounds to the process and shuing the result of
each round prior to supplying it as an input to the next round.
3.8.5 Demonstration of the Proof
We can provide an overall demonstration using a simple matrix unrelated to the
GNMNTs as follows.
Proof. Using N = 4 we dene an arbitrary matrix
M =
26666664
95 70 69 94
68 121 0 44
42 113 79 104
105 0 101 3
37777775 (3.123)
and vector
x = [52; 92; 99; 46] (3.124)
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so that
X = hxMi127
= [118; 51; 53; 66]:
(3.125)
Reusing the vector in (3.124) and changing the last value of the input vector x^3 = 3
shown as
x^ = [52; 92; 99; 3] (3.126)
results in
X^ = hx^Mi127
= [48; 51; 21; 64]
(3.127)
so that there is no change in the second value of the output vectors between (3.125)
and (3.127), which can be shown as X1 = X^1. Similarly, reusing the vector in
(3.124) and changing the second value of the input vector x^1 = 3 shown as
x^ = [52; 3; 99; 46] (3.128)
results in
X^ = h[52; 3; 99; 46]Mi127
= [35; 77; 53; 87]
(3.129)
so that there is no change in the third value of the output vectors between (3.125)
and (3.129), which can be shown as X2 = X^2.
3.9 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced the new transforms of the GNMNT and demonstrated
that they are easily adaptable for applications based upon convolution, verifying
their capability and value in signal-processing. Moreover, while the original NMNT
has seen a relevant amount of success and acceptance in the eld of security,
the extension of the NMNT to the GNMNT oers new and potentially stronger
transforms for security applications. The preliminary examples of encryption within
this chapter show that the GNMNT, particularly the O2NMNT transforms to have
comparable initial results in this eld, which will be later explored in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Fast Algorithms of the GNMNT
4.1 Introduction
Fast algorithms have been a prime focus of research since the inception of the fast
Fourier transform [120], which has initiated myriad pursuits in this area. Naturally,
the quicker such processes can be undertaken, the greater throughputs can be
achieved. Lowering typical power consumption and having a wider applicability
further increases their attractiveness. In this section we will show how the GNMNT
can be derived using fast algorithms like other transforms before it, such as
the original NMNT, fast Fourier transform [120], fast Hartley transform [121],
etc. Firstly, the radix-2 algorithms will be derived, followed by the radix-4 and
split-radix algorithms. A complexity analysis will also be developed and timings
for each algorithm will be included in order to compare and contrast.
4.2 Radix-2 ONMNT
The radix-2 algorithm is the simplest of the fast algorithms to both describe and
derive. It works by splitting an N -length algorithm into two smaller N
2
-length
algorithms. The signicance of this approach is quite profound when looking at
metrics based on the Fourier transform, which reduces an O(N2) problem to an
O(N log2N) problem. When N = 1024 then this represents a saving in processing
of over 90%. This process can be repeated log2N times meaning that any length
that is a power of two can use this process.
79
4. FAST ALGORITHMS OF THE GNMNT
4.2.1 Radix-2 DIT
The rst of the two radix-2 algorithms is the DIT algorithm. It is derived by
splitting the N -length transform into two smaller N
2
-length transforms representing
even and odd parts. This can easily be visualised when taking into consideration
the methods of indexing, which is X2n for even indexing and X2n+1 for odd
indexing. This decomposes the ONMNT algorithm
X (k) =
*
N 1X
n=0
x(n)

2k + 1
2
n
+
Mp
(4.1)
into
X (k) = Xev (k) +Xod (k) : (4.2)
The even and odd components in (4.2) can be further expressed as
Xev (k) =
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n)

2k + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
= X2n (k)
(4.3)
and
Xod (k) =
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)

2k + 1
2
(2n+ 1)
+
Mp
(4.4)
Simplifying  in (4.4) produces


2k + 1
2
(2n+ 1)

= 

2k + 1
2
2n+
2k + 1
2

: (4.5)
Using the identity given in [7] where
 (a+ b) = 1 (a) (b) + 2 (a) ( b) (4.6)
then (4.5) can be rewritten as


2k + 1
2
2n+
2k + 1
2

=1

2k + 1
2



2k + 1
2
2n

+ 2

2k + 1
2



 2k + 1
2
2n

:
(4.7)
To obtain a general odd form we get
X2n+1 (k) =
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)

2k + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
(4.8)
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2k+1
2
2k+1
2
X(k)
X(N/2-k)
X(k+N/2)
X(N-k)
X(k)
X(N/2-k)
X(k+N/2)
X(N-k)
β1( )
2k+1
2
β1( )
2k+1
2
β2( )
2k+1
2
β2( )
2k+1
2
2k+1
2
2k+1
2
=
Figure 4.1: Radix-2 1D-ONMNT In-Place DIT Butter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and
X2n+1 (N   k) =
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)

 2k + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
: (4.9)
Before combining (4.7) and (4.8) we rst need to correct the nal term in (4.7),
which because of the periodic properties of the transform, can be expressed as
Xod =

1

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (k) + 2

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (N   k)

Mp
: (4.10)
Combining (4.8) and (4.10) produces the rst point k as
X (k) =

X2n (k) + 1

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (k) + 2

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (N   k)

Mp
: (4.11)
In radix-2 there are four points: k, N
2
  k, k+ N
2
and N   k. Equation (4.11) shows
the point k. Dening subsequent points is a little more involved and requires k
to be replaced with the point position that is currently being derived. Similarly,
it can be easy to get all equations at dierent point by replacing k. For example
point N
2
  k, * N
2
  k :, N
2
  k   1 by denition, then

"
2
 
N
2   k   1

+ 1
2
2n
#
= 

N   2k   1
2
2n

(4.12)

"
2
 
k + N2

+ 1
2
2n
#
= 

N + 2k + 1
2
2n

(4.13)
and


2 (N   k   1) + 1
2
2n

= 

2N   2k   1
2
2n

: (4.14)
According to the  in each point derived in (4.12)-(4.14), the following points can
be derived by the respective processes as
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X2n+1
 
N
2   k

=
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)
"
2
 
N
2   k   1

+ 1
2
2n
#+
Mp
=
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)

 2k + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
= X2n+1 (N   k)
(4.15)
X2n+1
 
k + N2

=
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)
"
2
 
k + N2

+ 1
2
2n
#+
Mp
=
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)

2k + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
= X2n+1 (k)
(4.16)
and
X2n+1 (N   k) =
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)

2 (N   k   1) + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
=
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)

 2k + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
= X2n+1 (N   k) :
(4.17)
The point
 
N
2
  k is derived as
X
 
N
2   k

=
D
Xev
 
N
2   k

+Xod
 
N
2   k
+
Mp
=
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n)
"
2
 
N
2   k   1

+ 1
2
2n
#
+
N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)
"
2
 
N
2   k   1

+ 1
2
(2n+ 1)
#+
Mp
=
*
X2n
 
N
2   k

+ 1
"
2
 
N
2   k   1

+ 1
2
#
X2n+1
 
N
2   k

+ 2
"
2
 
N
2   k   1

+ 1
2
#
X2n+1

N    N2   k
+
Mp
=
*
X2n (N   k)  1

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (N   k)
+ 2

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (k)
+
Mp
:
(4.18)
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Similarly, in addition to equations (4.11) and (4.18) the rest of the points will be
derived respectively as
X
 
k + N2

=
*
X2n (k)  1

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (k)
  2

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (N   k)
+
Mp
(4.19)
and
X (N   k) =
*
X2n (N   k) + 1

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (N   k)
  2

2k + 1
2

X2n+1 (k)
+
Mp
:
(4.20)
The radix-2 ONMNT DIT buttery is shown in Figure 4.1.
4.2.2 Radix-2 DIF
The radix-2 DIF algorithm is the complement of the DIT. With the NMNT, the
DIT transform also serves to calculate the forward and inverse transforms, as
does the DIF. However, with the ONMNT the transform eectively transposes
the kernel, which essentially rules out the ability to use the same transformation
technique for the inverse. As such, the inverse ONMNT must therefore rely
upon the DIF algorithm. It too breaks the N -length transform into two smaller
N
2
-length transforms but this time representing left and right sequences. This is so
represented by the indexing, which is x(n) for the left part and x(n + N
2
) for the
right part.
The DIF starts with a variation of equation (4.1)
X (k) =
*
N 1X
n=0
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k
+
Mp
(4.21)
and is split into left and right components where
X (k) = X left (2k) +Xright (2k + 1) ; (4.22)
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which expands to
X (k) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k

+
N 1X
n=N
2
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k
+
Mp
(4.23)
noting that where we previously used 
 
2k+1
2
n

in DIT, we swap n and k to obtain

 
2n+1
2
k

as the direct algorithm produces a transposed kernel, so we need to
invert the transpose during the inverse procedure through the DIF. We can now
begin to use a common sequence where
X (k) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k

+
N
2
 1X
n=0
x

n+
N
2


"
2
 
n+ N2

+ 1
2
k
#+
Mp
: (4.24)
The next step is to solve the last term of  so

"
2
 
n+ N2

+ 1
2
k
#
= 

N + 2n+ 1
2
k

(4.25)
and subsequently


N + 2n+ 1
2
k

= 

Nk
2
+
2n+ 1
2
k

: (4.26)
Applying the identity from [7], equation (4.26) can be written as
1

Nk
2



2n+ 1
2
k

+ 2

Nk
2



 2n+ 1
2
k

: (4.27)
By combining (4.24) and (4.27) we then get
X (k) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0

x(n) + 1

Nk
2

x

n+
N
2

+ 2

Nk
2

x(N   n)



2n+ 1
2
k
+
Mp
:
(4.28)
Assessing 2 in (4.28) it is clear to see that due to the periodicity of
N
2
and that for
all Nk then 2(
Nk
2
) = 0. The nal term cancels out leaving
X (k) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0

x(n) + 1

Nk
2

x

n+
N
2



2n+ 1
2
k
+
Mp
: (4.29)
Substituting 2k and 2k + 1 into (4.29) and replacing k,
X (2k) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0

x(n) + 1

2Nk
2

x

n+
N
2



2n+ 1
2
2k
+
Mp
(4.30)
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Figure 4.2: Radix-2 1D-ONMNT In-Place DIF Butter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where 1
 
2Nk
2

= 1 producing
X (2k) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0

x(n) + x

n+
N
2



2n+ 1
2
2k
+
Mp
(4.31)
and
X (2k + 1) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0

x(n) + 1

N(2k + 1)
2

x

n+
N
2



2n+ 1
2
(2k + 1)
+
Mp
:
(4.32)
Using the identities in [7] equation (4.32) results in
X (2k + 1) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0

x(n)  x

n+
N
2



2n+ 1
2
2k +
2n+ 1
2
+
Mp
(4.33)
and nally produces
X (2k + 1) =
N2  1X
n=0
(
1

2n+ 1
2

x(n)  x

n+
N
2

+2

2n+ 1
2

x

N
2
  n

  x (N   n)



2n+ 1
2
2k
+
Mp
:
(4.34)
The radix-2 ONMNT DIF buttery is shown in Figure 4.2.
4.3 Radix-4 ONMNT
The main idea of radix-4 is to split the transform into four discrete parts and
process them at the same time. These attributes provide additional improvements
in terms of complexity and subsequently speed. However, the downside is that
only lengths that are derived as a power of four may be used. Therefore sequence
lengths of 8, 32, 128, 512, etc. cannot be processed using this method.
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4.3.1 Radix-4 DIT
According to the radix-2 ONMNT, equation (4.1) can be decomposed into
Xev (k) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0
x(2n)

2k + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
= X2n (k)
(4.35)
and
Xod (k) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0
x(2n+ 1)

2k + 1
2
(2n+ 1)
+
Mp
: (4.36)
Thus, when 2n turns into 4n and 4n+ 2, 2n+ 1 turns into 4n+ 1 and 4n+ 3, then
we have the requisite points to derive a radix-4 ONMNT. Again, noting that X2n
is even indexing and X2n+1 is odd indexing, then
X2n (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
x(4n)

2k + 1
2
4n

+
N
4
 1X
n=0
x(4n+ 2)

2k + 1
2
(4n+ 2)
+
Mp
: (4.37)
Decomposing the nal  term in (4.37) produces


2k + 1
2
(4n+ 2)

=  [2n (2k + 1) + (2k + 1)] (4.38)
and further decomposition produces
 [2n (2k + 1) + (2k + 1)] = 1 (2k + 1)

2k + 1
2
4n

+ 2 (2k + 1)

 2k + 1
2
4n

:
(4.39)
Applying (4.39) into (4.37) then produces the even part
X2n (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
x(4n)

2k + 1
2
4n

+ 1

2k + 1
2
2
 N4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 2)

2k + 1
2
4n

+ 2

2k + 1
2
2
 N4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 2)

 2k + 1
2
4n
+
Mp
:
(4.40)
In order to simplify (4.40) we dene
X4n (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
x(4n)

2k + 1
2
4n
+
Mp
(4.41)
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and
X4n (N   k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
x(4n)

 2k + 1
2
4n
+
Mp
: (4.42)
Applying (4.41) and (4.42) to (4.40) now produces
X2n (k) = X4n (k)+1

2k + 1
2
 2

X4n+2 (k)+2

2k + 1
2
 2

X4n+2 (N   k) : (4.43)
The odd part is denoted as
Xod (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
x(4n+ 1)

2k + 1
2
(4n+ 1)

+
N
4
 1X
n=0
x(4n+ 3)

2k + 1
2
(4n+ 3)
+
Mp
:
(4.44)
Simplifying both  terms in (4.44), produces


2k + 1
2
(4n+ 1)

= 

2k + 1
2
4n+
2k + 1
2

= 1

2k + 1
2



2k + 1
2
4n

+ 2

2k + 1
2



 2k + 1
2
4n
 (4.45)
and


2k + 1
2
(4n+ 3)

= 

2k + 1
2
4n+
2k + 1
2
 3

= 1

2k + 1
2
 3



2k + 1
2
4n

+ 2

2k + 1
2
 3



 2k + 1
2
4n

:
(4.46)
Applying equations (4.45) and (4.46) into (4.44) produces
Xod (k) =
*
1

2k + 1
2
 N4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 1)

2k + 1
2
4n

+ 2

2k + 1
2
 N4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 1)

 2k + 1
2
4n

+ 1

2k + 1
2
 3
 N4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 3)

2k + 1
2
4n

+ 2

2k + 1
2
 3
 N4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 3)

 2k + 1
2
4n
+
Mp
:
(4.47)
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Similar to (4.41), dene
X4n+1 (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
x(4n+ 1)

2k + 1
2
4n
+
Mp
(4.48)
and
X4n+3 (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
x(4n+ 3)

2k + 1
2
4n
+
Mp
(4.49)
then by applying (4.48) and (4.49) into (4.47) we get the odd part
Xod (k) =
*
1

2k + 1
2

X4n+1 (k) + 2

2k + 1
2

X4n+1 (N   k)
+ 1

2k + 1
2
 3

X4n+3 (k) + 2

2k + 1
2
 3

X4n+3 (N   k)
+
Mp
:
(4.50)
The equation of ONMNT radix-4 at point k is
X (k) = Xev (k) +Xod (k) (4.51)
and in the decomposed form becomes
X (k) =
*
X4n (k)+1

2k + 1
2
 2

X4n+2 (k) + 2

2k + 1
2
 2

X4n+2 (N   k)
+1

2k + 1
2

X4n+1 (k) + 2

2k + 1
2

X4n+1 (N   k)
+1

2k + 1
2
 3

X4n+3 (k) + 2

2k + 1
2
 3

X4n+3 (N   k)
+
Mp
:
(4.52)
In radix-4 there are eight points: k, N4   k, k + N4 , N2   k, k + N2 , 3N4   k, k + 3N4 and
N   k. Equations (4.51) and (4.52) show the point k.
Similarly, it can be easy to get all equations at dierent point by replacing k.
For example point N4   k, * N4   k :, N4   k   1 by denition, then
X4n (k)
k=
N
4  k     ! X4n
 
N
4   k

=
*N
4  1X
n=0
x(4n)
"
2
 
N
4   k   1

+ 1
2
4n
#+
Mp
: (4.53)
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Figure 4.3: Radix-4 1D-ONMNT In-Place DIT Butter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Decomposing the  term in (4.53) produces

"
2
 
N
4   k   1

+ 1
2
4n
#
= 
 N
2   2k   1
2
4n

= 

 2k + 1
2
4n
 (4.54)
We can identify the following  identities:
1
"
2
 
N
4   k   1

+ 1
2
 2
#
=  1

2k + 1
2
 2

(4.55)
2
"
2
 
N
4   k   1

+ 1
2
 2
#
= 2

2k + 1
2
 2

(4.56)
1
"
2
 
N
4   k   1

+ 1
2
#
= 2

2k + 1
2

(4.57)
2
"
2
 
N
4   k   1

+ 1
2
#
= 1

2k + 1
2

(4.58)
1
"
2
 
N
4   k   1

+ 1
2
 3
#
=  2

2k + 1
2
 3

(4.59)
and
2
"
2
 
N
4   k   1

+ 1
2
 3
#
=  1

2k + 1
2
 3

: (4.60)
Substituting the identities (4.55)-(4.60) into (4.52) will derive the point N4   k. The
rest of the points can be shown as follows, where we substitute 2k+12 with  for ease of
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reference 266666666666666666664
X (k)
X
 
N
4   k

X
 
k + N4

X
 
N
2   k

X
 
k + N2

X
 
3N
4   k

X
 
k + 3N4

X (N   k)
377777777777777777775
=
266666666666666666664
A+B2 +B1 +B3
A+B2 +B1  B3
A B2  B1 +B3
A B2 +B1 +B3
A+B2  B1  B3
A+B2  B1 +B3
A B2 +B1  B3
A B2  B1  B3
377777777777777777775
(4.61)
where
A = X4n (k) (4.62)
A = X4n
 
N
4   k

(4.63)
Bm =


1 (m)X4n+m (k) + 2 (m)X4n+m
 
N
4   k

Mp
(4.64)
and
Bm =


2 (m)X4n+m (k)  1 (m)X4n+m
 
N
4   k

Mp
(4.65)
for m 2 f1; 2; 3g. The radix-4 ONMNT DIT buttery is shown in Figure 4.3.
4.3.2 Radix-4 DIF
Using the variation of the original algorithm shown in (4.21), the whole sequence is
evenly divided into sequences that are of length N
4
as
X (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k

+
N
2
 1X
n=N
4
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k

+
3N
4
 1X
n=N
2
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k

+
N 1X
n= 3N
4
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k
+
Mp
:
(4.66)
Adjusting the range in (4.66) we then obtain
X (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
(
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k

+ x

n+
N
4


"
2
 
n+ N4

+ 1
2
k
#
+ x

n+
2N
4


"
2
 
n+ 2N4

+ 1
2
k
#
+ x

n+
3N
4


"
2
 
n+ 3N4

+ 1
2
k
#)+
Mp
:
(4.67)
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and can be simplied as
X (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
"
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
k

+ x

n+
N
4



2n+ 1
2
k +
N
4
k

+ x

n+
N
2



2n+ 1
2
k +
N
2
k

+ x

n+
3N
4



2n+ 1
2
k +
3N
4
k
#+
Mp
:
(4.68)
The  terms in (4.68) can decomposed as


2n+ 1
2
k +
N
2
k

= 1

N
2
k



2n+ 1
2
k

+ 2

N
2
k



 2n+ 1
2
k

(4.69)
noting that the 2 term in (4.69) will always equate to zero, we further obtain


2n+ 1
2
k +
N
4
k

= 1

N
4
k



2n+ 1
2
k

+ 2

N
4
k



 2n+ 1
2
k

(4.70)
and


2n+ 1
2
k +
3N
4
k

= 1

3N
4
k



2n+ 1
2
k

+ 2

3N
4
k



 2n+ 1
2
k

: (4.71)
Substituting (4.69)-(4.71) into (4.68) produces
X (k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
"
x(n) + 1

N
2
k

x

n+
N
2

+ 1

N
4
k

x

n+
N
4

+ 2

N
4
k

x

N
2
  n

+ 1

3N
4
k

x

n+
3N
4

+ 2

3N
4
k

x (N   n)
#


2n+ 1
2
k
+
Mp
:
(4.72)
In radix-4, after reducing the length to N
4
, we have even parts: 4k, 4k + 2 and odd
parts: 4k+1 and 4k+3 . In terms of the even parts, we get the following identities
similar to (4.55)-(4.60), by rst substituting 4k into (4.72) replacing k:
1

N
2
4k

= 1 (4.73)
1

N
4
4k

= 1 (4.74)
2

N
4
4k

= 0 (4.75)
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and 4k + 2 into (4.72) replacing k:
1

N
2
(4k + 2)

= 1 (4.76)
1

N
4
(4k + 2)

=  1 (4.77)
and
2

N
4
(4k + 2)

= 0: (4.78)
Putting equations (4.73)-(4.75) back into (4.72) we get
X (4k) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
"
x(n) + x

n+
N
2

+ x

n+
N
4

+ x

n+
3N
4
#


2n+ 1
2
4k
+
Mp
(4.79)
and also replacing equations (4.76)-(4.78) we get
X (4k + 2) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
"
x(n) + x

n+
N
2

  x

n+
N
4

  x

n+
3N
4
#


2n+ 1
2
4k +
2n+ 1
2
 2
+
Mp
=
*N
4
 1X
n=0
(
1

2n+ 1
2
 2
h
x(n) + x

n+
N
2

  x

n+
N
4

  x

n+
3N
4
i
+ 2

2n+ 1
2
2
h
x

N
4
  n

+ x

3N
4
  n

  x

N
2
  n

  x (N   n)
i)


2n+ 1
2
4k
+
Mp
:
(4.80)
In terms of the odd parts, we get the following identities similar to (4.73)-(4.78),
by rst substituting 4k + 1 again into (4.72) replacing k:
1

N
2
(4k + 1)

=  1 (4.81)
1

N
4
(4k + 1)

= 0 (4.82)
2

N
4
(4k + 1)

= 1 (4.83)
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Figure 4.5: Radix-4 1D-ONMNT In-Place DIF Buttery
and nally 4k + 3 into (4.72) replacing k:
1

N
2
(4k + 3)

=  1 (4.84)
1

N
4
(4k + 3)

= 0 (4.85)
2

3N
4
(4k + 3)

= 1: (4.86)
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Putting equations (4.81)-(4.83) back into (4.72) we get
X (4k + 1) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
(
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
(4k + 1)

+ x

n+
N
4


"
2
 
n+ N4

+ 1
2
(4k + 1)
#
+ x

n+
N
2


"
2
 
n+ N2

+ 1
2
(4k + 1)
#
+ x

n+
3N
4


"
2
 
n+ 3N4

+ 1
2
(4k + 1)
#)+
Mp
=
*N
4
 1X
n=0
(
1

2n+ 1
2
"
x(n)  x

n+
N
2

+ x

N
4
  n

  x

3N
4
  n
#
+ 2

2n+ 1
2
"
x

N
2
  n

  x (N   n)
  x

n+
N
4

+ x

n+
3N
4
#)


2n+ 1
2
4k
+
Mp
:
(4.87)
and replacing (4.84)-(4.86) into (4.72) we get
X (4k + 3) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
(
x(n)

2n+ 1
2
(4k + 3)

+ x

n+
N
4


"
2
 
n+ N4

+ 1
2
(4k + 3)
#
+ x

n+
N
2


"
2
 
n+ N2

+ 1
2
(4k + 3)
#
+ x

n+
3N
4


"
2
 
n+ 3N4

+ 1
2
(4k + 3)
#)+
Mp
=
*N
4
 1X
n=0
(
1

2n+ 1
2
3
"
x(n)  x

n+
N
2

  x

N
4
  n

+ x

3N
4
  n
#
+ 2

2n+ 1
2
3
"
x

N
2
  n

  x (N   n)
+ x

n+
N
4

  x

n+
3N
4
#)


2n+ 1
2
4k
+
Mp
:
(4.88)
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The equations of the radix-4 ONMNT DIF can be shown as a condensed representation,
similar to equations (4.61)-(4.65) but this time substituting 2n+12 with  for ease of
reference 26666664
X (4k)
X (4k + 1)
X (4k + 2)
X (4k + 3)
37777775 = 1 (m)
26666664
A+B
A B
A+ C
A  C
37777775+ 2 (m)
26666664
C +D
C  D
D  B
D +B
37777775 (4.89)
where
A = x (n) + x

n+
N
2

(4.90)
A = x (n)  x

n+
N
2

(4.91)
B = x

n+
N
4

+ x

n+
3N
4

(4.92)
B = x

n+
N
4

  x

n+
3N
4

(4.93)
C = x

N
4
  n

+ x

3N
4
  n

(4.94)
C = x

N
4
  n

  x

3N
4
  n

(4.95)
D = x

N
2
  n

+ x (N   n) (4.96)
D = x

N
2
  n

  x (N   n) : (4.97)
and m is derived from X(4k +m) for m 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g. The radix-4 ONMNT DIF
buttery is shown in Figure 4.5.
4.4 Split-Radix ONMNT
The split-radix, which is sometimes referred to as radix-2/4, combines the versatility
of the radix-2 with the eciency of the radix-4 and manages to further reduce
the number of operations in the process. It accomplishes this by using L shaped
butteries, which are based on radix-4 that interlock against each other until two
points remain. These L shaped butteries can have either a single twiddle stage or
a dual twiddle stage, which are denoted in Figure 4.6. When there is no further
room to implement an L-buttery, which typically encompasses two sub-stages
of butteries and a sub-stage for the twiddle, a radix-2 buttery is then used.
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Split-Radix
L1 Butterfly
Split-Radix
L2 Butterfly
Radix-2 Butterfly
Figure 4.6: Split-Radix DIT Structure
This section will show how combining algorithms from the radix-2 and radix-4
implementations can derive the split-radix DIT and DIF algorithms.
4.4.1 Split-Radix DIT
The split-radix combines radix-2 and radix-4, specically the even part of radix-2
and the odd parts of radix-4. Therefore we decompose the initial ONMNT
algorithm in (4.1) into
X (k) = Xev (k) +Xod (k) (4.98)
where
Xev (k) =
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n)

2k + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
(4.99)
and
Xod (k) =
*N
4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 1)

(4n+ 1)
2k + 1
2

+
N
4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 3)

(4n+ 3)
2k + 1
2
+
Mp
:
(4.100)
Dening point X2n(k) as
X2n (k) =
*N
2  1X
n=0
x(2n)

2k + 1
2
2n
+
Mp
(4.101)
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Figure 4.7: Split-Radix 1D-ONMNT In-Place DIT Buttery
point X4n+1(k) as
X4n+1 (k) =
*N
4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 1)

2k + 1
2
4n
+
Mp
(4.102)
and point X4n+3(k) as
X4n+3 (k) =
*N
4  1X
n=0
x(4n+ 3)

2k + 1
2
4n
+
Mp
(4.103)
we can then apply (4.101) into (4.99) and (4.102)-(4.103) into (4.100) to produce
the recursive equation
X (k) =
*
X2n (k) + 1

2k + 1
2

X4n+1 (k) + 2

2k + 1
2

X4n+1 (k)
+ 1

2k + 1
2
 3

X4n+3 (k) + 2

2k + 1
2
 3

X4n+3 (k)
+
Mp
:
(4.104)
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Equations for all points of the split-radix ONMNT DIT buttery can now be
derived from 266666666666666666664
X (k)
X
 
N
4   k

X
 
k + N4

X
 
N
2   k

X
 
k + N2

X
 
3N
4   k

X
 
k + 3N4

X (N   k)
377777777777777777775
=
266666666666666666664
A+B1 +B3
A+B1  B3
A B1 +B3
A+B1 +B3
A B1  B3
A B1 +B3
A+B1  B3
A B1  B3
377777777777777777775
(4.105)
where
A = X2n (k) (4.106)
A = X2n
 
N
2   k

(4.107)
Bm =


1 (m)X4n+m (k) + 2 (m)X4n+m
 
N
4   k

Mp
(4.108)
Bm =


1 (m)X4n+m (k)  2 (m)X4n+m
 
N
4   k

Mp
(4.109)
and m 2 f1; 3g. The split-radix ONMNT DIT buttery is shown in Figure 4.7.
4.4.2 Split-Radix DIF
Similar to the DIT split-radix, we initially start from (4.1) and subsequently derive
X (k) = X left (k) +Xright (k) (4.110)
where X left (k) is the left part. More specically it comes from the radix-2 ONMNT
DIF. Additionally, Xright (k) contains the right parts of the radix-4 ONMNT DIF.
Thus, the left sequence that is rst shown in (4.31) as
X (2k) =
*N
2
 1X
n=0

x(n) + x

n+
N
2



2n+ 1
2
2k
+
Mp
(4.111)
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Figure 4.8: Split-Radix 1D-ONMNT In-Place DIF Buttery
Similarly, the right parts of the radix-4 ONMNT DIF (4.87) and (4.88) as
X (4k + 1) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
(
1

2n+ 1
2
"
x(n)  x

n+
N
2

+ x

N
4
  n

  x

3N
4
  n
#
+ 2

2n+ 1
2
"
x

N
2
  n

  x (N   n)
  x

n+
N
4

+ x

n+
3N
4
#)


2n+ 1
2
4k
+
Mp
(4.112)
and
X (4k + 3) =
*N
4
 1X
n=0
(
1

2n+ 1
2
 3
"
x(n)  x

n+
N
2

  x

N
4
  n

+ x

3N
4
  n
#
+ 2

2n+ 1
2
 3
"
x

N
2
  n

  x (N   n)
+ x

n+
N
4

  x

n+
3N
4
#)


2n+ 1
2
4k
+
Mp
:
(4.113)
The split-radix ONMNT DIF buttery is shown in Figure 4.8.
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4.5 Complexity Analysis
Using the direct methods, similar to the discrete Fourier transform, the complexity
is represented as N2 multiplications and N(N   1) additions. This is typical of
multiplying a vector with a matrix. Applying the fast algorithm techniques that
were proposed by [120] can have a signicant impact in reducing this complexity.
Using the fast algorithms signicantly reduces this computation complexity as
shown in Table 4.1. However, focusing on implementations where it is common for
CPUs to take longer performing multiplication in comparison to additions, so the
number of multiplications will be doubled to reect this in respect of [122] as a
typical example. Therefore, in order to integrate this adjustment and normalise the
complexity, an adjust factor of  = 2 will be applied to derive the complexities of
multiplication and fused-multiply-add operations with respect to complexity. The
complexity for the radix-2 ONMNT can be shown to be
M(N) = N (log2N   1) (4.114)
and
A(N) =
3
2
N log2N +
N
2
; (4.115)
taking note that the rst round of twiddle calculations can be reduced to trivial
additions and this has therefore been reected in the calculation of the number
Table 4.1: ONMNT Radix-2 Complexity
Radix-2 Direct Improvement %
N Mults Adds Total Mults Adds Total Mults Adds Total
4 8 14 22 32 12 44 75.00 -16.67 50.00
8 32 40 72 128 56 184 75.00 28.57 60.87
16 96 104 200 512 240 752 81.25 56.67 73.40
32 256 256 512 2048 992 3040 87.50 74.19 83.16
64 640 608 1248 8192 4032 12224 92.19 84.92 89.79
128 1536 1408 2944 32768 16256 49024 95.31 91.34 93.99
256 3584 3200 6784 131072 65280 196352 97.27 95.10 96.54
512 8192 7168 15360 524288 261632 785920 98.44 97.26 98.05
1024 18432 15872 34304 2097152 1047552 3144704 99.12 98.48 98.91
2048 40960 34816 75776 8388608 4192256 12580864 99.51 99.17 99.40
4096 90112 75776 165888 33554432 16773120 50327552 99.73 99.55 99.67
8192 196608 163840 360448 134217728 67100672 201318400 99.85 99.76 99.82
16384 425984 352256 778240 536870912 268419072 805289984 99.92 99.87 99.90
32768 917504 753664 1671168 2147483648 1073709056 3221192704 99.96 99.93 99.95
65536 1966080 1605632 3571712 8589934592 4294901760 12884836352 99.98 99.96 99.97
131072 4194304 3407872 7602176 34359738368 17179738112 51539476480 99.99 99.98 99.99
262144 8912896 7208960 16121856 137438953472 68719214592 206158168064 99.99 99.99 99.99
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Table 4.2: ONMNT Radix-4 Complexity
Radix-4 Radix-2 Improvement %
N Mults Adds Total Mults Adds Total Mults Adds Total
4 8 10 18 8 14 22 0.00 28.57 18.18
16 80 84 164 96 104 200 16.67 19.23 18.00
64 512 512 1024 640 608 1248 20.00 15.79 17.95
256 2816 2752 5568 3584 3200 6784 21.43 14.00 17.92
1024 14336 13824 28160 18432 15872 34304 22.22 12.90 17.91
4096 69632 66560 136192 90112 75776 165888 22.73 12.16 17.90
16384 327680 311296 638976 425984 352256 778240 23.08 11.63 17.89
65536 1507328 1425408 2932736 1966080 1605632 3571712 23.33 11.22 17.89
262144 6815744 6422528 13238272 8912896 7208960 16121856 23.53 10.91 17.89
of multiplications and additions respectively in (4.114) and (4.115). The radix-4
ONMNT improves upon this complexity by signicantly reducing the number of
operations through halving the number of stages. However, this requires a further
sub-stage to be calculated for each stage, which results in N more additions taking
place. Depending on how this sub-stage is handled, a further re-ordering may be
required so as typically there will be N
4
signal lines that will be derived out of place,
which can be clearly seen in Figure 4.3. The complexity of the radix-4 transform
can be shown to be
M(N) =

N
2
(3 log4N   1)

 (4.116)
and
A(N) =
N
4
(11 log4N   1) ; (4.117)
Table 4.3: ONMNT Split-Radix Complexity
Split-Radix Radix-4 Improvement % Radix-2 Improvement %
N Mults Adds Total Mults Adds Total Mults Adds Total Mults Adds Total Mults Adds Total
4 8 10 18 8 10 18 0.00 0.00 0.00 8 14 22 0.00 28.57 18.18
8 24 30 54 32 40 72 25.00 25.00 25.00
16 72 82 154 80 84 164 10.00 2.38 6.10 96 104 200 25.00 21.15 23.00
32 184 206 390 256 256 512 28.13 19.53 23.83
64 456 498 954 512 512 1024 10.94 2.73 6.84 640 608 1248 28.75 18.09 23.56
128 1080 1166 2246 1536 1408 2944 29.69 17.19 23.71
256 2504 2674 5178 2816 2752 5568 11.08 2.83 7.00 3584 3200 6784 30.13 16.44 23.67
512 5688 6030 11718 8192 7168 15360 30.57 15.88 23.71
1024 12744 13426 26170 14336 13824 28160 11.10 2.88 7.07 18432 15872 34304 30.86 15.41 23.71
2048 28216 29582 57798 40960 34816 75776 31.11 15.03 23.73
4096 61896 64626 126522 69632 66560 136192 11.11 2.91 7.10 90112 75776 165888 31.31 14.71 23.73
8192 134712 140174 274886 196608 163840 360448 31.48 14.44 23.74
16384 291272 302194 593466 327680 311296 638976 11.11 2.92 7.12 425984 352256 778240 31.62 14.21 23.74
32768 626232 648078 1274310 917504 753664 1671168 31.75 14.01 23.75
65536 1339848 1383538 2723386 1507328 1425408 2932736 11.11 2.94 7.14 1966080 1605632 3571712 31.85 13.83 23.75
131072 2854456 2941838 5796294 4194304 3407872 7602176 31.94 13.68 23.75
262144 6058440 6233202 12291642 6815744 6422528 13238272 11.11 2.95 7.15 8912896 7208960 16121856 32.03 13.54 23.76
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Table 4.4: ONMNT Fused-Split-Radix Complexity
Fused-Split-Radix Split-Radix Improvement %
N Mults Adds FMAs Total Mults Adds Total Mults Adds FMAs Total
4 4 8 4 16 8 10 18 50.00 20.00 -22.22 11.11
8 12 24 12 48 24 30 54 50.00 20.00 -22.22 11.11
16 36 64 36 136 72 82 154 50.00 21.95 -23.38 11.69
32 92 160 92 344 184 206 390 50.00 22.33 -23.59 11.79
64 228 384 228 840 456 498 954 50.00 22.89 -23.90 11.95
128 540 896 540 1976 1080 1166 2246 50.00 23.16 -24.04 12.02
256 1252 2048 1252 4552 2504 2674 5178 50.00 23.41 -24.18 12.09
512 2844 4608 2844 10296 5688 6030 11718 50.00 23.58 -24.27 12.14
1024 6372 10240 6372 22984 12744 13426 26170 50.00 23.73 -24.35 12.17
2048 14108 22528 14108 50744 28216 29582 57798 50.00 23.85 -24.41 12.20
4096 30948 49152 30948 111048 61896 64626 126522 50.00 23.94 -24.46 12.23
8192 67356 106496 67356 241208 134712 140174 274886 50.00 24.03 -24.50 12.25
16384 145636 229376 145636 520648 291272 302194 593466 50.00 24.10 -24.54 12.27
32768 313116 491520 313116 1117752 626232 648078 1274310 50.00 24.16 -24.57 12.29
65536 669924 1048576 669924 2388424 1339848 1383538 2723386 50.00 24.21 -24.60 12.30
131072 1427228 2228224 1427228 5082680 2854456 2941838 5796294 50.00 24.26 -24.62 12.31
262144 3029220 4718592 3029220 10777032 6058440 6233202 12291642 50.00 24.30 -24.64 12.32
representing multiplication and addition respectively, with representations of these
complexities shown for dierent lengths of N in Table 4.2. Using the radix-4
signicantly improves upon the radix-2. However, there is a penalty for this in that
the radix-4 algorithm can only process lengths that are themselves a power of four.
This may well mean that these bounds are too big to adequately and eciently
process a radix-4 length. Representing the nal derivation of a fast ONMNT
implementation, the complexity for the split-radix ONMNT can be shown to be
M(N) =

2
3
N log2N  
4
9
N +
4
9
( 1)log2N

 (4.118)
and while the number of additions can be expressed as
A(N) =
4
3
N log2N  
2
9
N +
2
9
( 1)log2N : (4.119)
At the cost of a little inconvenience in processing the split-radix, we gain both
an improvement in the processing complexity and the ability to process all vector
lengths that are available to radix-2 as shown in Table 4.3. Typically, a critical
evaluation of complexity analysis in current architectures usually shows that there
is an emphasis in contrasting algorithms between the multiplication and addition
operations, rather than considering the total number of operations and how they
can be grouped and implemented. With current architectures, a multiplication
operation can be typically processed in the same time as it takes to perform an
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Figure 4.10: Complexity of Dierent Radices by Total Operations
addition operation [123]. Also, operators are now available that can combine
three operands into a fused multiplication and accumulate (FMA), a process rst
introduced in [124]. Such operators have been implemented in many architectures
including [123], [125] and [126] for example, which can be carried out at regular
addition speeds within the constraints of the word size [123]. Using these types of
architectures, it would therefore be possible to combine half of the multiplicative
operations of the ONMNT with an equal number of addition operations using
fused multiply and accumulate operators. This would signicantly reduce the total
number of operations that are required by half of the number of multiplications.
By implementing on appropriate architecture, the number of operations would be
reected to those shown in Table 4.4. A modied complexity calculation can
therefore be shown to be
F (N) =

1
3
N log2N  
2
9
N +
2
9
( 1)log2N

; (4.120)
M(N) =

1
3
N log2N  
2
9
N +
2
9
( 1)log2N

 (4.121)
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Figure 4.11: Processing Time for Vectors of Length 2N
and
A(N) = N log2N; (4.122)
representing the FMA operations and discrete multiply and addition operations
respectively. The total number of operations is calculated by
T (N) =
2+ 3
3
N log2N  
4
9
N +
4
9
( 1)log2N : (4.123)
The improvement in reducing processing complexity that this process can provide
is shown in Figure 4.10. This is further demonstrated by observing and example of
a typical implementation in Listing A.6.
Listing 4.1: Typical Implementation
unsigned int t00, t11, t10, t01, in0, in1, out0, out1;
unsigned int B1[N], B2[N];
t00 = in0 * B1[theta];
t11 = in1 * B1[theta];
t10 = in1 * B2[theta];
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Figure 4.12: Time to Process  1010 bits Using Vectors of Length 2N
t01 = in0 * B2[theta];
out0 = t00 + t10;
out1 = t11 - t01;
By removing half of the multiplications and the equivalent number of additions to
implement the FMA commands, we can see that not only has the complexity been
reduced but also the number of operations as shown in Listing 4.2.
Listing 4.2: Fused-Multiply-Accumulate Implementation
unsigned int t0, t1, in0, in1, out0, out1;
unsigned int B1[N], iB[N], B2[N];
t0 = in0 * B1[theta];
t1 = in1 * iB1[theta];
out0 = fma(in1, B2[theta], t0);
out1 = fma(in0, B2[theta], t1);
In this updated variation, there remains the requirement to provide the requisite
subtraction operation. However, this minor issue can be overcome by implementing
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twos-complement negation equivalent table for 1 (shown in 4.2 as iB1[theta]) and
would reduce the processing time from six-cycles to four-cycles per buttery for a
33:3% processing improvement, at a cost of introducing an additional table of size
log2N . At worst, performing the extra subtraction to the variable t1 in order to
save memory may be preferable, in which case this processing time is only reduced
to ve-cycles, which would improve the processing time by only 16:7%.
4.5.1 Higher Radices of the GNMNT
While there are clearly tangible benets in terms of reduced complexity to be
obtained in developing the radix-4 and split-radix-2/4, this comes at a cost
of implementation complexity, which becomes progressively more dicult with
successive increases of the radices. Moreover, increasing the radix also restricts the
exibility of the transform as it constrains the available lengths of the transform
to multiples of N = rs where r is the selected radix and s is the exponent used
to congure the length, which is shown more clearly in Table 4.5. To incorporate
higher radices with lengths that aren't directly supported by these radices as
shown in Table 4.5 would require that the implementation consist of a split-radix
scheme. However, this would impede the implementation with respect to structural
complexity, which can also have a negative impact on resource constrained devices
Table 4.5: Available Lengths N = rs According to Radix
r
2 4 8 16
s
2 4 - - -
3 8 - - -
4 16 16 - -
5 32 - - -
6 64 64 64 -
7 128 - - -
8 256 256 - 256
9 512 - 512 -
10 1024 1024 - -
11 2048 - - -
12 4096 4096 4096 4096
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where program and memory sizes are primary concerns. What is unintuitive
with Table 4.5 is that some lengths are unavailable owing to the buttery for the
particular radix consisting of 2r points, therefore suggesting that the minimum
implementation size would be r2 and not r.
4.6 Performance Analysis of the One-Dimensional
Derivations
A signicant factor governing implementation should be taken into consideration
by using languages such as OpenCL [127] and other architectures incorporating
features such as advanced vector extensions (AVX) [126], where it is possible
to combine similar operations across multiple signal lines within vector variables
simultaneously. These types of techniques are encompassed by single-instruction
multiple-data (SIMD) described in [128], which debuted in Intels processer with
multimedia extensions (MMX) [129]. An example how this would benet a buttery
implementation using OpenCL is shown in Listing 4.3.
Listing 4.3: Vectorised Fused-Multiply-Accumulate Implementation
unsigned int2 t0, in, out;
unsigned int B1[N], iB[N], B2[N];
t = (unsigned int2)(in.0 * B1[theta], in.1 * iB1[theta]);
out = fma(in.10, (unsigned int2)(B2[theta]), t);
This new method would further reduce the processing time to only two cycles
when using the additional negated 1 table or three-cycles if incorporating the
extra subtraction, resulting in a overall performance improvements of 66:7% and
50% respectively. Such methodologies imply natural parallelism where a small
number of operations can be unrolled out of loops into vectors. However, there
are limits imposed upon such practices with respect to the maximum allowable
size of the vector and the optimum size before the hardware incurs penalties. The
latter imposition is a reection to how the architecture is addressing memory. For
example, the AMD 7970 is able to manipulate up to 16 elements and can access
128 bits of memory using a single variable without incurring any performance
penalties. These constraints reect congurations of 16  8-bit chars, 8  16-bit
shorts, 4  32-bit integers / single precision oats or 2  64-bit long integers
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/ double precision oats without any performance penalties. Further constraints
would be imposed if one or more data words are accessed that cross a 128-bit
boundary, which would likely to be similar to an unaligned memory access. Aside
from these constraints, it would be possible to process, depending on the word size
being used, a number of operations simultaneously in the time it would normally
take to process a single operation, thereby increasing the processing performance
even further. This would obviously require additional implementation planning as
where a loop would be designed to process N lines within a stage, the loop could
potentially be reduced by N
2
, N
4
, N
8
or even N
16
, depending on the capabilities and
versatilities of the architecture and implementation respectively. The next step in
enhancing the performance is naturally to employ parallel processing techniques on
parallel capable devices. With respect to the current development of CPUs, there
is already scope at least to incorporate multiple processing cores. Going further
would utilise available streams within a CPU that are dedicated to the onboard
GPU. Increasing performance even more would either suggest using more CPUs,
which can be costly and require specialised hardware to incorporate multiple CPUs
on the same board, or to use other options such as discrete GPUs or CPU cards.
Using additional discrete hardware can by far be the most versatile solution and
sometimes the cheapest. While a CPU card, such as the many integrated core
(MIC) architecture oered by Intel [130] oer the greatest versatility, but the
highest cost. A cheaper alternative would be to use a GPU that is applicable for
GPGPU computing.
There are many benets with following the GPGPU route in that there are
usually a signicantly greater number of cores available with GPGPU computing
typically than MIC solutions. Respectively, this currently represents a ratio of
36:1 with respect to available stream processors / cores. Additionally, the GPUs
are signicantly cheaper than MICs. However, GPGPUs are more specialised
and require a signicant amount of application development to fully realise their
potential, whereas MICs, being more general purpose, are typically more adaptable.
Of course, should one go fully down the parallel route, it may turn out that the
fastest method to implement by far would be the direct method, as depending on
the size of N and the constraints of the architecture, so all of the multiplications
would occur simultaneously. Subsequently, there would be log2N reduction stages
that would add all of the appropriate results. This would suggest a signicant
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improvement over a sequence involving 2 log2N   1 radix-2 or 3 log2N radix-4 /
split-radix total sub-stages. In addition to this, there would be a delay of at least
two successive operations in each twiddle sub-stage; one to perform the initial
multiplication of either 1 or 2, followed by combining the result with a fused
multiply accumulate of the composite signal path. However, in order to perform
a vector by matrix multiplication simultaneously in parallel, the involvement of
operating with twiddles would be completely removed.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced complete developments of the radix-2, radix-4 and
split-radix algorithms for the ONMNT, in both DIT and DIF. The importance in
developing fast and ecient implementations is to ensure that economical, fast and
versatile methods exist such that applications for real-time systems are tenable.
These implementations have been assessed according to the number of mathematical
operations that they require and tested to conrm the successive improvements in
execution time. Additionally, methods using new architectures have been included
to signify the impact that the architectures have in the future development of
new algorithms. While no direct comparisons in terms of speed by incorporating
these new architectures have been made, they have been implemented in a parallel
processing capacity, which was used to provide the exhaustive assessments in
Chapter 6.
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Chapter 5
The Row-Column GNMNT
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, the 1D GNMNT has been presented and shown that it
can be calculated either as a fast algorithm or by the direct method. However,
there are also a number of areas where 2D processing is relevant, particularly in
image- and signal-processing applications where there are many areas that thrive
on such techniques and also on cryptography [104, 131{134]. As such, there are
many algorithms to facilitate the wealth of applications including the 2D-Fourier
Transform, 2D-Wavelet Transform and the 2D-Hartley Transform, to name but
few [135{137].
This chapter introduces the 2D-GNMNT using the row-column (RC) method,
including the extra calculations that are required in order to use the RC technique,
which is a non-separable algorithm used to attain a true 2D-algorithm. The RC
method of processing an N  N area can be seen as one of the most convenient
methods of using a single-dimensional algorithm to provide the functionality of a
two-dimensional algorithm. The RC achieves this by rst transforming the desired
matrix row-by-row and then transforming the resultant rows in a column-by-column
fashion. However, the RC algorithm on its own will not provide the desired results
when using the GNMNT because the  term is not separable when used in this
manner and therefore the RC method must be further processed. The initial
two-dimensional algorithm is shown for each of the GNMNTs, beginning with the
NMNT for an introductory point of reference, where steps to derive the forward and
inverse 2D transforms; also included are the steps required to enable the transforms
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to be separable are provided.
5.2 RC-NMNT
The standard algorithm for the 2D-NMNT is
X(k1; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2) (n1k1; n2k2)
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1: (5.1)
However, as the  term in the 2D-NMNT is non-separable due to its characteristic,
then it can be shown that processing the NMNT using the RC method actually
yields the following algorithm
XRC(k1; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2) (n1k1) (n2k2)
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1:
(5.2)
This is obviously a dierent algorithm because it is clear that
 (n1k1; n2k2) 6=  (n1k1) (n2k2) : (5.3)
Therefore, in order to achieve the separable version of the NMNT an additional step
is required, which was rst described in [138]. This step is achieved by breaking
down the  (n1k1; n2k2) term to
 (n1k1; n2k2) = h1 (n1k1; n2k2) + 2 (n1k1; n2k2)iMp : (5.4)
where we can further derive 1 and 2 by their denitions as
1 (n1k1; n2k2) =
D
Re (1 + j2)
n1k1+n2k2
E
Mp
(5.5)
and
2 (n1k1; n2k2) =
D
Im (1 + j2)
n1k1+n2k2
E
Mp
: (5.6)
Equations (5.5) and (5.6) can be further processed by expanding the exponential
term as
1 (n1k1; n2k2) =
D
Re
h
(1 + j2)
n1k1 (1 + j2)
n2k2
iE
Mp
(5.7)
and
2 (n1k1; n2k2) =
D
Im
h
(1 + j2)
n1k1 (1 + j2)
n2k2
iE
Mp
: (5.8)
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Simplifying the 1 term in (5.7) produces
1 (n1k1; n2k2) = Re
D h
Re (1 + j2)
n1k1 + jIm (1 + j2)
n1k1
i

h
Re (1 + j2)
n2k2 + jIm (1 + j2)
n2k2
i E
Mp
= Re
D
1 (n1k1)1 (n2k2) + j1 (n1k1)2 (n2k2)
+ j1 (n2k2)2 (n1k1)  2 (n1k1)2 (n2k2)
E
Mp
= 1 (n1k1 + n2k2)
(5.9)
and similarly
2 (n1k1; n2k2) = 2 (n1k1 + n2k2) : (5.10)
Substituting (5.9) and (5.10) into (5.4) produces
 (n1k1; n2k2) =
D
1 (n1k1 + n2k2) + 2 (n1k1 + n2k2)
E
Mp
=  (n1k1 + n2k2)
=
D
1 (n1k1) (n2k2) + 2 (n1k1) ( n2k2)
E
Mp
(5.11)
because
1 (n1k1) =
D
 (n1k1)  2 (n1k1)
E
Mp
(5.12)
and
1 ( n1k1) = 1 (n1k1)
=
D
 ( n1k1) + 2 (n1k1)
E
Mp
:
(5.13)
Combining (5.12) and (5.13) produces
21 (n1k1) =
D
 (n1k1) +  ( n2k2)
E
Mp
(5.14)
thus
1 (n1k1) =
*
1
2

 (n1k1) +  ( n2k2)
+
Mp
(5.15)
and
2 (n1k1) =
*
1
2

 (n1k1)   ( n2k2)
+
Mp
: (5.16)
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Substituting (5.15) and (5.16) into (5.11) produces
 (n1k1; n2k2) =
D
1 (n1k1) (n2k2) + 2 (n1k1) ( n2k2)
E
Mp
=
*
1
2
h
 (n1k1) +  ( n1k1)
i
 (n2k2)
+
1
2
h
 (n1k1)   ( n1k1)
i
 ( n2k2)
+
Mp
=
Dh
 (n1k1) (n2k2) +  ( n1k1) (n2k2)
+  (n1k1) ( n2k2)   ( n1k1) ( n2k2)
i
2p 1
E
Mp
:
(5.17)
Applying XRC (k1; k2) to (5.1) produces the full separable 2D transform for the
NMNT and can therefore be written as
X (k1; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x (n1; n2)
(h
 (n1k1) (n2k2) +  ( n1k1) (n2k2)
+  (n1k1) ( n2k2)   ( n1k1) ( n2k2)
i
2p 1
)+
Mp
(5.18)
and further simplied as
X (k1; k2) =
Dh
XRC (k1; k2) +XRC ( k1; k2)
+XRC (k1; k2) XRC ( k1; k2)
i
2p 1
E
Mp
:
(5.19)
A demonstration of how this is presented is shown in Figure 5.1, which started by
reducing the cameraman image to an 8  8 array and using the RC technique to
transform the data to a 2D-NMNT, using N = 8, p = 13 and Mp = 8191. The data
is shown as it progresses through the various stages of the process, both forwards
and backwards.
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150 158 166 172 171 161 154 146
166 182 172 89 152 178 166 154
169 128 38 60 106 163 163 149
165 48 7 21 91 166 162 150
150 57 8 71 122 154 163 146
104 14 20 99 122 98 120 108
125 29 38 109 134 116 119 117
120 58 74 128 125 125 119 114
7529 2694 481 4482 193 7035 485 2675
7002 1040 469 6771 4793 7249 6809 1345
115 7364 43 2416 8142 965 8146 5741
843 6700 7642 4925 7343 3853 2856 994
295 2738 83 2628 8078 5555 63 5445
1625 850 7890 7230 3514 5915 926 1396
657 4701 8012 175 45 2912 8076 8114
349 4362 8144 7137 688 1067 5419 3910
7529 2694 481 4482 193 7035 485 2675
7002 5514 906 1854 4793 3975 6372 5062
115 4846 8158 322 8142 3059 31 68
843 3574 540 951 7343 7827 1767 4120
295 2738 83 2628 8078 5555 63 5445
1625 3976 6801 3013 3514 1941 2015 6461
657 7219 8088 2269 45 818 8000 5596
349 8079 7707 3863 688 4341 5856 193
150 158 166 172 171 161 154 146
166 140 4242 135 152 132 4287 196
169 4190 60 108 106 115 141 4278
165 52 4130 94 91 93 4230 146
150 57 8 71 122 154 163 146
104 10 4088 26 122 171 4243 112
125 4158 16 61 134 164 141 4179
120 100 4195 82 125 171 4189 72
150 158 166 172 171 161 154 146
166 182 172 89 152 178 166 154
169 128 38 60 106 163 163 149
165 48 7 21 91 166 162 150
150 57 8 71 122 154 163 146
104 14 20 99 122 98 120 108
125 29 38 109 134 116 119 117
120 58 74 128 125 125 119 114
Original Data
RC-NMNT
2D-NMNT via
Separable Algorithm
Inverse RC-NMNT
Original Data via 
Separable Algorithm
Figure 5.1: Example of 2D-NMNT using Row-Column Method
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5.3 RC-ONMNT
The 2D-ONMNT is similar to the 2D-NMNT; however to obtain the full
2D-ONMNT using the RC method, there are two distinct procedures that
must be derived for the forward and inverse transforms. The forward transform
uses 
 
2k1+1
2
n1;
2k2+1
2
n2

, shown as
X(k1; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

2k1 + 1
2
n1;
2k2 + 1
2
n2
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1:
(5.20)
As the negative instances of k were replaced with N   k in the NMNT, they
must now be replaced by N   k   1 for the ONMNT otherwise negating k would
otherwise produce


2 (N   k) + 1
2
n

= 

2N   2k + 1
2
n

= 

2Nn
2
+
 2k + 1
2
n

= 
 2k + 1
2
n

= 

 2k   1
2
n

:
(5.21)
This detail is necessary when using negative k in the fractional part of the index so
that correct index is maintained by


2 (N   k   1) + 1
2
n

= 

2N   2k   2 + 1
2
n

= 

2Nn
2
+
 2k   1
2
n

= 
 2k   1
2
n

= 

 2k + 1
2
n

:
(5.22)
The RC denition for the 2D-ONMNT is
XRC(k1; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

2k1 + 1
2
n1



2k2 + 1
2
n2
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1
(5.23)
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and the full separable equation that was shown in (5.18) now becomes
X (k1; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x (n1; n2)



2k1 + 1
2
n1



2k2 + 1
2
n2

+ 

 2k1 + 1
2
n1



2k2 + 1
2
n2

+ 

2k1 + 1
2
n1



 2k2 + 1
2
n2

  

 2k1 + 1
2
n1



 2k2 + 1
2
n2

2p 1
+
Mp
:
(5.24)
In order to obtain 
  2k1+1
2
n1

from 
 
2k1+1
2
n1

, changing the indices that contain
 k1 to  k1   1 is necessary, this is shown as


2k1 + 1
2
n1

k1=N k1 1        ! 

2 (N   k1   1) + 1
2
n1

= 

2N   2k1   1
2
n1

= 

 2k1 + 1
2
n1
 (5.25)
and can be represented by using XRC so that
X (k1; k2) =
h
XRC (k1; k2) +XRC ( k1   1; k2)
+XRC (k1; k2   1) XRC ( k1   1; k2   1)
i
2p 1

Mp
:
(5.26)
The IONMNT begins by rst applying 
 
2n1+1
2
k1;
2n2+1
2
k2

to the original
2D-ONMNT formula and using X to indentify that the IONMNT transform
is currently selected. The standard equation for the IONMNT then becomes
X(k1; k2) =
*
N 2
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

2n1 + 1
2
k1;
2n2 + 1
2
k2
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1
(5.27)
where the RC method is dened as
XRC(k1; k2) =
*
N 2
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

2n1 + 1
2
k1



2n2 + 1
2
k2
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1:
(5.28)
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As previously shown from (5.17), it is obvious that 
 
2n1+1
2
k1;
2n2+1
2
k2

is applied
to (5.11) so that


2n1 + 1
2
k1;
2n2 + 1
2
k2

= 

2n1 + 1
2
k1 +
2n2 + 1
2
k2

=
*
1
2
"


2n1 + 1
2
k1

+ 

 2n1 + 1
2
k1
#
 

2n2 + 1
2
k2

+
1
2
"


2n1 + 1
2
k1

  

 2n1 + 1
2
k1
#
 

 2n2 + 1
2
k2
+
Mp
=
*"


2n1 + 1
2
k1



2n2 + 1
2
k2

+ 

 2n1 + 1
2
k1



2n2 + 1
2
k2

+ 

2n1 + 1
2
k1



 2n2 + 1
2
k2

  

 2n1 + 1
2
k1



 2n2 + 1
2
k2
#
2p 1
+
Mp
:
(5.29)
Substituting (5.29) into (5.27) produces
X(k1; k2) =
*
N 2
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)
"


2n1 + 1
2
k1



2n2 + 1
2
k2

+ 

 2n1 + 1
2
k1



2n2 + 1
2
k2

+ 

2n1 + 1
2
k1



 2n2 + 1
2
k2

  

 2n1 + 1
2
k1



 2n2 + 1
2
k2
#
2p 1
+
Mp
(5.30)
However, as k1 and k2 are not part of the fractional part then (5.30) can further be
simplied to
X (k1; k2) =
h
XRC (k1; k2) +XRC ( k1; k2)
+XRC (k1; k2) XRC ( k1; k2)
i
2p 1

Mp
:
(5.31)
However, as the ONMNT kernel is not a symmetrical transform, it must
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therefore rely upon the transpose of itself to obtain the inverse. Pre-processing is
required for the 2D-ONMNT transform using the RC method.
According to the identity in 2D-ONMNT, the basic formula for forward
transform is
X(k1; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

2k1 + 1
2
n1;
2k2 + 1
2
n2
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1
(5.32)
(k1; k2) can be deemed as dierent positions throughout a matrix, thus, when
k1 = 0, which represents the rst column, then (5.32) can be written as
X(0; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

2k2 + 1
2
n2
+
Mp
for k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1:
(5.33)
Similarly, when k2 = 0, which represents the rst row, then (5.32) can be written
as
X(k1; 0) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

2k1 + 1
2
n1
+
Mp
for k1 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1:
(5.34)
As shown in (5.32) and (5.34), both X(0; k2) and X(k1; 0) have identical values
by changing k1 and k2. However at position (1; 1) and (N   1; N   1) produce
transposed numbers in terms of the kernel matrix shown as
X(1; 1) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

3
2
n1;
3
2
n2
+
Mp (5.35)
When calculating position (N   1; N   1), the actual position in the ONMNT is
(N   1  1; N   1  1) due to its identity, so that
X(N   1; N   1) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

 3
2
n1; 3
2
n2
+
Mp (5.36)
Comparing (5.35) and (5.36), the value in  terms at the position X(1; 1) and
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150 158 166 172 171 161 154 146
166 182 172 89 152 178 166 154
169 128 38 60 106 163 163 149
165 48 7 21 91 166 162 150
150 57 8 71 122 154 163 146
104 14 20 99 122 98 120 108
125 29 38 109 134 116 119 117
120 58 74 128 125 125 119 114
7007 1805 2072 3936 4963 2994 1827 6656
3083 7303 4667 7806 7961 5437 7293 5493
16 8154 7274 8006 1676 2376 7053 4374
5980 4263 5467 6222 5775 5108 5847 2357
1841 443 5708 5652 4654 4843 3343 5705
212 1685 5711 2169 5286 7518 1545 3260
684 6826 2325 4880 7511 6602 2886 5155
75 1872 2054 1200 4334 7489 4254 1930
150 158 166 172 171 161 154 146
166 140 4242 135 152 132 4287 196
169 4190 60 108 106 115 141 4278
165 52 4130 94 91 93 4230 146
150 57 8 71 122 154 163 146
104 10 4088 26 122 171 4243 112
125 4158 16 61 134 164 141 4179
120 100 4195 82 125 171 4189 72
150 158 166 172 171 161 154 146
166 182 172 89 152 178 166 154
169 128 38 60 106 163 163 149
165 48 7 21 91 166 162 150
150 57 8 71 122 154 163 146
104 14 20 99 122 98 120 108
125 29 38 109 134 116 119 117
120 58 74 128 125 125 119 114
150 158 166 172 171 161 154 146
166 182 172 89 152 178 166 154
169 128 38 60 106 163 163 149
165 48 7 21 91 166 162 150
150 57 8 71 122 154 163 146
104 14 20 99 122 98 120 108
125 29 38 109 134 116 119 117
120 58 74 128 125 125 119 114
Original Data
RC-ONMNT
2D-ONMNT via
Separable Algorithm
Inverse RC-ONMNT
Original Data via 
Separable Algorithm
Figure 5.2: Example of 2D-ONMNT using Row-Column Method
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position X(N   1; N   1) is negated. Moreover, these positions can be represented
as the positions X(k1; k2) and X(N  k1; N  k2), when k1 or k2 are not zero values.
Thus, the pre-process step is to ip over and negate the input matrix, apart from
rst row and rst column. A demonstration of how this is presented is shown in
Figure 5.2, which started by reducing the cameraman image to an 8  8 array
and using the RC technique to transform the data to a 2D-ONMNT, using N = 8,
p = 13 and Mp = 8191. The data is shown as it progresses through the various
stages of the process, both forwards and backwards.
5.4 RC-O2NMNT
As discussed in the previous chapter, the GNMNT consists of the NMNT, ONMNT
and the O2NMNT. Therefore, the 2D-O2NMNT using the RC method will be
derived in this section. The O2NMNT has a symmetrical and orthogonal kernel
matrix, which has been described in Chapter 3, and therefore the basic equation
of forward 2D-O2NMNT and inverse 2D-O2NMNT are the same other than the
scaling factor, shown as
X(k1; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

(2k1 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
4
;
(2k2 + 1) (2n2 + 1)
4
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1
(5.37)
and
X(k1; k2) =
*
N 2
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

(2k1 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
4
;
(2k2 + 1) (2n2 + 1)
4
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1
(5.38)
respectively. The RC denition for the 2D-O2NMNT is
XRC(k1; k2) =
*
N 1X
n1=0
N 1X
n2=0
x(n1; n2)

(2k1 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
4



(2k2 + 1) (2n2 + 1)
4
+
Mp
for k1; k2 = 0; 1; 2; :::; N   1:
(5.39)
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150 158 166 172 171 161 154 146
166 182 172 89 152 178 166 154
169 128 38 60 106 163 163 149
165 48 7 21 91 166 162 150
150 57 8 71 122 154 163 146
104 14 20 99 122 98 120 108
125 29 38 109 134 116 119 117
120 58 74 128 125 125 119 114
6369 2526 6957 6406 6828 1123 7131 7442
7046 4108 6223 7810 1877 2225 3747 3642
4915 7986 3956 279 4174 1463 5526 1254
3810 5103 63 4742 5036 6544 4623 3575
4341 1657 6535 5159 4162 2913 1531 6198
2250 4247 6319 2299 2699 260 3158 2601
6009 4214 7901 8104 5408 8034 4751 499
5832 6204 1261 1761 7147 3917 7787 2977
142 4037 2712 3924 1119 5368 5620 5478
8099 3659 62 2096 7591 195 4196 2589
2909 3205 5739 6122 6522 7871 2116 3260
2764 4926 1019 1292 295 5588 4800 4621
5387 1834 5579 418 712 3869 1354 5152
4256 837 4536 4647 351 2043 6568 595
4956 4663 5871 5627 7885 1873 4302 1552
3868 4693 5506 4243 4665 7863 1107 4941
151 4221 138 173 170 189 4282 145
164 129 136 108 133 214 219 156
157 4188 4157 4167 4190 4235 4294 161
4255 52 4109 4126 4177 4255 158 4251
4251 53 4097 4157 4227 4256 167 4236
116 4145 4092 4183 4229 4217 4180 96
127 82 74 90 153 80 66 115
119 4186 102 127 126 97 4182 115
150 158 166 172 171 161 154 146
166 182 172 89 152 178 166 154
169 128 38 60 106 163 163 149
165 48 7 21 91 166 162 150
150 57 8 71 122 154 163 146
104 14 20 99 122 98 120 108
125 29 38 109 134 116 119 117
120 58 74 128 125 125 119 114
Original Data
RC-O2NMNT
2D-O2NMNT via
Separable Algorithm
Inverse RC-O2NMNT
Original Data via 
Separable Algorithm
Figure 5.3: Example of 2D-O2NMNT using Row-Column Method
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Following the same procedure in (5.29), 
h
(2k1+1)(2n1+1)
4
; (2k2+1)(2n2+1)
4
i
can be
calculated as


(2k1 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
4
;
(2k2 + 1) (2n2 + 1)
4

= 

(2k1 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
4
+
(2k2 + 1) (2n2 + 1)
4

=
*"


(2k1 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
4



(2k2 + 1) (2n2 + 1)
4

+ 

 (2k1 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
4



(2k2 + 1) (2n2 + 1)
4

(5.40)
+ 

(2k1 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
4



 (2k2 + 1) (2n2 + 1)
4

  

 (2k1 + 1) (2n1 + 1)
4



 (2k2 + 1) (2n2 + 1)
4
 #
2p 1
+
Mp
:
Finally, applying (5.41) to (5.37) and combing with XRC produces
X (k1; k2) =
Dh
XRC (k1; k2) +XRC ( k1   1; k2)
+XRC (k1; k2   1) XRC ( k1   1; k2   1)
i
2p 1
E
Mp
:
(5.41)
A demonstration of how this is presented is shown in Figure 5.3, which started
by reducing the cameraman image to an 8  8 array and using the RC technique
to transform the data to a 2D-O2NMNT, using N = 8, p = 13 and Mp = 8191.
The data is shown as it progresses through the various stages of the process, both
forwards and backwards.
5.5 Complexity Analysis
Calculating the complexity of using the RC method and subsequent separable
algorithm to obtain the 2D-GNMNT can easily be achieved by applying a series of
modications to the complexities of the 1D counterparts provided in Section 4.5.
By noting that the RC method will in fact invoke a 1D method 2N times for each
of the N rows and then N columns, we can respectively obtain
MRC(N) = 2N
2 (log2N   1) (5.42)
and
ARC(N) = 3N
2 log2N +N
2 (5.43)
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for the radix-2 implementation;
MRC(N) =

N2 (3 log4N   1)

 (5.44)
and
ARC(N) =
N2
2
(11 log4N   1) (5.45)
for the radix-4 implementation;
MRC(N) =

4
3
N2 log2N  
8
9
N2 +
8
9
N( 1)log2N

 (5.46)
and
ARC(N) =
8
3
N2 log2N  
4
9
N2 +
4
9
N( 1)log2N : (5.47)
for the split-radix implementation. The results using  = 2 to normalise the
multiplications against the additions can be observed in Figure 5.4. In Section
4.5, the notion of using more up to date instructions that combine more than one
operator was introduced using the FMA command. Applying this technique for the
RC method using the split-radix algorithm produces
FRC(N) =

2
3
N2 log2N  
4
9
N2 +
4
9
N( 1)log2N

; (5.48)
MRC(N) =

2
3
N2 log2N  
4
9
N2 +
4
9
N( 1)log2N

 (5.49)
and
ARC(N) = 2N
2 log2N; (5.50)
to produce a total operational count of
TRC(N) =
4+ 6
3
N2 log2N  
8
9
N2 +
8
9
N( 1)log2N : (5.51)
To complete the process of taking the results from the RC algorithm to the 2D
algorithm requires the application of the separable algorithm. This stage has
a signicant impact, as shown in Figure 5.5, owing that the multiplication and
three additions that are required for each point. Therefore, applying a further
modication of N2 multiplications and 3N2 additions to (5.42) and (5.43) produces
MS(N) = 2N
4 (log2N   1) (5.52)
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Split−Radix
Fused−Split−Radix
Figure 5.4: Complexity of Dierent Radices for Row-Column by Total Operations
and
AS(N) = 9N
4 log2N + 3N
4 (5.53)
for the radix-2 implementation; to (5.44) and (5.45) produces
MS(N) =

N4 (3 log4N   1)

 (5.54)
and
AS(N) =
3N4
2
(11 log4N   1) ; (5.55)
for the radix-4 implementation and nally to (5.46) and (5.47) produces
MS(N) =

4
3
N4 log2N  
8
9
N4 +
8
9
N3( 1)log2N

 (5.56)
and
AS(N) = 8N
4 log2N  
4
3
N4 +
4
3
N3( 1)log2N (5.57)
for the split-radix implementation of the separable algorithm. As the separable
algorithm consists of three additions then a multiplication, applying this adjustment
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Figure 5.5: Complexity of Dierent Radices for Row-Column with Separable
Algorithm by Total Operations
to the FMA version in (5.48)-(5.51) is limited to the multiplications and additions
without ooading operations to the FMA operator. Therefore, adjusting (5.49)
with an additional N2 multiplications produces
MS(N) =

2
3
N4 log2N  
4
9
N4 +
4
9
N3( 1)log2N

; (5.58)
adjusting (5.51) with an additional 3N2 multiplications produces
AS(N) = 6N
4 log2N; (5.59)
and combining (5.48) with (5.58) and (5.59) produces a total operational count of
TS(N) =
2+ 3
3
N4 log2N  
4
3
N4 +
4
3
N3( 1)log2N
+
2
3
N2 log2N  
4
3
N2 +
4
3
N( 1)log2N :
(5.60)
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5.6 The 2D Cyclic Convolution for the GNMNT
The 1D cyclic convolution for the GNMNT was discussed previously in Chapter 3.
A common application of the 2D cyclic convolution is image processing, where lters
can be applied quickly and eciently. The derivations for the various convolutions
forthwith were rst derived by [7] for the NMNT and [8, 139] for the expansion
to the GNMNT, and have been included here for the sake of completeness with
further insights and demonstrations. Typically, the signals x (n1; n2) and h (n1; n2)
are the inputs containing the image and lter of size N  N , while y
CC
(n1; n2)
provides the output of the 2D convolution using the GNMNT.
5.6.1 Cyclic Convolution for the 2D-NMNT
Denoting X (k1; k2), H (k1; k2) and YCC (k1; k2) as the signal values within the
NMNT domain of x (n1; n2), h (n1; n2) and yCC (n1; n2), the 2D-NMNT Cyclic
Convolution is calculated as
YCC (k1; k2) =
D
2p 1 [H (k1; k2) +H (N   k1; N   k2)]X (k1; k2)
+ 2p 1 [H (k1; k2) H (N   k1; N   k2)]X (N   k1; N   k2)
E
Mp
(5.61)
As previously described in [7], a new operator can be used to simplify (5.61), for
which  will be used, so that
YCC (k1; k2) = X (k1; k2)H (k1; k2)
=
D
Hev(k1; k2)X (k1; k2)
+Hod(k1; k2)X (N   k1; N   k2)
E
Mp
(5.62)
where Hev(k1; k2) and H
od(k1; k2) are the even and odd parts of H (k1; k2) shown
respectively as
Hev(k1; k2) =
D
[H (k1; k2) +H (N   k1; N   k2)] 2p 1
E
Mp
(5.63)
NMNT
NMNT
x(n1,n2)
h(n1,n2)
X(k1,k2)
H(k1,k2)
NMNT
-1Y(k1,k2) y(n1,n2)
RC
RC
XRC(k1,k2)
HRC(k1,k2)
RC
-1yRC(k1,k2)⊙
Figure 5.6: Convolution Process Structure for the 2D-NMNT
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ONMNT
ONMNT
x(n1,n2)
h(n1,n2)
XO(k1,k2)
HO(k1,k2)
IONMNT
YO(k1,k2) y(n1,n2)
RC
RC
XRC(k1,k2)
HRC(k1,k2)
RC
-1yRC(k1,k2)⊙
Figure 5.7: Convolution Process Structure for the 2D-ONMNT
and
Hod(k1; k2) =
D
[H (k1; k2) H (N   k1; N   k2)] 2p 1
E
Mp
: (5.64)
Figure 5.6 further illustrates the process of the 2D-NMNT cyclic convolution, which
shows two RC blocks that are slightly dierent from the 1D convolution owing to
the RC method being applied to the 2D-GNMNT.
5.6.2 Cyclic Convolution for the 2D-ONMNT
The variables XO (k1; k2), HO (k1; k2) and YOCC (k1; k2) are the signals x (n1; n2),
h (n1; n2) and yCC (n1; n2) that are within the ONMNT domain. The operation to
derive the ONMNT result Y
OCC
(k1; k2) is processed using XO (k1; k2), HO (k1; k2)
by
YOCC (k1; k2) = XO (k1; k2)HO (k1; k2)
=
D
HevO (k1; k2)XO (k1; k2)
+HodO (k1; k2)XO (N   k1   1; N   k2   1)
E
Mp
(5.65)
where HevO (k1; k2) and H
od
O (k1; k2) stand for even and odd parts of HO (k1; k2)
respectively as
HevO (k1; k2) =
D
[HO (k1; k2) +HO (N   k1   1; N   k2   1)] 2p 1
E
Mp
(5.66)
and
HodO (k1; k2) =
D
[HO (k1; k2) HO (N   k1   1; N   k2   1)] 2p 1
E
Mp
: (5.67)
The process of computing the 2D cyclic convolution for the ONMNT is shown in
Figure 5.7.
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ONMNT
O
2
NMNT
x(n1,n2)
h(n1,n2)
XO(k1,k2)
HO2(k1,k2)
O
2
NMNT
-1YO2(k1,k2) y(n1,n2)
RC
RC
XRC(k1,k2)
HRC(k1,k2)
RC
-1yRC(k1,k2)⊙
Figure 5.8: Convolution Process Structure for the 2D-O2NMNT
5.6.3 Cyclic Convolution for the 2D-O2NMNT
Transforming into the O2NMNT domain, the input and output signals x (n1; n2),
h (n1; n2) and yCC (n1; n2) are represented by XO2 (k1; k2), HO2 (k1; k2) and
Y
O2CC
(k1; k2) respectively and processed as
Y
O2CC
(k1; k2) = XO (k1; k2)HO2 (k1; k2)
=
D
HodO2(k1; k2)XO (k1; k2)
+HevO2(k1; k2)XO (N   k1   1; N   k2   1)
E
Mp
(5.68)
where HevO2(k1; k2) and H
od
O2(k1; k2) stand for even and odd parts of HO2 (k1; k2)
respectively as
HevO2(k1; k2) =
D
[HO2 (k1; k2) +HO2 (N   k1   1; N   k2   1)] 2p 1
E
Mp
(5.69)
and
HodO2(k1; k2) =
D
[HO2 (k1; k2) HO2 (N   k1   1; N   k2   1)] 2p 1
E
Mp
: (5.70)
Figure 5.8 shows the process of computing 2D cyclic convolution for O2NMNT.
5.6.4 Verication using Cyclic Convolution
An example application for using convolution would be to apply the Sobel lter to
an image, which is used to provide edge detection [140]; this is congured as
H =
26664
1 2 1
0 0 0
 1  2  1
37775 : (5.71)
Using the NMNT to process the required convolutions is shown Figure 5.9, where
the original image Figure 5.9(a) is rst processed using MATLAB for reference,
producing Figure 5.9(b). Applying the Sobel lter to the image Y via convolution
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(a) Original Image (b) MATLAB Implementation
(c) Sobel Filter x-Axis Derivative (d) Sobel Filter y-Axis Derivative
(e) Magnitude using xy-Derivatives (f) GNMNT Implementation
Figure 5.9: Convolution using Sobel Filter for Edge Detection using Cameraman
Image with NMNT
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5.6 The 2D Cyclic Convolution for the GNMNT
(a) Original Image (b) MATLAB Implementation
(c) Sobel Function x-Axis Derivative (d) Sobel Function y-Axis Derivative
(e) Magnitude using xy-Functions (f) GNMNT Implementation
Figure 5.10: Convolution using Sobel Filter for Edge Detection using Lena Image
with ONMNT
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(a) Original Image (b) MATLAB Implementation
(c) Sobel Function x-Axis Derivative (d) Sobel Function y-Axis Derivative
(e) Magnitude using xy-Functions (f) GNMNT Implementation
Figure 5.11: Convolution using Sobel Filter for Edge Detection using Baboon
Image with O2NMNT
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across the x- and y-axes produces
Gx = H ~ Y (5.72)
and
Gy = H
0 ~ Y: (5.73)
The results of (5.72) and (5.73) using the NMNT are shown in Figures 5.9(c) and
5.9(d) respectively. The gradient map in Figure 5.9(e) is obtained by combining
the two direction sources by
G =
q
Gx2 +Gy2 (5.74)
The process concludes by dening a threshold level, which in this case was
accomplished by calculating the mean of the gradient map
TG = G (5.75)
and applying this threshold to dene the boundaries for G yields Figure 5.9(f).
It appears that MATLAB may use additional processing techniques such as line
thinning for example [141]. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 depict the same processes using
the ONMNT and O2NMNT respectively, thus validating the implementations.
Table 5.1: Eective Lengths of 1D and 2D GNMNTs
1D Block and Key Size 2D Block and Key Size
p p
N 5 7 13 17 19 5 7 13 17 19
4 20 28 52 68 76 80 112 208 272 304
8 40 56 104 136 152 320 448 832 1088 1216
16 80 112 208 272 304 1280 1792 3328 4352 4864
32 160# 224 416 544 608 5120# 7168 13312 17408 19456
64 - 448 832 1088 1216 - 28672 53248 69632 77824
128 - 896# 1664 2176 2432 - 114688# 212992 278528 311296
256 - - 3328 4352 4864 - - 851968 1114112 1245184
512 - - 6656 8704 9728 - - 3407872 4456448 4980736
1024 - - 13312 17408 19456 - - 13631488 17825792 19922944
 NMNT and ONMNT, # NMNT Only
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5.7 Encryption Applications
An application for using the 2D algorithm of the GNMNT for encryption is where
two people have the same image. This can be combined with a password for an
implementation of the two-factor authentication (2FA) protocol that is applied to
encryption: something you know and something you have [142]. Selecting a random
area of the image and transferring the coordinates produces an ephemeral-type
key, which can be communicated to the receiving party using similar techniques to
those used to transmit the password. However, in order to safeguard the integrity
of the encryption, it would be advisable to transfer the image attributes and the
regular password using two distinct public key techniques. Such techniques enhance
security by adding an additional layer of security. There are a number of methods
used to provide 2FA including documentation, text message, email, hardware token
or even software [143], which have become highly adopted by many industries,
particularly by the nance sector.
This section will provide examples on this methodology by incorporating an
encryption system that uses a 2D key from an image that both parties are known to
have. The method of image selection, image key could well be communicated using
a public key encryption system such as RSA or ECC. Once an image and image
Figure 5.12: Image from which the selected 2D key is obtained
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Table 5.2: Pixel Values of 2D Key without Concatenation
0xb1 0x7e 0x9e 0x87 0x71 0x80 0x95 0x63 0xb0 0x76 0x7b 0x68 0x6a 0x7a 0x97 0xa0
0x90 0x80 0x9d 0x9f 0x8e 0x79 0x8a 0xbe 0xad 0x92 0x90 0x4b 0x9a 0x8d 0x78 0x5f
0x42 0x6f 0x5f 0x75 0x6d 0xa5 0xa8 0xaf 0x95 0x58 0x4e 0x85 0x82 0x86 0x73 0x9c
0x94 0x51 0x37 0x39 0x4e 0x7f 0x82 0x86 0x44 0x5f 0x88 0x64 0xa9 0x87 0x5e 0xa1
0x78 0x69 0x94 0x9b 0x36 0x62 0x54 0x57 0x72 0x45 0x40 0x8b 0xa6 0x6d 0x87 0x77
0x44 0x64 0xa6 0x6b 0x32 0x5a 0x47 0x4f 0x87 0x68 0x5b 0x3c 0x49 0x55 0x6b 0x6b
0x72 0x91 0x55 0x1e 0x68 0x4e 0x78 0xac 0x48 0x39 0x86 0xb1 0x5b 0x3f 0x8d 0xa4
0x67 0x76 0x59 0x1e 0x38 0x74 0x9c 0xa0 0x46 0x72 0x80 0x87 0x3a 0x64 0x99 0x61
Table 5.3: Pixel Values of 2D Key with Concatenation
0xb17e 0x9e87 0x7180 0x9563 0xb076 0x7b68 0x6a7a 0x97a0
0x9080 0x9d9f 0x8e79 0x8abe 0xad92 0x904b 0x9a8d 0x785f
0x426f 0x5f75 0x6da5 0xa8af 0x9558 0x4e85 0x8286 0x739c
0x9451 0x3739 0x4e7f 0x8286 0x445f 0x8864 0xa987 0x5ea1
0x7869 0x949b 0x3662 0x5457 0x7245 0x408b 0xa66d 0x8777
0x4464 0xa66b 0x325a 0x474f 0x8768 0x5b3c 0x4955 0x6b6b
0x7291 0x551e 0x684e 0x78ac 0x4839 0x86b1 0x5b3f 0x8da4
0x6776 0x591e 0x3874 0x9ca0 0x4672 0x8087 0x3a64 0x9961
position have been selected, this will then act as a private session key between the
two parties.
5.7.1 RC-GNMNT Implementations
One of the advantages of the NMNT and GNMNT transforms are their highly
adaptable lengths [7, 8]. However, irrespective of these lengths, limitations are still
put in place with respect to the prime that is dened by p. Using a 2D algorithm
allows even greater versatility by essentially squaring the lengths over the same
value of p, thereby providing signicant increases in these lengths as shown in Table
5.1. In the following examples, a key of size based on an image area of 16  8 in
size has been selected from the image shown in Figure 5.12. This key is shown
numerically in Table 5.2 as it was extracted from the greyscale image and again
in Table 5.3 after the concatenation process has taken place. Data within the key
was concatenated in pairs to reduce the size from 16 columns to 8 so that the
length N = 8 could be assigned to a square area. A value of p = 17 was selected
to derive a Mersenne prime number of 131071, which completes the conguration
of the encryption system. The system uses a similar procedure that was dened in
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(a) Original (b) Cipher
(c) Incorrect Key (d) Correct Key
Figure 5.13: Encrypted Cameraman using RC-NMNT, N = 88 andMp = 131071
(3.81)-(3.91) adapted as a 2D system using a 2D key for all examples, where only
the transform type was changed according to the appropriate subsection.
5.7.1.1 RC-NMNT
The results of encrypting the cameraman image using the RC-NMNT and a
2D key are shown in Figure 5.13. As anticipated from previous results using
1D-implementations, it can be seen that the NMNT has performed at a comparable
level. The decryption using a dierent key has rendered the resultant deciphering
operation completely worthless with no information apparently being released.
Moreover, it would appear that there may not be a necessary requirement in
computing the separable algorithm in order to completely process the image using
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(a) Original (b) Cipher
(c) Incorrect Key (d) Correct Key
Figure 5.14: Encrypted Camerman using RC-ONMNT, N = 88 andMp = 131071
the RC method.
5.7.1.2 RC-ONMNT
Using the rst of the two new transforms for RC encryption suggests that there are
very promising results. Deciphering the image has rendered it worthless, similar to
the results obtained from the NMNT. After applying the correct key, it is shown
in Figure 5.14 that the system correctly deciphered the image, suggesting that
encryption system is working as expected.
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(a) Original (b) Cipher
(c) Incorrect Key (d) Correct Key
Figure 5.15: Encrypted Camerman using RC-O2NMNT, N = 8  8 and Mp =
131071
5.7.1.3 RC-O2NMNT
The second of the two new transforms applied for encryption using the RC method
is the O2NMNT. Like its counterparts, the O2NMNT has successfully encrypted
and decrypted the image using the correct key, while failing to decipher the image
using the incorrect key as shown in Figure 5.15. Again, this would initially suggest
that the system using the O2NMNT would be applicable for use in the eld of
cryptography.
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(a) Original (b) NMNT
(c) ONMNT (d) O2NMNT
Figure 5.16: Decrypted Cameraman Error using RC-GNMNT, N = 8  8 and
Mp = 131071
5.7.1.4 Comparison of RC-Encryption Characteristics
The dierent variations of the enciphered images using the same key but dierent
transforms is depicted in Figure 5.16. Whilst there is nothing to be gained directly
from observing this image, it is presented to demonstrate that the results from
using each transform to decrypt the image using the same alternate key and also
that they have provided dierent results according to each transform. Each of the
images was previously shown to correctly encrypt and decrypt the image when
using the same key.
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(a) Original (b) Cipher
(c) Incorrect Key (d) Correct Key
Figure 5.17: Encrypted Cameraman using 2D-NMNT, N = 88 and Mp = 131071
5.7.2 2D-GNMNT Implementations
This section is similar to the RC-GNMNT except that the additional separable
algorithm has been applied to provide a true 2D transformation of the image in
each system. While no further processing has been done in respect to 2D signal-
or image-processing, the underlying implementation has been developed and tested
to ensure compatibility throughout these transforms. The development of true
2D algorithms in cryptography opens many opportunities to further incorporate
dierent methods such as ltering to enhance the framework of a developed
encryption system.
142
5.7 Encryption Applications
(a) Original (b) Cipher
(c) Incorrect Key (d) Correct Key
Figure 5.18: Encrypted Camerman using 2D-ONMNT, N = 88 andMp = 131071
5.7.2.1 2D-NMNT
Like the RC-NMNT, the 2D-NMNT has correctly encrypted and decrypted the
image using the same key. When using the alternate key to decrypt, again like the
RC-GNMNT, the results yielded an unusable image where no information of the
original contents appears to be obtainable, as shown in Figure 5.17.
5.7.2.2 2D-ONMNT
Using the rst of the new transforms and the separable algorithm has again yielded
favourable results as shown in Figure 5.18. The results that were obtained from
the result of the RC-ONMNT appear to be comparable to the 2D variant using the
separable algorithm.
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(a) Original (b) Cipher
(c) Incorrect Key (d) Correct Key
Figure 5.19: Encrypted Camerman using 2D-O2NMNT,N = 88 andMp = 131071
5.7.2.3 2D-O2NMNT
The nal example of 2D encryption shows in Figure 5.19 that the second new
transform has also demonstrated favourable results. The encryption and decryption
process using the same key to obtain the original image and using dierent keys to
show that recovering the original image is unobtainable has reached expectations
and, like the other implementations of the GNMNT in these simulations, the
O2NMNT has performed comparably.
5.7.2.4 Comparison of 2D-Encryption Characteristics
The nal image in these simulations again shows in Figure 5.20 the comparison
of the resulting images using the 2D transforms where the same alternate
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(a) Original (b) NMNT
(c) ONMNT (d) O2NMNT
Figure 5.20: Decrypted Cameraman Error using 2D-GNMNT, N = 8  8 and
Mp = 131071
decrypting keys were used instead of the same encrypting keys. Similar to the RC
implementations, there is no direct information to be obtained from these images
other than to show that by using the same key to encrypt and using the same
incorrect key to decrypt, each of the transforms used has produced dierent results.
5.7.3 Imposing a Single-Bit Error using the RC- and
2D-GNMNT
With previous respect to Section 3.8.1, it would be remiss to ignore the results of
changing a single bit of the GNMNT using the RC method to assess whether there
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(a) Original Image (b) RC-NMNT Bit Error N = 8
(c) RC-NMNT Bit Error N = 16 (d) RC-NMNT Bit Error N = 32
(e) RC-NMNT Bit Error N = 64 (f) RC-NMNT Bit Error N = 128
Figure 5.21: Decrypted Bit Error using RC-NMNT with N = 8; 16; 32; 64; 128 and
Mp = 131071
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(a) Original Image (b) RC-ONMNT Bit Error N = 8
(c) RC-ONMNT Bit Error N = 16 (d) RC-ONMNT Bit Error N = 32
(e) RC-ONMNT Bit Error N = 64 (f) RC-ONMNT Bit Error N = 128
Figure 5.22: Decrypted Bit Error using RC-ONMNT with N = 8; 16; 32; 64; 128
and Mp = 131071
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(a) Original Image (b) RC-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 8
(c) RC-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 16 (d) RC-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 32
(e) RC-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 64 (f) RC-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 128
Figure 5.23: Decrypted Bit Error using RC-O2NMNT with N = 8; 16; 32; 64; 128
and Mp = 131071
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(a) Original Image (b) 2D-NMNT Bit Error N = 8
(c) 2D-NMNT Bit Error N = 16 (d) 2D-NMNT Bit Error N = 32
(e) 2D-NMNT Bit Error N = 64 (f) 2D-NMNT Bit Error N = 128
Figure 5.24: Decrypted Bit Error using 2D-NMNT with N = 8; 16; 32; 64; 128 and
Mp = 131071
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(a) Original Image (b) 2D-ONMNT Bit Error N = 8
(c) 2D-ONMNT Bit Error N = 16 (d) 2D-ONMNT Bit Error N = 32
(e) 2D-ONMNT Bit Error N = 64 (f) 2D-ONMNT Bit Error N = 128
Figure 5.25: Decrypted Bit Error using 2D-ONMNT with N = 8; 16; 32; 64; 128 and
Mp = 131071
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(a) Original Image (b) 2D-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 8
(c) 2D-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 16 (d) 2D-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 32
(e) 2D-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 64 (f) 2D-O2NMNT Bit Error N = 128
Figure 5.26: Decrypted Bit Error using 2D-O2NMNT with N = 8; 16; 32; 64; 128
and Mp = 131071
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are similar characteristics that were observed with the NMNT and ONMNT. In
doing so, a random key is this time selected and concatenated and again, the last
bit of the nal element is changed. The results for the bit error RC-GNMNT are
shown in Figures 5.21-5.23 where it can be observed that the eects are greatly
exacerbated. The reason for this relates to the nature of the processing as the
method essentially utilises N keys rather than an N  N key because of the way
the RC-GNMNT is processed. As such, more of the image can still be recovered as
clearly observed, although this diminishes as the transform length and subsequent
key length increases. Interestingly, the O2NMNT result in Figure 5.23 appears
to be dening the processing blocks rather than producing a random collection
of pixels. There should therefore be caution in implementing a technique using
the RC-O2NMNT, ensuring that any schemes employing this transform contain
multiple rounds and non-linear operations.
Addressing this technique with the 2D-GNMNT using a random key for
encryption with subsequent bit error in the key for decryption produces results that
can be observed in Figures 5.24-5.26. There is again evidence within the respective
images from each technique that information has been recovered, albeit somewhat
skewed, which again diminishes as the transform length and subsequent key length
increases. The skewing artefacts are no doubt a result of the separable algorithm
being applied to the RC method, which would emphasise how the transform
is being processed. As the implementation has been proven already using the
convolution techniques, there is no doubt that this skewing condition is conned
to the application of the RC and separable algorithm methods. Moreover, the
outline of the cameraman can be observed in Figure 5.26, indicating that even the
O2NMNT is not infallible with respect in this instance.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter has developed and demonstrated the RC-GNMNT and its respective
separable algorithms, specically the ONMNT, IONMNT and O2NMNT for
developing 2D algorithms. Examples using the cyclic convolution have been
shown and demonstrated using the Sobel lter to provide edge detection through
2D convolution, thereby verifying its implementation. Example RC and 2D
core encryption systems have been developed and presented to demonstrate
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the capabilities of these new transforms. Moreover, the simulations of the
encryption system show that it is not necessarily required to complete the full 2D
transformation in order to achieve favourable results, but maximising the transform
length and subsequent key length would certainly be advantageous. However,
there is a denite emphasis from the results that further steps are mandated when
implementing the GNMNT within an encryption system, particularly shuing,
non-linear operations and multiple rounds. Whilst there were comparable results
between the RC and 2D methods and the RC method may serve as a faster
implementation, there may well be further benets in completing the full 2D
process as other opportunities are presented that could incorporate additional
functionality to an encryption system. For example, part of an encryption system
may consist of ltering parts of the data either as a pre- or post-operation to the
underlying encryption system.
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Chapter 6
The Avalanche Eect of the
GNMNT
6.1 Introduction
The continual pace of technological development has accelerated the need for
stronger and more resilient encryption schemes. These schemes should oer
exibility with respect to scalability, depending on needs and requirements. The
current standard [144] is currently halfway through its second decade of ratication
and while it has shown signicant resilience so far, that is not to say it will
continue to do so. Reecting how DES has been continually attacked with the
production of faster and more powerful GPUs highlighting the need for development
of similar systems that can be developed like deep crack, but using only commercial
o-the-shelf (COTS) components.
6.2 The Strict Avalanche Criterion
The avalanche eect is primarily inuenced by diusion that was noted by Shannon
when he rst suggested that the two core concepts of security are confusion and
diusion [12]. The key principle behind the avalanche model is that should a single
bit in the cipher text be out of place when applied to the decryption algorithm,
then it will yield a catastrophic eect upon the decoded plaintext. This theory
was developed further by Feistel and the ideas of confusion and diusion were more
commonly referred to and implemented as networks incorporating substitution and
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permutation respectively [13]. Webster and Travers developed the avalanche eect
further still by introducing the SAC [14]. The SAC states that when a single bit is
changed in the cipher text, the eect of this change should inuence the resultant
bits after the decryption process ideally by a probability of 0.5. We can therefore
measure the resultant plaintext of such an event and compare it with the original
plaintext where we should ideally observe that 50% of the bits between the two
plaintexts dier.
6.3 Methodology
There were a number of congurations and variations used for the development
of this simulation that include the simulation algorithm to apply conditions to
test and measure the SAC, the AES algorithm and the GNMNT transforms. The
simulations involved 106 iterations for each of the GNMNT transforms and the
AES algorithm, where either 136 or 128 bits were manipulated respectively during
each iteration. The implementation for each process will be described in greater
detail in Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 for AES and GNMNT respectively.
6.3.1 Applying and Testing the SAC
The method used to undertake these measurements was designed to probe each
and every bit of the cipher text to identify not only consistency but also areas that
potentially exhibit undesirable characteristics: these may manifest as results that
contain excessively low or high metrics or exhibit consistent patterns. The process
used to accomplish this process was previously described in [119], beginning with
the obtaining of a cipher text c by applying an encryption operation E () to a
plaintext t by
c = E(t): (6.1)
We can then change a single bit in c by selecting a bit position n and performing
c^m = c 2n for 0  n < pN (6.2)
where c^m is the indexed state from the original cipher text where the bit that has
been modied n = m,  denotes a bitwise XOR operation, p is the size of each
element and N represents the number of elements in the cipher. Using n to select
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t tG = G(t)
tĜ[e] = < tG⊕ 2
b
>Mp
0 ≤ e < N, 0 ≤ b < p
t ̂= G-1(tĜ)
δm[n̂] = ((t[e]⊕ t[̂e])>>b̂) ∧ 1
0 ≤ e < N, 0 ≤ b ̂ < p,
m = p⋅ e + b, n̂ = p⋅ e + b̂
Δm=Σδm(n̂)
Δn=Σδn(m̂)
Δm
Δn
δn[m̂] = ((t[e]⊕ t[̂e])>>b̂) ∧ 1
0 ≤ e < N, 0 ≤ b ̂ < p,
m̂ = p⋅ e + b̂, n = p⋅ e + b
Figure 6.1: Avalanche Assessment Process
a bit and treating the vector as if it were an N size element, it can be better
visualised as
n = pe+ b; for 0  e < N and 0  b < p; (6.3)
which converts n into an element that is index by e and the associated bit of that
element referenced by 2b. We then decrypt the altered cipher text c^m to obtain an
alternate plaintext t^m by
t^m = D(c^m) (6.4)
where D () refers to the corresponding decryption algorithm from (6.1). The bits
that have changed can be easily detected by developing a small function
m(n) =
8<: 1; if (t t^m) ^ 2
n 6= 0
0
(6.5)
using ^ to denote a bitwise AND operation to process each bit in t^m. We can then
represent the total change in the resultant vector t^m by
m =
"
1
pN
pN 1X
n=0
m(n)
#
 100. (6.6)
As (6.5) and (6.6) provide a methodology to measure the dierential change in
the vector, so we can also measure the dierential bit positions from the resultant
vector by applying a transpose. This will provide
m(n) =
8<: 1; if (t t^n) ^ 2
m 6= 0
0
(6.7)
and
n =
"
1
pN
pN 1X
n=0
n(m)
#
 100. (6.8)
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This process is further illustrated in Figure 6.1.
We can demonstrate a small exhaustive example using p = 3 and N = 4 and
begin by selecting four numbers at random for t producing
t = f3; 2; 1; 2g: (6.9)
Table 6.1: Modication of t^G for p = 3, N = 4
e b t^G[3] t^G[2] t^G[1] t^G[0]
0 0 001 010 000 011
0 1 001 010 000 000
0 2 001 010 000 110
1 0 001 010 001 010
1 1 001 010 010 010
1 2 001 010 100 010
2 0 001 011 000 010
2 1 001 000 000 010
2 2 001 110 000 010
3 0 000 010 000 010
3 1 011 010 000 010
3 2 101 010 000 010
Table 6.2: Resultant Values of t^ for p = 3, N = 4
pe+ b t^[3] t^[2] t^[1] t^[0]
0 101 100 110 000
1 110 101 101 110
2 100 011 000 001
3 101 000 011 000
4 000 101 101 101
5 100 001 010 001
6 101 000 110 100
7 110 110 101 101
8 100 001 000 011
9 001 000 110 000
10 000 110 101 110
11 100 011 010 011
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However, for the sake of clarity in this example we shall instead represent values in
binary, which results in
t = f0112; 0102; 0012; 0102g: (6.10)
Transforming this vector using the NMNT produces the vector
TG = f0012; 0102; 0002; 0102g: (6.11)
Now we can produce a loop using e and b, which were dened in (6.3) to change
each bit of TG in sequence resulting in pN new transformed vectors denoted by T^G.
These altered values of TG are shown in Table 6.1. Applying the inverse NMNT
transform to each of the T^G and record them in t^m, where m was dened in (6.4).
These resultant values of t^ are shown in Table 6.2. Finally, applying (6.5) and (6.6)
using t and each t^ produces values for m and m respectively. While this method
assess the bits that have changed in each vector and can be seen as a row-by-row
approach, using the resultant vectors we can also examine each column. Applying
the similar (6.7) and (6.8) produces values for n and n respectively. The results
Table 6.3: Dierences Between t and t^ for p = 3, N = 4
n m m
 m
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 8 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 7 2
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 5 3
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 9 4
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 9 5
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 8 6
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 7 7
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 7 8
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 6 9
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 10
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 7 11

n 9 10 8 5 8 6 7 6 7 5 8 6 85 P 
n
n 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
P
m P m=
P  n
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of the XOR operation between t and each t^ that produces the respective  and 
values that can be seen in Table 6.3. This table also shows the sums of the two
sequences of , which naturally should be equal. Calculating the mean x can be
achieved by using either m or n for 0  m;n < N as both yield the same value.
In fact, this is a measure to verify that the results have been both recorded and
processed correctly. Measuring the standard deviation is again a straight forward
process as
 =
vuut 1
m
N 1X
m=0
(m   x)2: (6.12)
As the data has been processed to provide a percentage for the results, the standard
deviation is also expressed as a percentage. To reect the impact this has on the
actual block, a small adjustment must be made to change from a percentage to the
relevant number of bits. We denote this new measurement as  and calculate it
thus:
 = (pN) 1
100
: (6.13)
6.3.2 AES Implementation
The AES implementation uses a slightly stripped-down version of the algorithm
that has the password functionality removed so as to better compare the algorithm
with the GNMNT where any inuence of the passwords is removed; this is
essential for measuring the raw diusion characteristics. To fully exploit the main
implementation characteristics of AES, which was designed to run on eight-bit
processors, all of the functions have been replaced with lookup tables. This has
a minimal impact in terms of storage as only eight tables of 256 bytes each are
required to accomplish this implementation: SubBytes, inverse SubBytes, 2n, 3n,
9n, 11n, 13n and 14n. This results in a total of 2,048 bytes of storage in total with
only 16 lookups / round for the SubBytes function and 64 lookups with 48 XOR
operations that combine the ShiftRows and MixColumns functions for each round.
Finally, when simulations were undertaken using the AES algorithm, they ran from
between one and 16 rounds, the total number of elements in the cipher block. This
was so that as well as the common 10, 12 and 14 rounds that are usually applied,
further congurations could be applied and analysed.
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6.3.3 GNMNT Implementation
The conguration for the GNMNT simulations was selected as p = 17 and N = 8,
which provided a block size of 136 bits that was as close as possible to the 128-bit
block size of AES. The same vector that was derived for the AES was used but each
element contained two elements from AES that were concatenated. Assessments
using the GNMNT implementation were initially accomplished using the relevant
straightforward transforms with no further operations applied. These simulations
ran from one to a maximum of eight rounds, the number of elements in the
GNMNT cipher block. In the second set of simulations, the elements were rotated
one place in between each round during the forward encryption phase. During
the inverse decryption phase, the elements were rotated in the opposite direction
in between each round. This rationale for doing this will be explained further in
Section 6.5 where its relevance can be better appreciated.
6.4 Assessing the Default Conguration
The results from each simulation are shown both graphically and statistically.
Whilst it is more common to disseminate such results statistically, the graphical
representation provides signicantly more information that otherwise would be
missing in the statistics. The metrics obtained within the statistics include the
minimum, maximum and the range of bits that were aected expressed as a
percentage, the standard deviation  that was observed to serve as a tolerance, also
as a percentage and the standard deviation  that was expressed as the aected
number of bits. The average number of bits aected was also the same which,
as expected, was consistent whether observing the diusion over the vector or
the bit position. The default results demonstrate each process with no additional
interference.
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Figure 6.2: AES Analysis
Table 6.4: AES Metrics - Vector / Bit Position
Rounds
m% m bits mn% n bits n%
Min Max Range   x   Range Max Min
1 0.7813 6.2500 5.4688 0.1252 0.1600 3.1447 0.0030 0.0022 0.1745 3.2239 3.0495
2 3.1250 23.4375 20.3125 0.3406 0.4360 12.5521 0.0110 0.0086 0.0219 12.5613 12.5394
3 25.7813 74.2188 48.4375 0.9190 1.1760 50.1963 0.0440 0.0345 0.0293 50.2137 50.1844
4 25.0000 73.4375 48.4375 0.9085 1.1630 49.9995 0.0440 0.0344 0.0216 50.0107 49.9891
5 25.0000 73.4375 48.4375 0.9085 1.1630 49.9996 0.0440 0.0344 0.0248 50.0143 49.9895
6 25.0000 75.0000 50.0000 0.9085 1.1630 50.0002 0.0440 0.0344 0.0237 50.0095 49.9858
7 25.0000 75.7813 50.7813 0.9085 1.1630 50.0005 0.0440 0.0344 0.0240 50.0120 49.9879
8 25.0000 73.4375 48.4375 0.9086 1.1630 50.0006 0.0440 0.0344 0.0244 50.0123 49.9880
9 25.7813 75.0000 49.2188 0.9086 1.1630 49.9998 0.0440 0.0344 0.0206 50.0107 49.9901
10 26.5625 74.2188 47.6563 0.9086 1.1630 50.0004 0.0440 0.0344 0.0254 50.0119 49.9865
11 25.7813 73.4375 47.6563 0.9085 1.1630 50.0002 0.0440 0.0344 0.0197 50.0101 49.9904
12 25.0000 76.5625 51.5625 0.9085 1.1630 49.9996 0.0440 0.0344 0.0242 50.0117 49.9875
13 25.0000 75.0000 50.0000 0.9086 1.1630 49.9999 0.0440 0.0344 0.0226 50.0119 49.9893
14 25.7813 75.0000 49.2188 0.9085 1.1630 49.9996 0.0440 0.0344 0.0274 50.0146 49.9871
15 26.5625 74.2188 47.6563 0.9085 1.1630 49.9999 0.0440 0.0344 0.0208 50.0133 49.9926
16 24.2188 75.0000 50.7813 0.9085 1.1630 50.0006 0.0440 0.0344 0.0196 50.0103 49.9907
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Figure 6.3: NMNT Analysis
Table 6.5: NMNT Metrics - Vector / Bit Position
Rounds
m% m bits mn% n bits n%
Min Max Range   x   Range Max Min
1 4.4118 38.9706 34.5588 0.2121 0.2880 10.2982 0.0170 0.0126 2.9737 11.7906 8.8169
2 0.7353 11.7647 11.0294 0.0628 0.0850 0.7353 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.7353 0.7353
3 4.4118 38.9706 34.5588 0.2121 0.2880 10.2982 0.0170 0.0126 2.9737 11.7906 8.8169
4 0.7353 11.7647 11.0294 0.0628 0.0850 0.7353 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.7353 0.7353
5 4.4118 38.9706 34.5588 0.2121 0.2880 10.2982 0.0170 0.0126 2.9737 11.7906 8.8169
6 0.7353 11.7647 11.0294 0.0628 0.0850 0.7353 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.7353 0.7353
7 4.4118 38.9706 34.5588 0.2121 0.2880 10.2982 0.0170 0.0126 2.9737 11.7906 8.8169
8 0.7353 11.7647 11.0294 0.0628 0.0850 0.7353 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.7353 0.7353
6.4.1 Assessing the AES
The results for the AES up to 16 rounds is shown graphically in Figures 6.2(a)
and 6.2(b), which depict the diusion rate that was obtained using the default
implementation. It can be observed that it took three rounds for AES to settle to
a desirable rate and four rounds to consistently reach the ideal rate. The statistics
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Figure 6.4: ONMNT Analysis
Table 6.6: ONMNT Metrics - Vector / Bit Position
Rounds
m% m bits mn% n bits n%
Min Max Range   x   Range Max Min
1 21.3235 54.4118 33.0882 0.6781 0.9220 30.9032 0.2230 0.1642 47.1186 52.9952 5.8766
2 31.6176 72.7941 41.1765 0.8713 1.1850 46.9111 0.1190 0.0877 35.7798 53.3721 17.5924
3 27.9412 72.7941 44.8529 0.7971 1.0840 47.2102 0.0480 0.0354 8.8330 50.6216 41.7886
4 32.3529 72.0588 39.7059 0.9238 1.2560 49.3714 0.0440 0.0327 4.9214 52.2194 47.2980
5 29.4118 75.0000 45.5882 0.8292 1.1280 49.0878 0.0510 0.0376 8.7430 53.7353 44.9923
6 29.4118 73.5294 44.1176 0.8571 1.1660 49.9016 0.0540 0.0395 9.2530 54.7078 45.4548
7 31.6176 75.0000 43.3824 0.8556 1.1640 49.5020 0.0480 0.0349 6.3323 53.2010 46.8686
8 32.3529 76.4706 44.1176 0.8882 1.2080 50.2657 0.0490 0.0360 7.8730 54.0375 46.1644
obtained for this simulation are shown in Table 6.4, which shows the total bits
aected within the vectors tested on the left-hand side of the table and the bit
positions aected within the vectors tested on the right-hand side. However, the
statistics suggest that the best scenario would be at least four rounds to ensure
consistency. It can be observed in Figure 6.2(b) that this would be the ideal
starting point, where the remaining rounds consistently yield results that are both
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Figure 6.5: O2NMNT Analysis
Table 6.7: O2NMNT Metrics - Vector / Bit Position
Rounds
m% m bits mn% n bits n%
Min Max Range   x   Range Max Min
1 36.0294 76.4706 40.4412 1.0047 1.3660 51.4521 0.0440 0.0323 0.0153 51.4593 51.4440
2 0.7353 11.7647 11.0294 0.0628 0.0850 0.7353 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.7353 0.7353
3 36.0294 76.4706 40.4412 1.0047 1.3660 51.4521 0.0440 0.0323 0.0153 51.4593 51.4440
4 0.7353 11.7647 11.0294 0.0628 0.0850 0.7353 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.7353 0.7353
5 36.0294 76.4706 40.4412 1.0047 1.3660 51.4521 0.0440 0.0323 0.0153 51.4593 51.4440
6 0.7353 11.7647 11.0294 0.0628 0.0850 0.7353 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.7353 0.7353
7 36.0294 76.4706 40.4412 1.0047 1.3660 51.4521 0.0440 0.0323 0.0153 51.4593 51.4440
8 0.7353 11.7647 11.0294 0.0628 0.0850 0.7353 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.7353 0.7353
close to one another and at the ideal 50% threshold.
6.4.2 Assessing the NMNT
Figures 6.3(a) and 6.3(b) show the results of the NMNT, which unfortunately
have yielded very unfavourable results; In fact ndings suggest that in some cases
there was virtually no change. The statistics in Table 6.5 show that every even
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round that has been processed has resulted in an extremely low performance. A
quick calculation on the mean to convert the value from a percentage to bit count
consistently produces a gure of 2.0425 bits on average that have been changed.
Observation of the NMNT processed over the odd rounds shows only a marginal
improvement, with a consistent average of 10.3
6.4.3 Assessing the ONMNT
An initial observation of Figures 6.4(a) and 6.4(b) shows that the ONMNT has
produced very promising results. Although Figure 6.4(a) shows that the rst round
is relatively weaker than the rest and Figure 6.4(b) shows that in fact the rst
two rounds are potentially the weakest. Removing the rst two rounds from these
results produces Figures 6.4(c) and 6.4(d) where the is a marked and signicant
improvement. Table 6.6 shows statistically that after overcoming the rst two
rounds the transform produces consistently desirable results as can be seen in the
range variation across the bit positions. While it is not as good as the AES
algorithm, it is a signicant baseline from which to develop.
6.4.4 Assessing the O2NMNT
On rst impressions, the results that are provided by the O2NMNT transform
appear to be ambiguous. While there is a signicant improvement in the diusion of
both the vector total bits and over the bit positions that reach the ideal threshold,
the result is similar to the NMNT where the odd rounds are similar to each other.
Similarly, the even rounds are also similar to each other and, like the NMNT,
exhibit extremely undesirable results. This is conrmed statistically, where all the
odd and even rounds yield identical results. Regardless of the negative aspects
however, we can see both statistically in Table 6.6 and graphically in Figures 6.5(c)
and 6.5(d) that from the very rst round, not only has the objective almost been
achieved, but in some areas it yields results that exceed the AES in terms of the
amount of change at peak, the dierence in bit range and the reective smaller bit
tolerance. Moreover, these positive results are reected across the bit positions,
indicating that the transform produces a strong diusion factor in respect to the
total number of bits aected and shows a consistent metric across all bit positions.
Aside from the initial weakness, the O2NMNT shows very desirable characteristics
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in its very rst round.
6.5 Assessing the Modied Conguration
This section addresses the congurations that were rst introduced in the
methodology and builds upon the default results. The AES shows, from four
rounds and beyond, an unfaltering convergence to the desirable characteristics to
conrm its resilience and integrity in the measurement of this metric. However,
while the ShiftRows and MixColumns functions are very linear in construction,
it would make an interesting study to ascertain the amount of inuence that the
SubBytes function has with respect to diusion. This is particularly interesting
as Rijndaels S-Box, which is essentially what the SubBytes function is, can be
recongured in many dierent ways during use; a new irreducible polynomial
can be used as can a dierent ane transform. Addressing the result of the
GNMNT suggests that an additional operation should be introduced that will have
a minimal impact upon the transforms, yet oer enough inuence to address the
poor performance that was observed in successive rounds. The rst round of the
O2NMNT was particularly favourable, which suggests that the modication should
therefore be made as an additional process after the rst round. As introduced in
the methodology, this additional process is a function that rotates the elements by
one place in between rounds of the forward transform and reverses the direction
during the inverse transform over successive rounds. Whilst there are myriad
ways that these elements can be rotated, shued, ipped or mirrored, it would be
appropriate for the change to have as little impact to the structure as possible so
as not to introduce undetectable weaknesses that would be missed through overly
complex processes.
6.5.1 Assessing the NMNT (Shued)
The results shown in the newly modied NMNT are marginally better at best.
While the original default transform alternated the results according to whether
or not the current round was an even or odd iteration, the modied version now
repeats every converging round. For example it can be observed in Table 6.8 that
the rst round is almost identical to the seventh round, the second round is almost
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Figure 6.6: NMNT Analysis (Shued)
Table 6.8: NMNT Metrics - Vector / Bit Position (Shued)
Rounds
m% m bits mn% n bits n%
Min Max Range   x   Range Max Min
1 4.4118 38.9706 34.5588 0.2121 0.2880 10.2982 0.0170 0.0126 2.9737 11.7906 8.8169
2 0.7353 13.9706 13.2353 0.0567 0.0770 1.8382 0.0110 0.0082 2.2089 2.9442 0.7353
3 2.9412 32.3529 29.4118 0.1627 0.2210 7.3698 0.0160 0.0118 3.0593 8.9365 5.8772
4 1.4706 13.9706 12.5000 0.0956 0.1300 2.9411 0.0030 0.0018 0.0069 2.9442 2.9373
5 2.9412 33.8235 30.8824 0.1627 0.2210 7.3696 0.0160 0.0118 3.0676 8.9425 5.8750
6 0.7353 13.9706 13.2353 0.0567 0.0770 1.8383 0.0110 0.0082 2.2086 2.9438 0.7353
7 4.4118 38.9706 34.5588 0.2121 0.2880 10.2981 0.0170 0.0126 2.9842 11.7976 8.8134
8 0.7353 11.7647 11.0294 0.0628 0.0850 0.7353 0.0010 0.0005 0.0000 0.7353 0.7353
identical to the sixth round, the third with the fth and the fourth and eight rounds
show certain attributes that are either multiples of two or four in some cases.
6.5.2 Assessing the ONMNT (Shued)
Modifying the ONMNT does not appear to have brought any noticeable benets. It
doesnt appear to have brought any noticeable degradation either as the transform
still demonstrates that a minimum of three rounds are required before the transform
starts producing optimal results. In this respect, adding the shue function has
had an overall neutral eect.
6.5.3 Assessing the O2NMNT (Shued)
The O2NMNT has probably shown the greatest benets of applying such a simple
routine. Figure 6.8(a) clearly shows the benets that have been gained, where the
characteristic that was rst observed with the NMNT has now been eradicated.
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Figure 6.7: ONMNT Analysis (Shued)
Table 6.9: ONMNT Metrics - Vector / Bit Position (Shued)
Rounds
m% m bits mn% n bits n%
Min Max Range   x   Range Max Min
1 21.3235 54.4118 33.0882 0.6781 0.9220 30.9032 0.2230 0.1642 47.1186 52.9952 5.8766
2 30.8824 72.0588 41.1765 0.8599 1.1690 47.5942 0.1210 0.0888 35.4079 52.9872 17.5793
3 32.3529 73.5294 41.1765 0.9342 1.2710 49.6727 0.0450 0.0330 4.4809 52.0231 47.5422
4 31.6176 75.0000 43.3824 0.8695 1.1830 50.1399 0.0510 0.0373 8.7159 55.0933 46.3773
5 30.8824 72.7941 41.9118 0.8649 1.1760 49.3147 0.0460 0.0341 6.1181 52.2781 46.1601
6 29.4118 73.5294 44.1176 0.8182 1.1130 49.7799 0.0470 0.0344 6.1096 53.3335 47.2238
7 32.3529 74.2647 41.9118 0.8741 1.1890 49.9703 0.0480 0.0350 6.5114 52.9310 46.4196
8 29.4118 73.5294 44.1176 0.8664 1.1780 49.9853 0.0490 0.0357 8.8204 54.6907 45.8702
However, there is still room for improvement with respect to diusion across the bit
positions that are shown by their fairly heavy uctuations as in Figure 6.8(b). The
statistics in Table 6.10 conrm that the rst round still oers the best performance
of the GNMNT with noticeable improvement over the remaining seven rounds.
6.5.4 Exhaustive Analysis of the GNMNT
This section covers the scenario where every bit in a 40-bit space GNMNT
conguration using p = 5 and N = 8 is permutated and manipulated as shown
previously in (6.1)-(6.13). The vector space that this conguration spans
(2p   1)N =  25   18
= 852; 891; 037; 441 permutations:
(6.14)
In order to undertake an exhaustive analysis, we must also take pN = 40 bits into
consideration as well as the three forward #G and three inverse #G 1 operations,
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Figure 6.8: O2NMNT Analysis (Shued)
Table 6.10: O2NMNT Metrics - Vector / Bit Position (Shued)
Rounds
m% m bits mn% n bits n%
Min Max Range   x   Range Max Min
1 36.0294 76.4706 40.4412 1.0047 1.3660 51.4521 0.0440 0.0323 0.0153 51.4593 51.4440
2 36.7647 75.0000 38.2353 1.0448 1.4210 53.0417 0.0470 0.0344 3.0756 54.4265 51.3509
3 31.6176 75.0000 43.3824 0.9280 1.2620 51.7577 0.0500 0.0367 7.6145 54.1491 46.5346
4 33.0882 73.5294 40.4412 0.9400 1.2780 51.6110 0.0490 0.0357 6.0566 53.4523 47.3958
5 30.8824 73.5294 42.6471 0.8507 1.1570 50.2736 0.0510 0.0374 8.5247 54.2704 45.7457
6 33.8235 73.5294 39.7059 0.9242 1.2570 51.1050 0.0480 0.0350 6.1917 55.8871 49.6954
7 33.0882 74.2647 41.1765 0.9354 1.2720 49.8996 0.0440 0.0326 3.6158 51.3236 47.7077
8 32.3529 74.2647 41.9118 0.8571 1.1660 49.6516 0.0490 0.0360 7.1228 54.0376 46.9148
resulting in
#G
n
pN
h
(2p   1)N
io
+#G 1
n
pN
h
(2p   1)N
io
= 204; 693; 848; 985; 840 operations:
(6.15)
However, we can mitigate almost half of these operations by reusing the forward
part of the algorithm so that we then have
#G
h
(2p   1)N
o
+#G 1
n
pN
h
(2p   1)N
io
= 104; 905; 597; 605; 243 operations: (6.16)
Unfortunately, developing a test application in C running on a single core of a
fairly recent 3 GHz CPU [145] yields a peak processing performance of 272,586,000
vectors / second. While this appears to be a signicant processing metric, when
put into context with the amount of work to be completed, it then means that
the analysis will be completed in approximately 40,343 hours or slightly less than
4.61 years. The performance of this particular CPU is rated at 22.17 GFLOPs and
consumes 65 Watts [146]. Over the projected time period, this CPU would likely
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Figure 6.9: GNMNT Exhuastive Analysis: p = 5; N = 8
Table 6.11: GNMNT Exhuastive Analysis: p = 5; N = 8
G
m% m bits mn% n bits n%
Min Max Range   x   Range Max Min
NMNT 15.0000 97.5000 82.5000 1.2298 0.4920 33.8703 0.0720 0.1792 9.6986 38.7218 29.0232
ONMNT 27.5000 85.0000 57.5000 2.0142 0.8060 43.5483 0.1740 0.4358 38.7181 58.0729 19.3548
O2NMNT 35.0000 97.5000 62.5000 2.6331 1.0530 56.1284 0.0880 0.2191 0.0121 56.1350 56.1229
consume approximately 2.62 MWh of power to complete the simulation. Using the
relatively new architecture of GPGPU, we can substantially reduce the processing
time. As graphic cards are developed using parallel techniques inherently, a large
amount of research and development has resulted in this new type of processing
using consumer grade equipment. For this application, an AMD HD7970 graphics
card was used containing 2,048 streams (eective cores); it runs at a clock speed of
1 GHz and is capable of a peak single precision throughput of 4,300 GFLOPs [147],
consuming 218 Watts at full load [148]. From an initial viewpoint and taking into
consideration of the additional processing resources and clock speed, we should
expect to see an increase in performance by a factor of 682 calculated by
Increase Factor =
coresGPU  ClockGPU
coresCPU  ClockCPU ; (6.17)
which should reduce the expected completion time to approximately 59 hours and
6 minutes.
Containing commands such as the fused-multiply-add that can simultaneously
perform a 24-bit multiply and a 32-bit addition using four-element vector variables
in a single clock cycle, the actual time that the HD7970 took to complete the
simulation was a little over 52 hours and 19 minutes. This completion time shows
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Table 6.12: Multiple Conguration Analysis of the GNMNT
N
8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
p
5 1, 2, 3 1, 2 1 - - - - - - - -
7 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2 1 - - - - - -
13 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2 1
17 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3
19 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3
31 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 3
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Figure 6.10: GNMNT Vector Analysis with Multiple Congurations
an actual speed increase by a factor of 771. During the course of the simulation
it was anticipated that the GPU had a power consumption of approximately 11.41
kWh, which is 0.49% of the power that the CPU would have required. This
could possibly be further improved upon as the implementation was designed to
process the metrics using atomic operations that naturally introduce bottlenecks
in the processing when memory accesses run into contention. The design of the
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(d) GNMNT - NMNT, ONMNT, O2NMNT
Figure 6.11: GNMNT Bit Position Analysis with Multiple Congurations
implementation could be rearranged so that the program minimised the number of
atomic operations. However, this would certainly imply the use of slower memory
in order to cope with the volume of data that would be presented in addition to
the complex data consolidation requirements. However, with the myriad dierent
ways to approach a problem then obviously more time could be spent searching
for superior solutions than to disseminate the actual results already obtained. The
results of this simulation are depicted in Figures 6.9(a) and 6.9(b). Looking closer
at the statistics that have been produced in Table 6.11, it is interesting to note that
this conguration has produced notably dierent results: the NMNT has increased
in performance to almost 34%, the ONMNT has dropped in performance to 43:5%
and the O2NMNT has increased to a little over 56%. In fact, there is a very simple
explanation for this profound shift in performance, which is that the conguration
has maximised the transform length in retrospect to the selected Mersenne prime
for which the transform has been congured. As such, there is a stronger pull for
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all transforms to converge to the ideal 50% threshold, although simulating every
possible vector permutation doesnt necessarily indicate this. However, this eect
can be shown by dening similar vectors across dierent transform parameters.
Using values for p and N that dene a more manageable vector range then a more
accurate performance of the GNMNT can be measured. For the nal conguration,
a multiple set of congurations is dened and shown in Table 6.12, which refers
to the following transforms: 1 - NMNT, 2 - ONMNT and 3 - O2NMNT. Each
simulation is executed four times using various dierent vector values that provide
a wide range of values across the entire vector. The results that are obtained
are then combined to produce an average set of results. Using these results,
various plots are produced as shown in Figure group 6.10 that depicts the diusion
eect across the vectors and 6.11 that depicts the diusion eect down the bit
positions. The plots show the mean value that was observed and the application
of the standard deviation to show the upper and lower boundaries. It can be
seen in these plots, particularly with values of p = 13 and greater, that as the
length N approaches the maximum length according to p then typically the ideal
characteristics are obtained. This would appear to collaborate the results that
were depicted in Figures 3.10-3.12, 5.21-5.23 and 5.24-5.26 for the 1D, RC and 2D
methods respectively, where it was observed that the longer the transform length
the better the transform appeared to perform.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced methodologies to apply existing techniques to the
GNMNT, which have enabled such a diverse and thorough examination of these
transforms and where they have also been compared against the industry standard.
The AES has repeatedly shown that it has extremely robust characteristics with
respect to diusion, where it manages to obtain peak performance after only four
rounds. The transform from the GNMNT that characteristically better matched
to AES was the O2NMNT, which was able do so in only one round. However, a
number of potential weaknesses were exposed within the GNMNT, including the
O2NMNT that show that it is not a transform that can be used solely for encryption
purposes. Whilst it is able to perform to the ideal specications, it is not able to do
so consistently without any further intervention. However, the addition of a simple
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function did make a dierence to the O2NMNT in such a way that coupled with a
round key generator, it could be possible to derive a fairly crude yet fairly robust
encryption system without too much eort. An exhaustive analysis was undertaken
on the GNMNT using a comparatively conservative conguration. Whilst this
conguration was certainly not enough to withstand the rigor of resources that
are currently available, the availability of a new type of computing was able to
provide an insight into the performance of the GNMNT over all possible vector
permutations that were previously out of reach. Moreover, while the conguration
used was dierent to the simulations that were run against the AES, the results
brought additional insight that suggested the value of further investigation into a
broader conguration range. The nal simulation set encompassed a conguration
range that spanned common usable ranges and beyond, where it was shown that
there are signicant advantages to congure p so that the longest value of N can
be used. Finally, this study has shown that while there may initially be negative
results using particular transforms and congurations, they should not be dismissed
without exploring the potential to change to more suitable congurations and
applying additional functionality.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
It can be seen that the rate of progress with respect to both the development and
defeat of methodologies is perpetual and fuelled by theoretical and technological
advances. The development of security algorithms was presented in Chapter 2
where it was shown that provided with enough impetus, the amounts of resources
that organisations/hackers are prepared to invest to address/defeat security issues
could potentially be limitless. Technological advances will also mean that hardware
becomes very cheap very quickly and also more reusable.
Newly developed transforms have been implemented and applied as part of an
encryption algorithm, where both random keys and similar keys were used to see
how eective the raw algorithm was. Unwanted eects manifested from the NMNT
and ONMNT algorithms using similar keys that diered by a single bit and proofs
were provided to validate the implementation. Initial results suggested that there
was particular interest with the O2NMNT transform as it appeared to resist the
similar key attack very well.
The GNMNT has also been fully realised as fast algorithms for one-dimensional
applications. Complexity analysis has shown that there are substantial improvements
to be gained, especially in consideration of other architectures that possess emerging
instructions and techniques to merge operations into a single command and employ
parallelism through vector operations. However, depending on the size of the work
required, particularly the length when relating to fast algorithms for transforms,
it may prove more fortuitous to revert back to direct methods when considering
parallel techniques.
The development of separable algorithms for the row-column approach of the
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newly developed GNMNT has empowered this suite by not requiring fully developed
two-dimensional algorithms. Implementations were veried using the Sobel lter
on a number of images before conducting encryption assessments using RC and
2D techniques. Results appeared to lean towards caution upon application of the
similar key attack. However, it is well known that encryption systems employ many
rounds and techniques and in particular, non-linear operations.
The GNMNT algorithms were implemented using parallel techniques on a
consumer based graphics card. In doing so, simulations that were previously out of
reach in terms of years were accomplished in hours. The focus on security continues
to grow, especially with the development of new architectures and advances in
cryptanalysis.
The incorporation of GPGPU computing in this research facilitated the in-depth
analysis of the SAC, which has been performed and assessed alongside the algorithm
used in the AES. The O2NMNT was shown to yield comparable results to the AES
and suggests that there is potential scope to use it within an encryption system.
While the exhaustive analysis of the diusion aspects for the NMNT and in part
the ONMNT are perhaps not as good as expected, consideration must be taken
into account where these results were obtained without any confusion techniques.
Moreover, obtaining an initial assessment into how well the GNMNT performs
within RC and 2D applications, it is clear to see that such an encryption system
would benet from non-linear operations and shuing, as well as multiple rounds.
Future Work
The development and subsequent assessment of the GNMNT has demonstrated
that there is sucient scope to develop the algorithm further. Areas where this
could be feasible and advantageous are:
 further research into the GNMNT for development of new techniques
and algorithms that are based upon one- or two-dimensions; examples of
using two-dimensional techniques have demonstrated the circular convolution
properties of these new transforms, making these transforms accessible to
other disciplines such as image-, video- and signal-processing to name but a
few
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 develop a method of encryption that can incorporate additional functionality;
it has previously been demonstrated the strengths of the GNMNT in
convolutions, therefore it may well be that an encryption system that would
envelop additional convolution-based functionality should also be feasible
 development of adaptable and congurable S-Boxes for encryption systems
based upon the GNMNT that are comparable to the S-Boxes used with
AES so as to i) add additional and recongurable security and ii) derive a
secure methodology that can addresses the potential weaknesses that were
discovered in Chapter 6
 research new techniques for medical applications to piece and process images
from dierent sources; the advent of mobile technology has fuelled the desire
to incorporate many dierent types of sensors that can measure all sorts of
attributes including pulse, heat and humidity and piece together an analysis
to how healthy the user may be - such techniques could well be applicable to
other sensors and disciplines that may have medical benets.
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Appendix A
Radix-2 GNMNT Algorithms
Listing A.1: Beta Generation
// Generate beta1 and beta2 for transforms
void betaGen(unsigned long long B1, unsigned long long B2,
unsigned long long C1, unsigned long long C2,
unsigned long long E1, unsigned long long E2,
unsigned int p, unsigned int log2N)
f
unsigned long long d, A1, A2;
long long a1, a2, t1, t2;
A1 = (unsigned long long)malloc(sizeof(unsigned long long)  fN);
A2 = (unsigned long long)malloc(sizeof(unsigned long long)  fN);
a1 = 2;
a2 = 3;
d = p   log2N   1;
if (d == 0)
d = 1;
for(loop = 0; loop < (p   2); loop++)
f
a1 = mods(a1  a1, p);
a2 = mods(a2  a2, p);
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g
for(loop = 0; loop < d; loop++)
f
t1 = mods((a1  a1)   (a2  a2), p);
t2 = mods(2  a1  a2, p);
a1 = t1;
a2 = t2;
g
A1[0] = 1;
A2[0] = 0;
for(loop = 0; loop < fNmm; loop++)
f
A1[loop + 1] = mods((a1  A1[loop])   (a2  A2[loop]), p);
A2[loop + 1] = mods((a1  A2[loop]) + (a2  A1[loop]), p);
g
for(loop = 0; loop < N; loop++)
f
B1[loop] = A1[loop << 2];
B2[loop] = A2[loop << 2];
C1[loop] = A1[loop << 1];
C2[loop] = A2[loop << 1];
E1[loop] = A1[(loop << 1) + 1];
E2[loop] = A2[(loop << 1) + 1];
g
free (A2);
free (A1);
g
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Listing A.2: Bit Reversal
// Perform Bit Reverse Order to a vector
// Derived from: http://graphics.stanford.edu/~seander/bithacks.html#ReverseParallel
void bitrevorder(unsigned long long vec, unsigned char log2N)
f
unsigned long long newpos, temp;
for(loop = 0; loop < log2N; loop ++)
f
newpos = loop;
newpos = ((newpos >> 1) & 0x55555555) j ((newpos & 0x55555555) << 1);
newpos = ((newpos >> 2) & 0x33333333) j ((newpos & 0x33333333) << 2);
newpos = ((newpos >> 4) & 0x0F0F0F0F) j ((newpos & 0x0F0F0F0F) << 4);
newpos = ((newpos >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF) j ((newpos & 0x00FF00FF) << 8);
newpos >>= (16   log2N);
if (loop < newpos)
f
temp = vec[loop];
vec[loop] = vec[newpos];
vec[newpos] = temp;
g
g
g
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Listing A.3: Radix-2 NMNT (DIT)
// Forward and Inverse Radix 2 NMNT (DIT)
void nmnt(unsigned long long oldvec, unsigned long long vec,
unsigned long long b1, unsigned long long b2,
unsigned long long inverse)
f
unsigned int i , j , k, n, io2 , ts , tmask, line1 , line2 , betaz, oset ;
unsigned int log2N, p;
long long t1, t2;
i = 2;
io2 = 1;
ts = N >> 1;
tmask = ts   1;
for(n = 0; n < N; n++)
vec[n] = oldvec[n];
bitrevorder(vec, log2N);
for(j = 1; j <= log2N; j++)
f
for(k = 0; k < (ts & tmask); k++)
f
line1 = (1 << (j   1)) + (k << j) + 1;
line2 = (1 << j) + (k << j)   1;
oset = (((N >> (ts >> 1))  (k + 1))   1);
oset = ((k + 1) << (log2N   (ts >> 1)))   1;
for(n = 0; n < ((1 << (j   2))); n++)
f
betaz = n << (ts >> 1);
t1 = mods((vec[line1]  b1[betaz]) + (vec[line2 ]  b2[betaz]) , p);
t2 = mods((vec[line1]  b2[betaz])   (vec[line2 ]  b1[betaz]) , p);
vec[ line1 ] = t1;
vec[ line2 ] = t2;
line1++;
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line2 = oset   n;
g
g
for(k = 0; k < N; k += i)
for(n = 0; n < io2; n++)
f
t1 = vec[k + n];
t2 = vec[k + n + io2];
vec[k + n] = mods(t1 + t2, p);
vec[k + n + io2] = mods(t1   t2, p);
g
io2 = i;
i <<= 1;
ts >>= 1;
g
for(j = 0; j < N; j++)
vec[ j ] = mods(vec[j]  inverse , p);
g
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Listing A.4: Radix-2 ONMNT (DIT)
// Forward Radix 2 ONMNT (DIT)
void onmnt(unsigned long long oldvec, unsigned long long vec,
unsigned long long b1, unsigned long long b2)
f
unsigned int i , j , k, n, io2 , ts , tmask, line1 , line2 , betaz, step;
unsigned int log2N, p;
long long t1, t2;
i = 2;
io2 = 1;
ts = N >> 1;
tmask = ts   1;
betaz = N >> 1;
line1 = 0;
line2 = 1;
for(n = 0; n < N; n++)
vec[n] = oldvec[n];
bitrevorder(vec, log2N);
for(j = 0; j < log2N; j++)
f
for(k = j; k < 1; k++)
for(n = 1; n < N; n += 2)
vec[n] = mods(vec[n]  b2[betaz], p);
for(k = 0; k < (ts & tmask); k++)
f
line1 = (1 << j) + (k << (j + 1));
line2 = line1 + (1 << j)   1;
step = N >> j;
betaz = step >> 1;
for(n = 0; n < (unsigned int)(1 << (j   1)); n++)
f
t1 = mods((vec[line1]  b1[betaz]) + (vec[line2 ]  b2[betaz]) , p);
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t2 = mods((vec[line1]  b2[betaz])   (vec[line2 ]  b1[betaz]) , p);
vec[ line1++] = t1;
vec[ line2  ] = t2;
betaz += step;
g
g
for(k = 0; k < N; k += i)
for(n = 0; n < io2; n++)
f
t1 = vec[k + n];
t2 = vec[k + n + io2];
vec[k + n] = mods(t1 + t2, p);
vec[k + n + io2] = mods(t1   t2, p);
g
io2 = i;
i <<= 1;
ts >>= 1;
g
g
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Listing A.5: Radix-2 ONMNT (DIF)
// Inverse Radix 2 ONMNT (DIF)
void ionmnt(unsigned long long oldvec, unsigned long long vec,
unsigned long long b1, unsigned long long b2)
f
unsigned int i , j , k, n, io2 , ts , tmask, line1 , line2 , betaz, step;
unsigned int log2N, p;
long long t1, t2;
i = N;
io2 = i >> 1;
ts = 1;
tmask = (N >> 1)   1;
line1 = 0;
line2 = 1;
for(n = 0; n < N; n++)
vec[n] = oldvec[n];
for(j = log2N; j > 0; j  )
f
for(k = 0; k < N; k += i)
for(n = 0; n < io2; n++)
f
t1 = vec[k + n];
t2 = vec[k + n + io2];
vec[k + n] = mods(t1 + t2, p);
vec[k + n + io2] = mods(t1   t2, p);
g
for(k = 0; k < (ts & tmask); k++)
f
line1 = (1 << (j   1)) + (k << j);
line2 = line1 + (1 << (j   1))   1;
step = N >> (j   1);
betaz = step >> 1;
for(n = 0; n < (unsigned int)(1 << (j   2)); n++)
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f
t1 = mods((vec[line1]  b1[betaz]) + (vec[line2 ]  b2[betaz]) , p);
t2 = mods((vec[line1]  b2[betaz])   (vec[line2 ]  b1[betaz]) , p);
vec[ line1++] = t1;
vec[ line2  ] = t2;
betaz += step;
g
g
for(k = j; k < 2; k++)
f
betaz = N >> 1;
for(n = 1; n < N; n += 2)
vec[n] = mods(vec[n]  b2[betaz], p);
g
i = io2;
io2 >>= 1;
ts <<= 1;
g
for(j = 0; j < N; j++)
vec[ j ] = mods(vec[j]  sn, p);
bitrevorder(vec, log2N);
g
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Listing A.6: Radix-2 O2NMNT (DIT)
// Forward and Inverse Radix 2 O2NMNT (DIT)
void o2nmnt(unsigned long long oldvec, unsigned long long vec,
unsigned long long b1, unsigned long long b2,
unsigned long long e1, unsigned long long e2,
unsigned long long inverse)
f
unsigned int i , j , k, n, io2 , ts , tmask, line1 , line2 , betaz, step;
unsigned int log2N, p;
long long t1, t2;
i = 2;
io2 = 1;
ts = N >> 1;
tmask = ts   1;
betaz = N >> 1;
line1 = 0;
line2 = 1;
for(n = 0; n < N; n++)
vec[n] = oldvec[n];
bitrevorder(vec, log2N);
for(j = 1; j <= log2N; j++)
f
for(k = j; k < 2; k++)
for(n = 1; n < N; n += 2)
f
vec[n] = mods(vec[n]  b2[betaz], p);
g
for(k = 0; k < (ts & tmask); k++)
f
line1 = (1 << (j   1)) + (k << j);
line2 = line1 + (1 << (j   1))   1;
step = N >> (j   1);
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betaz = step >> 1;
for(n = 0; n < ((1 << (j   2))); n++)
f
t1 = mods((vec[line1]  b1[betaz]) + (vec[line2 ]  b2[betaz]) , p);
t2 = mods((vec[line1]  b2[betaz])   (vec[line2 ]  b1[betaz]) , p);
vec[ line1 ] = t1;
vec[ line2 ] = t2;
line1++;
line2  ;
betaz += step;
g
g
for(k = 0; k < N; k += i)
for(n = 0; n < io2; n++)
f
t1 = vec[k + n];
t2 = vec[k + n + io2];
vec[k + n] = mods(t1 + t2, p);
vec[k + n + io2] = mods(t1   t2, p);
g
io2 = i;
i <<= 1;
ts >>= 1;
g
line1 = 0;
line2 = N   1;
for(n = 0; n < (N >> 1); n++)
f
t1 = mods((vec[line1]  e1[ line1 ]) + (vec[line2 ]  e2[ line1 ]) , p);
t2 = mods((vec[line2]  e1[ line2 ]) + (vec[line1 ]  e2[ line2 ]) , p);
vec[ line1 ] = t1;
vec[ line2 ] = t2;
line1++;
line2  ;
g
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for(j = 0; j < N; j++)
vec[ j ] = mods(vec[j]  inverse , p);
g
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Appendix B
Parallel GNMNT Algorithms
Listing B.1: OpenCL GPGPU Code for Exhaustive GNMNT Assessment
#pragma OPENCL EXTENSION cl khr local int32 base atomics : enable
#dene LOCK(a) atom cmpxchg(a, 0, 1)
#dene UNLOCK(a) atom xchg(a, 0)
#dene DATA SIZE 144
#dene STORE DATA SIZE  6
#dene MP 31
#dene BITS 5
#dene SCALE 4
#dene b18x50 1
#dene b18x51 27
#dene b18x52 0
#dene b18x53 4
#dene b28x50 0
#dene b28x51 4
#dene b28x52 30
#dene b28x53 4
#dene b1O8x50 1
#dene b1O8x51 18
#dene b1O8x52 27
#dene b1O8x53 24
193
B. PARALLEL GNMNT ALGORITHMS
#dene b2O8x50 0
#dene b2O8x51 7
#dene b2O8x52 4
#dene b2O8x53 13
#dene b1OS8x50 5
#dene b1OS8x51 20
#dene b1OS8x52 2
#dene b1OS8x53 21
#dene b2OS8x50 10
#dene b2OS8x51 29
#dene b2OS8x52 11
#dene b2OS8x53 26
uint mod1(uint input)
f
private uint output;
output = input & MP;
output = (output != MP) ? output : 0;
output += ((input >> BITS) & MP);
return((output + ((output < MP) ? 0: 1)) & MP);
g
uint2 mod2(uint2 input)
f
private uint2 output;
output = input & MP;
output = (output != MP) ? output : 0;
output += ((input >> BITS) & MP);
return ((output + ((output < MP) ? (uint)0 : (uint)1)) & MP);
g
uint3 mod3(uint3 input)
f
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return (uint3)(mod2(input.s01), mod1(input.s2));
g
uint4 mod4(uint4 input)
f
return (uint4)(mod2(input.s01), mod2(input.s23));
g
uint8 mod8(uint8 input)
f
return (uint8)(mod2(input.s01), mod2(input.s23), mod2(input.s45), mod2(input.s67));
g
uint8 nmnt(uint8 stage)
f
private uint4 temp;
private uint2 temp2;
stage = stage.s04261537;
// Stage 1
temp = stage.s1357;
stage.s1357 = mod4(((uint4)stage.s0246 + (uint4)MP   (uint4)temp));
stage.s0246 = mod4(((uint4)stage.s0246 + (uint4)temp));
// Stage 2a
temp2 = mod2(mul24((uint2)stage.s37, (uint2)(MP   b18x52, MP   b18x52)));
stage.s37 = mod2(mad24((uint2)stage.s37, (uint2)(b28x52), (uint2)temp2));
// Stage 2b
temp = (uint4)stage.s2367;
stage.s2367 = mod4(((uint4)stage.s0145 + (uint4)MP   (uint4)temp));
stage.s0145 = mod4(((uint4)stage.s0145 + (uint4)temp));
// Stage 3a
stage.s567 = mod3(mad24((uint3)stage.s765, (uint3)(b28x51, b28x52, b28x53), n
mod3(mul24((uint3)stage.s567, n
(uint3)(b18x51, MP   b18x52, b18x53)))));
// Stage 3b
temp = (uint4)stage.s4567;
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stage.s4567 = mod4(((uint4)stage.s0123 + (uint4)MP   (uint4)temp));
stage.s0123 = mod4(((uint4)stage.s0123 + (uint4)temp));
return stage;
g
uint8 inmnt(uint8 stage)
f
stage = nmnt(stage);
stage = mod8((stage  (uint8)(SCALE)));
return stage;
g
uint8 onmnt(uint8 stage)
f
private uint4 temp;
// ONMNT (DIT)
// Bit Reverse
stage = stage.s04261537;
// Stage 1a
stage.s1357 = mod4(mul24(stage.s1357, (uint4)(30)));
// Stage 1b
temp = stage.s1357;
stage.s1357 = mod4((stage.s0246   temp + MP));
stage.s0246 = mod4((stage.s0246 + temp));
// Stage 2a
temp = mod4(mul24(stage.s2367, (uint4)(b1O8x52, MP   b1O8x52, n
b1O8x52, MP   b1O8x52)));
stage.s2367 = mod4(mad24( stage.s3276, (uint4)(b2O8x52), temp));
// Stage 2b
temp = stage.s2367;
stage.s2367 = mod4((stage.s0145   temp + MP));
stage.s0145 = mod4((stage.s0145 + temp));
// Stage 3a
temp = mod4(mul24(stage.s4567, (uint4)(b1O8x51, b1O8x53, MP   b1O8x53, n
MP   b1O8x51)));
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stage.s4567 = mod4(mad24(stage.s7654, n
(uint4)(b2O8x51, b2O8x53, b2O8x53, b2O8x51), temp));
// Stage 3b
temp = stage.s4567;
stage.s4567 = mod4((stage.s0123   temp + MP));
stage.s0123 = mod4((stage.s0123 + temp));
return stage;
g
uint8 ionmnt(uint8 stage)
f
private uint4 temp;
// iONMNT (DIF)
// Stage 3b
temp = stage.s4567;
stage.s4567 = mod4((stage.s0123   temp + MP));
stage.s0123 = mod4((stage.s0123 + temp));
// Stage 3a
temp = mod4(mul24(stage.s4567, (uint4)(b1O8x51, b1O8x53, n
MP   b1O8x53, MP   b1O8x51)));
stage.s4567 = mod4(mad24(stage.s7654, n
(uint4)(b2O8x51, b2O8x53, b2O8x53, b2O8x51), temp));
// Stage 2b
temp = stage.s2367;
stage.s2367 = mod4((stage.s0145   temp + MP));
stage.s0145 = mod4((stage.s0145 + temp));
// Stage 2a
temp = mod4(mul24(stage.s2367, (uint4)(b1O8x52, MP   b1O8x52, n
b1O8x52, MP   b1O8x52)));
stage.s2367 = mod4(mad24(stage.s3276, (uint4)(b2O8x52), temp));
// Stage 1b
temp = stage.s1357;
stage.s1357 = mod4((stage.s0246   temp + MP));
stage.s0246 = mod4((stage.s0246 + temp));
// Stage 1a
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stage.s1357 = mod4(mul24(stage.s1357, (uint4)(30)));
// Bit Reverse
stage = stage.s04261537;
// Scale
stage = mod8((stage  (uint8)(SCALE)));
return stage;
g
uint8 osnmnt(uint8 stage)
f
private uint4 temp, tempa, tempb;
// OSNMNT
// Bit Reverse
stage = stage.s04261537;
// Stage 1a
stage.s1357 = mod4(mul24(stage.s1357, (uint4)(30)));
// Stage 1b
temp = stage.s1357;
stage.s1357 = mod4((stage.s0246   temp + MP));
stage.s0246 = mod4((stage.s0246 + temp));
// Stage 2a
temp = mod4(mul24(stage.s2367, (uint4)(b1O8x52, MP   b1O8x52, n
b1O8x52, MP   b1O8x52)));
stage.s2367 = mod4(mad24(stage.s3276, (uint4)(b2O8x52), temp));
// Stage 2b
temp = stage.s2367;
stage.s2367 = mod4((stage.s0145   temp + MP));
stage.s0145 = mod4((stage.s0145 + temp));
// Stage 3a
temp = mod4(mul24(stage.s4567, (uint4)(b1O8x51, b1O8x53, n
MP   b1O8x53, MP   b1O8x51)));
stage.s4567 = mod4(mad24(stage.s7654, (uint4)(b2O8x51, b2O8x53, n
b2O8x53, b2O8x51), temp));
// Stage 3b
temp = stage.s4567;
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stage.s4567 = mod4((stage.s0123   temp + MP));
stage.s0123 = mod4((stage.s0123 + temp));
// Convert ONMNT to OSNMNT
temp = stage.s7654;
tempa = mod4(mul24(stage.s0123, (uint4)(b1OS8x50, b1OS8x51, n
b1OS8x52, b1OS8x53)));
tempb = mod4(mul24(stage.s7654, (uint4)(MP   b1OS8x50, MP   b1OS8x51, n
MP   b1OS8x52, MP   b1OS8x53)));
stage.s7654 = mod4(mad24(stage.s0123, (uint4)(b2OS8x50, b2OS8x51, n
b2OS8x52, b2OS8x53), tempb));
stage.s0123 = mod4(mad24(temp, (uint4)(b2OS8x50, b2OS8x51, n
b2OS8x52, b2OS8x53), tempa));
return stage;
g
uint8 iosnmnt(uint8 stage)
f
stage = osnmnt(stage);
stage = mod8((stage  (uint8)(SCALE)));
return stage;
g
void latInc( local uint source, uint data)
f
if (data & 16 == 16)
atomic inc(source);
if (data & 8 == 8)
atomic inc(source + 1);
if (data & 4 == 4)
atomic inc(source + 2);
if (data & 2 == 2)
atomic inc(source + 3);
if (data & 1 == 1)
atomic inc(source + 4);
g
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void atomicStat( local uint source, uint8 data, uint8 diAbs, uint data2)
f
atomic add(source, data.s0);
atomic add(source + 1, data.s1);
atomic add(source + 2, data.s2);
atomic add(source + 3, data.s3);
atomic add(source + 4, data.s4);
atomic add(source + 5, data.s5);
atomic add(source + 6, data.s6);
atomic add(source + 7, data.s7);
atomic inc(source + 8 + data.s0);
atomic inc(source + 14 + data.s1);
atomic inc(source + 20 + data.s2);
atomic inc(source + 26 + data.s3);
atomic inc(source + 32 + data.s4);
atomic inc(source + 38 + data.s5);
atomic inc(source + 44 + data.s6);
atomic inc(source + 50 + data.s7);
atomic inc(source + 56 + data2);
latInc(source + 97, diAbs.s0) ;
latInc(source + 102, diAbs.s1) ;
latInc(source + 107, diAbs.s2) ;
latInc(source + 112, diAbs.s3) ;
latInc(source + 117, diAbs.s4) ;
latInc(source + 122, diAbs.s5) ;
latInc(source + 127, diAbs.s6) ;
latInc(source + 132, diAbs.s7) ;
g
kernel void gnmntAvN8p5( constant uint inVec,
global uint outBuer,
local uint dataStore,
local uint eVal,
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local uint bitVal)
f
private uint8 in , stage, domain, diAbs, di ;
private uint lid = get local id (0) ;
private uint gid = get group id(0);
private uint gbl = get global id(0) ;
private uint y;
private uint transform; // 0   NMNT, 1   ONMNT, 2   OSNMNT
private uint e0, e1;
private uchar ill ;
private uchar length;
private uchar doInv;
if ( lid == 0) // Setup Local Variables
f
for(y = 0; y < STORE; y++)
dataStore[y] = 0;
for(y = 0; y < 40; y++)
f
eVal[y] = y / 5;
bitVal[y] = 1 << (4   (y % 5));
g
g
if ((gid < 744) jj ( lid < 31))
f
barrier (CLK LOCAL MEM FENCE);
doInv = 0;
in = vload8(0, inVec);
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// Translate vector course
// range 0 to 961 or 10 bits worth
in .s2 = mod1(gbl);
gbl = (gbl   in.s2) / MP;
in .s3 = mod1(gbl);
gbl = (gbl   in.s3) / MP;
in .s4 = mod1(gbl);
e1 = 0;
while(e1 < 31)
f
// Translate vector medium
in .s1 = e1;
e0 = 0;
while(e0 < 31)
f
// Translate vector ne
in .s0 = e0;
transform = 3;
while(transform > 0)
f
transform  ;
stage = in;
switch((transform << 1) j doInv)
f
case 0:
// NMNT
stage = nmnt(stage);
break;
case 1:
// iNMNT
stage = inmnt(stage);
break;
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case 2:
// ONMNT (DIT)
stage = onmnt(stage);
break;
case 3:
// iONMNT (DIF)
stage = ionmnt(stage);
break;
case 4:
// OSNMNT
stage = osnmnt(stage);
break;
case 5:
// iOSNMNT
stage = iosnmnt(stage);
break;
default :
break;
g
domain = stage;
length = 40;
while(length > 0)
f
length  ;
stage = domain;
switch(eVal[length])
f
case 7:
stage.s0 ^= bitVal[length ];
ill = 1   (stage.s0 != MP);
break;
case 6:
stage.s1 ^= bitVal[length ];
ill = 1   (stage.s1 != MP);
break;
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case 5:
stage.s2 ^= bitVal[length ];
ill = 1   (stage.s2 != MP);
break;
case 4:
stage.s3 ^= bitVal[length ];
ill = 1   (stage.s3 != MP);
break;
case 3:
stage.s4 ^= bitVal[length ];
ill = 1   (stage.s4 != MP);
break;
case 2:
stage.s5 ^= bitVal[length ];
ill = 1   (stage.s5 != MP);
break;
case 1:
stage.s6 ^= bitVal[length ];
ill = 1   (stage.s6 != MP);
break;
case 0:
stage.s7 ^= bitVal[length ];
ill = 1   (stage.s7 != MP);
break;
default :
break;
g
switch((transform << 1) j doInv)
f
case 0:
// iNMNT
stage = inmnt(stage);
break;
case 1:
// NMNT
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stage = nmnt(stage);
break;
case 2:
// iONMNT (DIF)
stage = ionmnt(stage);
break;
case 3:
// ONMNT (DIT)
stage = onmnt(stage);
break;
case 4:
// iOSNMNT
stage = iosnmnt(stage);
break;
case 5:
// OSNMNT
stage = osnmnt(stage);
break;
default :
break;
g
diAbs = stage ^ in ;
di = popcount(diAbs);
atomicStat(&dataStore[(((transform << 1) j ill)  n
DATA SIZE)], di, diAbs, di .s0 + di .s1 + n
di .s2 + di .s3 + di .s4 + n
di .s5 + di .s6 + di .s7) ;
g
g
e0++;
g
e1++;
g
g
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barrier (CLK LOCAL MEM FENCE);
if ( lid == 0)
f
gid = STORE;
for(y = 0; y < STORE; y++)
outBuer[gid + y] = dataStore[y];
g
g
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